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<::■■ 


THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 

THE  VITAL  NECESSITY  OF  ITS 
CONTINUED  MAINTENANCE 


PUBLISHED  BY  THE     . 
KNIGHTS  OF  COLUMBUS  HISTORICAL  COMMISSION 


BY 
THOMAS  H.  MAHONY 

Assistant  District  Attorney 
Suffolk  District,  Commonwealth  of  Massachusetts 


WITH  A  FOREWORD  BY 
REAR-ADMIRAL  W.  S.  BENSON,  U.  S.  N. 


MEMBERS  OP  COMMISSION 

Edward  F.  McSweeney 
Chairman 

William  S.  Benson  Hannis  Taylor 

Henry  Jones  Ford  Charles  H.  McCarthy 

Maurice  Francis  Egan  George  Hermann  Derry 


1921 


3 


3} 


4  •  " 


«         ■        *       *    •   •  • 


7.\ 


PREFACE 

By  Rear-Admiral  W.  S.  Benson,  U.  S.  N. 

An  earnest  consideration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a 
sincere  appreciation  of  what  it  means  to  the  United  States 
is  more  imperative  now  than  ever  before. 

There  are  at  least  four  reasons  which  have  prompted 
the  Knights  of  Columbus  Historical  Commission  to  publish  a 
monograph  upon  the  "Monroe  Doctrine"  as  its  first  offering  to 
the  Amercian  public. 

First:  The  declaration  to  the  world  contained  in  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  that  the  United  States  would  not  permit  any 
non- American  nation  to  intervene  in  American  political  affairs, 
and  Washington's  policy  of  American  non-intervention  in 
non-American  affairs  have  been  the  keystone  of  our  foreign 
policy  since  this  country  has  had  a  foreign  policy.  These  com- 
plementary principles  which  have  controlled  our  relations  with 
foreign  powers  have  made  the  United  States  the  great  and 
powerful  nation  which  it  now  is.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  at 
all  times,  merits  the  most  important  thought  of  this  country. 

Second:  The  League  of  Nations  Covenant,  which  was  re- 
pudiated by  the  people  of  this  coimtry  in  the  national  election 
of  1921  has  been  adopted  by  the  allied  and  victorious  powers. 
That  covenant  provides  in  Article  XXI,  that 
\^  "Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  be  deemed 

ti  to  affect  the  validity  of  international  engage- 

ments, such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional 
J^  understandings  like  the   Monroe   Doctrine,   for 

\  securing  the  maintenance  of  peace." 

^  Some  of  the  American  nations  and  Canada,  are  members 

*^     of  the  League  of  Nations. 

^  Disputes  arising  between  such  American  nations  or  between 

5^     any  of  such  American  nations  and  any  non- American  nation, 
"^     under  the  terms  of  the  Covenant  are  within  the  jurisdiction  of 
^     the  League  of  Nations.    Just  how  far  the  League  of  Nations 
might  go  in  effectuating  any  League  decision  rendered  in  such 
^     a  dispute  is  a  question.     Recently  Bolivia  requested  the  League 
~^"     to  consider  a  revision  of  the  Bolivian-Chilean  treaty  of  1904 
"5^     covering  certain  territorial  boundaries  of  Bolivia  with  reference 
to  Tacna  and  Arica.      Chile  protested  that  any  such  action  by 
'^    the  League  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    The 
v^    League  took  no  definite  action,  and  after  considerable  objection 
Bolivia  withdrew  her  request.     Clearly,  if  the  League  attempted 
to  modify  the  1904  treaty  and  awarded  to  Bolivia  any  of  the 
territory  therein  set  forth  as  belonging  to  Chile,  it  would  con- 
stitute a  non-American  intervention  in  American  affairs  to  the 


426270 


^ 


detriment  politically  and  territorially  of  Chile  and  hence  an 
infringement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Such  questions  are  likely 
to  arise  again,  and  it  is  possible  that  no  such  appeal  as  Chile 
recently  made  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  may  then  be  made. 
The  United  States  therefore  is  most  vitally  interested  at  the 
present  in  the  assertion  and  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Third:  There  is  now  pending  before  the  Congress  of  the 
United  States  a  bill  to  exempt  American  coastwise  shipping  from 
the  payment  of  tolls  for  passage  through  the  Panama  Canal, 
Considerable  objection  is  made  to  any  such  exemption 
on  the  ground  that  it  woidd  be  a  violation  of  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty  of  1901.  The  question  of  tolls  is  but  an  incident 
in  the  operation  of  the  Canal,  but  the  question  of  an  inter- 
oceanic  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  have  been  inextricably  interwoven  in  the  past  and 
must  necessarily  be  so  interwoven  in  the  futtire. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  intended  as  a  self-protective 
measure  for  the  United  States.  The  Panama  Canal  to  a  very 
great  degree  was  also  so  intended.  Any  diminution  of  the 
control  of  the  United  States  over  the  Canal  not  only  endangers 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  but  also  endangers  the  future  safety, 
peace  and  prosperity  of  the  United  States. 

Fourth:  President  Harding  has  invited  the  great  Powers 
to  take  part  in  a  conference  in  Washington  to  discuss  Limitation 
of  Armaments  and  Far  Eastern  Questions.  The  Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  the  necessity  for  its  maintenance  will  undoubtedly, 
be  a  controlling  factor  in  determining  the  position  of  the 
United  States  with  reference  to  disarmament. 

The  Knights  of  Colimibus  Historical  Commission,  there- 
fore, deems  it  most  appropriate  to  present  this  discussion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  at  the  present  time.  The  author,  Mr. 
Thomas  H.  Mahony,  Assistant  District  Attorney  of  Boston, 
claims  no  originality  in  the  discovery  of  the  material  used  or 
treated.  He  presents  an  arrangement  of  the  materials  already 
at  hand  and  accessible  to  anybody,  which  sets  forth  and  empha- 
sizes the  American  aspect  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  is  that 
American  aspect  which  the  Knights  of  Columbus  Historical 
Commission  intends  to  offer  in  all  its  publications  dealing  with 
American  History,  to  stimulate  a  deep,  sincere,  and  nation-wide 
spirit  of  patriotism  to  the  end  that  the  United  States  may  con- 
tinue its  mission  of  holding  aloft  the  torch  of  freedom  for  all 
peoples.  W.  S.  BENSON. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


Summary 

Chapter  I. — The  Principle  Involved.  Page 

The  United  States  as  well  as  other  nations  possess  the  right 
of  self -protection  and  of  self-preservation 7 

Chapter  n. — Its  Early  Application. 

In  the  exercise  of  this  right,  President  Washington  inaugurated 
the  policy  of  isolation  from  European  political  affairs 12 

Chapter  m.— Our  Foreign  Policy  Prior  to  1823. 

The  complementary  policy  of  preventing  non-American  inter- 
vention in  American  political  affairs,  was  hinted  at  by  Wash- 
ington, and  actually  applied  by  President  Madison  in  the  matter 
of  West  Florida 17 

Chapter  IV. — The  Holy  Alliance  and  its  Menace  to  the  United  States 

through  the  Spanish-American  Colonies  and   the  Oregon 

Controversy  with  Russia. 

The  menace  to  popular  government  from  the  Holy  Alliance 

and  Russia's  claim  to  Oregon  presented  a  situation  in  1823 

which  called  for  a  definite  appUcation  of  this  second  principle.  23 

Chapter  V. — Great  Britain  and  Her  Desire  for  a  Joint  Declaration  with 
the  United  States. 
Great  Britain's  Ministry,  while  sympathizing  with  the  anti- 
republican  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance  nevertheless  feared 
French  political  ascendency  in  Europe  and  commerical  ascend- 
ency in  the  Spanish-American  colonies,  and  sought  a  joint 
declaration  with  the  United  States  opposing  intervention  by 
France  and  the  Holy  Alliance  in  the  affairs  of  the  rebellious 
Spanish-American  Colonies 33 

Chapter  VI.— Its  Refusal. 

The  United  States  Refused  to  Enter  into  any  such  joint  Declara- 
tion with  Great  Britain 39 

Chapter  Vn. — The  Message  to  Congress. 

The  United  States,  through  President  Monroe,  proclaimed  to 
the  world  the  determination  to  prevent  any  European  nation 
from  future  colonization  in,  or  extension  of  its  political  sys- 
tem to  the  Western  Hemisphere 45 

Chapter  Vm.— The  Doctrine  Tested. 

The  "Monroe  Doctrine"  has  been  tested  at  various  times  by 
France,  Spain,  Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Japan,  but  the 
United  States  has  resolutely  maintained  this  poHcy  to  the  present 
time 47 


Summary — Continued 

Chapter  IX. — Comments,  Criticisms  and  Fallacies.  Page 

Many    mistakes   and   misinterpretations   have   arisen   relative 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  such  as  the  following: 67 

A.  That  George  Canning,  the  British  statesman,  was  the 
author  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  that  the  British  fleet 
has  ever  supported  it. 

B.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  changed  or  extended 
beyond  its  original  scope. 

C.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  guaranty  given  by  the 
United  States  to  Spanish  America. 

D.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been  consistently 
applied  by  the  United  States. 

E.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  prohibition  against  the 
acquisition  of  new  territory  by  the  United  States. 

Chapter  X. — The  Future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  effect  must  resolve  itself 
into  one  of  the  following  policies: 85 

A.  Its  absolute  abandonment. 

B.  It  continued  assertion  and  maintenance  by  the  United 
States  acting  alone. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


CHAPTER  I  — THE  PRINCIPLE  INVOLVED 


The  United  States  as  well  as  other  nations  possess  the  right  of 
self-protection  and  of  self-preservation. 


For  the  last  three  or  four  years  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
been  most  prominent  in  the  discussion  of  world  politics.  The 
Peace  Conference  at  Versailles,  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant, 
and  more  recently  the  Limitation  of  Armaments  Conference 
have  all  shared  in  the  responsibility  for  directing  public  atten- 
tion to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  What  it  is,  how  it  came  into 
existence,  and  what  is  to  be  its  future  are  questions  of  great 
interest  to  all  students  of  international  affairs,  and  questions  of 
vital  importance  to  all  Americans. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  defined  or  described  in  many 
ways,  and  by  many  people.  Ex-President  Taft  described  it  in 
the  following  way: 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  in  spirit  and  effect  is  a  policy 
of  the  United  States  which  forbids  any  non-American 
nation,  by  external  aggression,  by  pvirchase  or  by  intrigue, 
to  acquire  the  territory  in  whole  or  in  part,  of  any  country 
or  nation  in  this  Western  Hemisphere. "^ 
It  has  also  been  defined  or  described  thus: 

"A  prohibition  of  the  United  States  of  European  inter- 
ference with  the  political  arrangements  of  the  New 
World.  "2 

"The  poHcy  by  which  the  United  States  opposes 
any  acts  that  it  considers  as  'oppressing'  or  'controlling 
the  destiny  of  the  Latin  American  states."* 

"It  is  a  declaration  of  the  United  States  that  cer- 
tain acts  would  be  injurious  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the 
United  States,  and  that  the  United  States  would  regard 
them  as  unfriendly.  The  declaration  does  not  say  what 
the  course  of  the  United  States  would  be  in  case  such 
acts  are  done.  That  is  left  to  be  determined  in  each 
particular  instance.  .  .  .  The  doctrine  rests  upon  the  right 
of  self-protection  and  that  right  is  recognized  by  inter- 
national law.  ...  It  does  not  assert  or  imply  or  involve 
any  right  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  impair  or 

^Taft  Papers  on  League  of  Nations,  p.  292. 
^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  3. 

*R.  D.  Armstrong,  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Modified  or  Aban- 
doned,— 10  American  Journal  International  Law,  p.  77. 

7 


control   the   independent   sovereignty   of   any   American 
State.  .  .  .The  scope  of  the  doctrine  is   strictly  limited. 
It  concerns  itself  only  with  the  occupation  of  territory 
in  the  New  World  to  the  subversion  or  exclusion  of  a  pre- 
existing American  Government. "^ 
These  definitions  and  descriptions  set  forth  the  unilateral 
character  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  its  enunication  and  main- 
tenance for  the  security  of  the  United  States,  only. 

On  the  other  hand,  Lord  Bryce,  former  British  Minister  at 
Washington  argues  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 

"was  originally  delivered  as  annotmcing  a  restriction  or 
limitation  which  America  proposed  to  place  on  her  own 
action.  She  would  not  interefere  in  the  wars  and  alliances 
of  the  Old  World  and  she  expected  that  in  rettun  the 
States  of  the  Old  World  would  not  interfere  in  the  affairs 
of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  "* 

As  will  be  pointed  out,  there  is  no  foundation  of  historical 
fact  which  justifies  any  such  conclusion  as  that  drawn  by  Lord 
Bryce.  On  the  contrary,  the  evidence  warrants  but  one  con- 
clusion as  to  this  question,  viz.,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
based  upon  the  right  of  this  country  to  self-protection,  that  it 
was  intended  solely  for  that  piirpose,  and  that  no  obligations  to 
any  other  power  were  assumed  in  its  pronouncement. 

Many  authors  contend  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not 
attained  the  status  of  international  law.  Among  such  critics 
may  be  mentioned  Ex-President  Taft,^  Elihu  Root,*  W.  F. 
Reddaway,^  and  H.  Bingham. « 

On  the  other  hand  President  Cleveland  in  his  special 
message  to  Congress  on  the  Venezuela  question,  stated  most 
emphatically  that  while 

"It  may  not  have  been  admitted  in  so  many  words  to  the 
Code  of  International  law,  ...  if  the  enforcement  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  something  we  may  justly  claim  it 
has  its  place  in  the  code  of  international  law  as  certainly 
and  as  securely  as  if  it  was  specifically  mentioned.  .  .  . 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  finds  its  recognition  in  those 
principles  of  international  law  which  are  based  upon 
the  theory  that  every  nation  shall  have  its  rights  protected 
and  its  just  claims  enforced.  ..."'' 

'E.  Root,  Addresses  on  International  Subjects,  pp.  109-117. 

^The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a  League  of  Nations, — The  Nation,  Dec. 
13,  1917. 

^Tajt  Papers  on  League  of  Nations,  p.  120. 

■•E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  111. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  103-113. 

«H.  Bingham,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  an  Obsolete  Shibboleth,  Atlantic 
Monthly,  June,  1913. 

'Special  Message  to  Congress,  Dec.  17, 1895— J.  D.^Richardson,  Mes- 
sages and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  IX,  655. — J.  B.  Moore,  Digest  of  Inter- 
national Law,  VI,  577,  578. 

8 


Richard  Olney,  President  Cleveland's  Secretary  of  State, 
with  reference  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  said  that, 

"The  nile  thus  defined  has  been  the  accepted  public 
law  of  this  country  ever  since  its  promulgation. "^ 

So  far  as  the  United  States  is  concerned  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is,  and  must  remain  a  principle  of  International  Law, 
if  there  is  any  International  Law,  and  in  any  event  must  be 
accepted  as  a  principle  controlling  international  relations. 
It  will  have  the  force  of  such  a  principle  until  such  time  as 
the  United  States  shall  be  unable  to  supply  the  force  necessary 
for  its  maintenance. 

Practically  all  students  of  the  political  history  of  the 
United  States  agree  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  based  upon 
the  right  of  national  self-protection,  which  right  is  recognized 
by  international  law.^  In  order  to  secure  a  proper  perspective 
for  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  therefore,  a  short  glance  at  this 
principle  of  self -protection  and  its  application  will  not  be  amiss. 
Every  sovereign  State  possesses  as  incidental  to  such 
sovereignty  the  right  of  self-defense  and  of  self-preservation." 
A  sovereignty  without  such  right  is  an  absurdity.  As  deeply 
rooted  as  is  the  desire  for  self-preservation  in  the  individual, 
just  so  deeply  rooted  is  the  same  desire,  but  raised  to  a  national 
degree,  in  the  State.  Just  as  the  individual's  right  of  self- 
preservation  is  recognized  in  national  law,  so  is  the  State's  right 
of  a  similar  nature  recognized  in  what  we  call  international  law. 
In  national  courts  of  law  the  right  of  self-defense  justifies 
an  individual  in  anticipating  attack. 

"One  is  not  obliged  to  wait  until  he  is  struck  by  an 
impending  blow;  for,  if  a  weapon  be  raised  in  order  to  shoot 
or  strike,  or  the  danger  of  other  personal  violence  be  immi- 
nent, the  party  is  such  imminent  danger  may  protect  him- 
self by  striking  the  first  blow  for  the  purpose  of  repelling  and 
preventing  the  attempted  injury."* 

The  same  right  of  States  to  anticipate  injurious  attack,  and 
to  go  beyond  their  jurisdictional  territory  in  exercising  such 
right  is  recognized  internationally.*    Of  this  there  are  many 

iQlney  to  Bayard,  July  20,  1895— Senate  Ex.  Documents,  31-54th 
Congress,  1st  Session,  p.  4. 

*E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  111. 
J.  W.  Foster,  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  p.  477. 
A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  75,  80. 
H.  Taylor,  International  Public  Law,  p.  405. 

'H.  Taylor,  International  Public  Law,  p.  405,  sec.  401;  C.  H.  Stock- 
ton, International  Law,  pp.  97-109;   Creasy,  International  Law,  p.  149. 

*Words  and  Phrases  Judicially  Used,    2nd    series,  IV.,  509;  State  v, 
Wilson,  (Delaware),  62  Atlantic  Reporter,  pp.  227,  231. 
*Oppenheim,  International  Law,  3d  ed.  I.,  214. 
Creasy,  International  Law,  p.  153. 
Vattel,  III.,  ch.  3,  sees.  42-49. 
,    R.  Phillimore,  Int.  Law,  I.,  216.  ' 

H.  Taylor,  International  Public  Law,  pp.  422,  426. 

9 


illustrations.  The  mobilization  of  forces  upon  a  State's  fron- 
tier by  a  neighboring  State  justifies  defensive  mobilization  and 
even  war  by  the  former  against  the  latter.  Again,  if  one 
nation  is  attempting,  directly  or  indirectly,  to  seize  or  occupy 
sites  of  great  military  strategical  value,  and  such  occupation 
is  considered  by  another  nation  as  threatening  the  existence  of 
the  latter,  it  might  properly  object  to  such  occupation,  and  go 
to  war  if  necessary  to  prevent  it.^  In  the  exercise  of  this  right 
Great  Britain  in  1911  objected  to  Germany's  occupation  of  a 
naval  station  on  the  Coast  of  Morocco.  So,  too,  Great|Britain 
in  the  past  objected  to  Russia's  occupation  of  Constantinople. 
In  fact,  the  whole  theory  of  the  Balance  of  Power  is  based  upon 
this  principle. 2 

It  must  be  noted  at  once,  however,  that  in  the  present  con- 
dition of  international  relations,  International  Law  as  enforce- 
able law,  like  national  law,  does  not  really  exist.  There  is  no 
underlying  sanction  for  it,'  such  as  there  is  for  aU  national 
law  in  the  supreme  authority  of  the  State,  arising  directly  from 
its  people.  There  is  no  international  legislature  to  enact 
international  laws,  no  international  executive  to  enforce  them, 
and  no  international  courts  to  administer  them  with  power  to 
enforce  their  decrees.  Strictly  speaking,  therefore,  in  the 
absence  of  such  sanction  there  is  no  such  thing  as  international 
law  at  the  present  time,  at  least  no  international  law  upon 
which  alone  a  state  might  safely  rely  for  its  protection  and 
preservation.*  The  force  underlying  what  we  know  as 
international  law  is  merely  the  public  opinion  of  the  world, 
the  comity  of  nations  and  nothing  more.'  Public  morality, 
however,  has  never  been  sufficient  to  control  the  actions  of  the 
populations  of  States,  and  is  not  ^sufficient  to^  control  the 
actions  of  States. 

In  the  past  the  nation  having  power  to  enforce  its  demands 
has  had  the  basis  or  results  of  such  demands  incorporated,  to 
some  extent,  into  what  we  call  International  Law.*  In  times 
of  national  stress,  however,  even  the  few  rules  or  maxims,  re- 
garded as  approaching  an  international  code,  have  been  dis- 
regarded with  impunity  by  nations  which  feared  no  disad- 
vantageous or  disproportionate  results  from  such  disregard. 
For  example.  Great  Britain  entirely  disregarded  our  rights  as 
neutrals  on  the  sea  in  the  French-English  wars  of  1793  and 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  111. 
^Creasy,  Int.  Law,  pp.  151,  279. 
H.  Taylor,  Int.  Pub.  Law,  pp.  425,  426. 
'A.  J.  Balfour,  The  British  Blockade  (1915),  p.  10. 
^Austin,  Lectures  on  Jurisprudence,  VI. 

*C.  H.  Stockton,  Int.  Law,  p.  1;  Pomeroy,  Int.  Law,  p.   14;  Oppen- 
heim,  Int.  Law,  3d  ed.,  pp.  1,  14,  15;   Creasy,  Int.  Law,  p.  1. 
'A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  81. 

10 


1803.*  In  the  World  War,  Germany  disregarded  such  rules  of 
war  as  referred  to  blockades,  to  bombing  of  unfortified  places, 
and  to  search  of  merchant  vessels  before  sinking.  Great 
Britain,  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  United  States,  and  in  vio- 
lation of  the  provisions  of  the  Declaration  of  London  (1909), 
by  Orders  in  Council  of  August  20,  1914,  October  29,  1914, 
March  11,  1915,  and  March  23,  1915,  deliberately  disregarded 
the  rules  of  contraband,  neutral  trade  and  blockade. ^ 

A  State,  therefore  to  retain  its  economic  and  political  inde- 
pendence, must  be  prepared  to  enforce  its  rights,  for  so  far, 
International  Law  has  not  furnished  sufficient  guaranties. 
A  sovereign  State  at  all  times  must  be  the  sole  judge  of  whether 
its  safety  is  or  is  not  threatened,  and  of  what  action  it  will 
take.*  To  argue  otherwise  would  be  a  denial  of  sovereignty. 
In  the  last  analysis,  it  will  always  be  a  question  of  the  potential 
energy  possessed  by  that  State  which  will  control  the  necessity 
and  the  character  of  any  action  to  be  taken. 

The  United  States,  as  a  sovereign  State  possess  the 
sole  and  unqualified  right  to  say  when,  where  or  how  their  safety 
or  their  existence  is  endangered  by  the  action  or  threatened  action 
of  any  other  State.  They  possess  the  absolute  right  to  take 
any  action  which  they  may  deem  proper,  to  prevent  the  aris- 
ing of  such  danger  or  to  remove  it  if  it  has  already  arisen. 
The  practical  question  at  any  given  time  will  be  whether  the 
United  States  has  the  power  to  carry  out  their  desires,  and  to 
enforce  their  demands,  for  if  at  any  time  they  are  in  such  a  condi- 
tion that  any  foreign  nation,  with  which  they  have  as  a  dis- 
pute, beHeves  itself  powerful  enough  to  disregard  those  desires 
or  demands,  or  actually  to  overcome  the  United  States  by 
force  of  arms,  then  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  no  mere  dec- 
laration of  principle,  or  verbal  objection,  however  strongly 
phrased,  will  be  sufficient  to  protect  the  United  States.* 

President  Roosevelt  pointed  this  out  in  his  message  of 
December  2,  1902  relative  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  wherein  he 
stated  that, 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  treated  as  the  car- 
dinal feature  of  American  foreign  policy;  but  it  would  be 
worse  than  idle  to  assert  it  unless  we  intended  to  back 
it  up. "6 

i»  . ■ . . 

m.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II,  171,  172. 

A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  6-29. 

*E.  J.  Clapp,  Economic  Aspects  of  the  War,  pp.  1-108,  appendix 
312-316;  see  also  A,  J.  Balfour  The  British  Blockade  (1915). 

The  Declaration  of  London  set  forth  rules  of  naval  warfare  which 
Great  Britain  and  the  other  nations  there  represented  agreed  were  "actual 
principles  of  international  law,"  C.  H.  Stockton,  Int.  Law,  pp.  57-58, 
App.  IV.,  535-549. 

'E.  Root,  Addresses  on  International  Subjects,  p.  111. 

*P.  F.  Martin,  "Maximilian  in  Mexico,"  415. 

*J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  p.  6762. 

11 


CHAPTER  II— ITS  EARLY  APPLICATION 


In  the  exercise  of  this  right  President  Washington  inaugu- 
rated the  policy  of  isolation  from  European  political  affairs. 

When  the  American  Revolution  ended,  the  American 
Colonies  were  recognized  as  constituting  a  new  and  distinct 
nation  with  all  the  rights  of  sovereignty,  a  republican  form  of 
government,  unusual  in  the  world  of  that  period,  was  adopted 
by  the  American  people.  At  first  a  loosely  federated  system 
was  attempted,  but  later,  the  Constitution  was  adopted,  creat- 
ing the  representative  democracy  which  we  now  have.  At 
that  time  the  European  world  was  monarchical  and  auto- 
cratic in  character.  Russia,  Holland,  Spain,  Portugal,  France 
and  Great  Britain  all  had  colonies  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 
Some  of  these  nations  looked  with  jealous  eyes  at  the  United 
States,  and  all  of  them,  with  the  possible  exception  of  France, 
were  opposed  to  republicanism. 

This  new  venture  of  republicanism  was,  therefore,  con- 
fronted with  many  dangers.  The  success  of  the  Revolution 
was  not  hoped  by  the  European  nations,  and  was  not  believed 
by  England,  to  be  permanent. ^  The  same  international  jeal- 
ousies, manifested  by  the  European  Powers  in  Europe,  were 
reflected  in  the  control  of  their  colonies. 

The  continued  existence  of  the  Republic  of  the  United 
States  was  at  best  precarious.  If  the  experiment  was  to 
succeed,  and  if  representative  government  was  to  survive,  it 
was  necessary  to  take  all  possible  precautions  to  anticipate  and 
to  prevent  the  arising  of  any  circimistances  which  might  tend 
to  destroy  or  endanger  to  it. 

It  was  apparent  from  the  beginning  that  the  greatest 
menace  to  the  United  Sta.tes  lay  in  the  colonies  of  the  European 
nations  upon  its  borders. ^^  Great  Britain,  in  open  violation 
of  the  Treaty  of  1783,  by  retaining  the  fortified  posts  along  our 
northern  frontier,  threatened  trouble  at  any  time.'  Spain 
held  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  closed  that 
river  to  navigation,*  and  also  endeavored  to  alienate  the  west- 

^Woodrow  Wilson,  George  Washington,  pp.  248,  249. 

H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II,  170,  175. 

Such  opinion  has  been  entertained  more  recently.     See  A.  Carnegie, 
The  Reunion  of  Britain  and  America — North  Am.  Review,  June,  1893. 
''H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II,  133. 

J.  B.  Moore,  Four  Phases  of  American  Development,  p.  149. 
'Bancroft,  History  of  United  States,  VI,  463. 

H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II,  175,  176. 

W.  Wilson,  George  Washington,  302. 

John  Marshall,  George  Washington,  p.  255. 

*H.  C.  Lodge,  Washington,  II,  133;  J.  Marshall,  George  Washington, 
p.  269,  270. 

12 


em  population  from  this  nation.  Neither  of  these  nations  was 
averse  to  inciting  the  Indian  tribes  along  our  border  to  serve 
their  own  ptirposes.  Everything  was  done  to  render  as  diffi- 
cult as  possible  the  progress  of  this  country. ^  In  the  Caribbean 
Sea,  Great  Britain,  by  hampering  oiu*  trade  and  holding  strate- 
gical places,  as  well  as  Spain  and  France  by  occupation  of 
other  similar  strategical  points,  threatened  the  future  safety 
of  the  United  States.  Even  before  his  election  to  the  presi- 
dency, Washington  believed  that  national  seciu-ity  lay  in  isola- 
tion from  European  political  affairs. ^ 

While  the  United  States  were  developing,  and  while  the 
various  phases  of  national  live  were  being  consolidated,  Wash- 
ington was  of  the  opinion  that  they  must  be  kept  free  of  any 
disputes  between  the  various  European  nations  or  their  colonies ; 
moreover,  he  believed  that  all  attempts  of  these  same  European 
nations  to  meddle  in  the  affairs  of  the  United  States,  or  tend- 
ing to  endanger  their  political  or  territorial  integrity,  must,  if 
possible,  be  prevented  and,  in  any  event,  most  bitterly  opposed. 
Washington  on  January  1 ,  1788,  wrote  to  Jefferson  as  follows : 
"Our  situation  is  such,  as  makes  it  not  only  imneces- 
sary  but  extremely  imprudent,  for  us  to  take  part  in  their 
quarrels;    and  whenever  a  contest  happens  among  them, 
if  we  wisely  and  properly  improve  the  advantages  which 
nature  has  given  us,  we  may  be  benefited  by  their  folly, 
provided  we  conduct  ourselves  with  circumspection."' 

Washington  in  1788  writing  to  Sir  Edward  Newenham 
observed : 

"I  hope  that  the  United  States  of  America  will  be  able 
to  keep  disengaged  from  the  labyrinth  of  Etuopean  poli- 
tics and  wars;  and  that  before  long  they  will,  by  the 
adoption  of  a  good  national  government,  have  become 
respectable  in  the  eyes  of  the  world,  so  that  none  of  the 
maritime  powers,  especially  none  of  those  who  hold  pos- 
sessions in  the  New  World  or  the  West  Indies,  shall  pre- 
sume to  treat  them  with  insult  or  contempt."* 

In  these  letters  Washington  showed  clearly  that  this  prin- 
ciple of  national  self-preservation  even  at  that  time  had  as- 
sumed in  his  mind  a  definite  form,  and  had  become  the  well- 
defined  system,  which,  as  President,  he  later  followed. 

As  one  of  his  first  executive  acts,  he  careftdly  examined 
and  noted  all  the  foreign  correspondence  in  the  Government 
archives.  He  realized  the  dangers  to  the  United  States  from 
the  European  nations  with  colonies  along  our  borders,  and 
became  convinced  that  the  United  States  should  not  become 


iH.  C.  Lodge,  Washington,  II .  86,  87,  90,  133,  172,  175. 
m.  C.  Lodge  Washington,  II.,  139,  141. 
»J.  Sparks,  Writings  of  George  Washington,  IX.,  291-294. 
mid,  IX.,  398-402: 

13 


entangled  in  the  affairs  of  the  European  nations  and  should  in- 
sist at  all  times  upon  being  accorded  all  the  rights  of  a  sovereign 
nation.  1  The  foreign  policy  of  Washington'sXadministration, 
based  upon  isolation  from  European  entanglements,  the  result 
of  sound  logic  and  sober  thinking  was  matured  at  the  outset, 
to  be  applied  from  time  to  time  as  the  occasion  arose.^ 

Two  striking  instances  in  our  early  history  may  be  cited  in 
illustration  of  these  points.  The  first,  illustrative  of  Wash- 
ington's policy,  involved  our  refusal  to  be  drawn  into  the 
European  War  of  1793. 

In  1789  the  people  of  France,  inspired^by  the  success  of  the 
American  Revolution,  and  of  representative  government,  over- 
turned the  monarchy  and  set  up  in  its  place  a  republic.  In 
1793  France  and  England  were  at  war  and  the  former  sought 
our  aid.  At  that  time  treaties  were  in  force  between  France 
and  the  United  States,  which  provided,  among  other  things, 
for  the  payment  of  our  Revolutionary  debt  to  France,  for  the 
guaranty  of  her  possessions  on  this  continent,  and  for  a  defen- 
sive alliance.^  The  United  States  was  in  very  great  danger 
of  being  drawn  into  the  war  by  reason  of  the  hostile  activities 
of  both  belligerents,  and  at  a  time  when  every  consideration 
for  its  future  security  demanded  that  it  avoid  participation." 

Washington,  while  gratefully  remembering  the  French 
assistance  during  the  Revolution,  and  mindful  of  the  exist- 
ing treaties  with  that  country,  nevertheless,  interested  in  the 
welfare  of  the  United  States  above  all  else,^  pointed  out  that 
it  was  not  a  defensive  war,  such  as  was  covered  by  the  treaty, 
and  proclaimed  the  neutrality  of  the  United  States  on  April 
22,  1793. 

This  Proclamation  of  Neutrality  was  followed  in  1794  by 
the  enactment  by  Congress  of  the  Neutrality  Act,  the  first  of  its 
kind  among  modem  nations,  which  imposed  upon  every  person 

m.  C.  Lodge,  Washington  II.,  132,  133,  137,  143. 

UHd,  II,  139,  141;  Bancroft,  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  VI.,  469. 

3H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II.,  166,  167. 
Treaties  and  conventions  concluded  between   U.  S.  and  other  powers 
since  July  4,  1776,  pp.  241-254. 

""The  minds  of  the  people  are  so  much  agitated,  and  resentments  are 
so  warm  that  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  we  shall  be  hurried  into  the 
torrent  that  is  ravaging  Europe."  Letter  of  March  24,  1794,  J.  Coit, 
Member  of  Congress,  to  D.  L.  Coit, — Oilman's,  James  Monroe,  p.  45. 

'"Tis  perhaps  fortunate  for  us  that  we  are  ill-treated  by  both  the 
belligerent  powers;  experiencing  no  favor  from  either,  we  shall  be  less  an 
object  of  jealousy  from  either,  and  probably  less  in  danger  of  rushing  into 
the  war  than  if  we  were  ill-treated  by  one  only.  I  believe  we  had  better 
suffer  almost  anything  than  get  into  the  war.  ..."  Letter  March  25, 
1794,  Joshua  Coit,  to  Daniel  L.  Coit — Oilman's  James  Monroe,  p.  44. 

^"All  our  late  accounts  from  Europe  hold  up  the  expectation  of  a 
general  war  in  that  quarter.  For  the  sake  of  humanity,  I  hope  such  an 
event  will  not  take  place;  but,  if  it  should,  I  trust  that  we  shall  have  too 
just  a  sense  of  our  own  interest  to  originate  any  cause,  that  may  involve 
us  in  it."  Washington  to  D.  Humphreys,  March  23,  1793,  J.  Sparks, 
Writings  0}  George  Washington,  X.,  331:  W.  C.  Ford,  Writings  of  George 
Washington,  XII.,  276. 

U 


in  the  United  States,  the  obligation  to  refrain  from  any  act, 
therein  set  forth  and  defined  as  unneutral,  against  any  nation 
with  which  the  United  States  was  at  peace. ^ 

The  second  instance  referred  to,  involved  the  War  of  1812. 
Upon  the  renewal  of  war  between  France  and  Great  Britain  in 
1803,  the  latter  announced  wholesale  blockades  of  French  ports, ^ 
and  in  addition,  ordered  the  seizure  of  all  neutral  ships,  wher- 
ever found,  trading  with  an  enemy, «  denying  them  the  right  to 
enter  any  harbor  on  great  stretches  of  the  European  oast.^ 

In  1807  Great  Britain  promulgated  the  "Orders  in  Council," 
intending  to  prohibit  all  neutral  vessels  from  the  use  of  the 
oceans,  save  such  as  traded  directly  with  England  or  its  colo- 
nies.^  All  this  time  Napoleon  was  replying  with  "orders"  and 
"decrees"  of  a  like  nature. «  Both  belligerents  by  such  acts 
violated  the  sovereignty  of  this  country  and  injured  it  more  than 
they  injured  all  other  neutral  countries  combined.''  American 
vessels  were  seized  by  both  belligerents,  but  by  reason  of  Great 
Britain's  mastery  of  the  seas,  the  United  States  suffered  more 
severely  by  the  lawless  seizures  of  that  nation.*  In  effect, 
American  ports  were  blockaded.' 

Great  Britain  forcibly  impressed  at  least  20,000  American 
seamen  into  her  service,!"  on  the  theory  that  a  person,  once  a 
British  subject,  could  not  expatriate  himself,  and  as  a  corol- 
lary, that  the  British  Government  could  seize  anybody,  attempt- 
ing to  do  so,  wherever  found,  and  forcibly  compel  him  to  serve 
Great  Britain  in  any  way  that  nation  or  its  agents  might  re- 
quire." The  United  States  insisted  that,  as  a  neutral,  they  had 
the  right  to  trade  imhampered  with  other  neutrals,  and,  under 
the  proper  restrictions  as  to  contraband,  had  the  right  to  trade 
with  either  belligerent;  they  further  insisted  that  Great  Britain 
had  no  right  whatever,  forcibly  to  impress  nationals  of  the 
United  States  into  British  service. 

Great  Britain,  by  her  insistence  upon  this  alleged  right  of 
"Impressment,"   practically  proclaimed  the  right  to  British 

laAct  of  June  5,  1794—1.  Stat,  at  Large,  p.  381,  ch.  50. 

'^Harrowby's  Circular,  Aug.  9,  1804;  Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign 
Relations,  III.,  266. 

*Hawkesbury's  Instructions,  Aug.  17,  1805;    Ibid,  266. 

^Fox  to  Monroe,  April  8,  1805,  and  Nov.  11,  1805;   Ibid  267. 

'Orders  in  Council,  Jan.  1807,  and  Nov.  11,  1807,  Ibid,  pp.  267-273. 

«The  Berlin  Decree,  Nov.  21,  1806;  Ibid,  pp.  290-291. 
The  Milan  Decree,  Dec.  17,  1807;   Ibid,  p.  290. 

^A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  7. 

8H.  Adams,  Hist,  of  U.  S.,  V.  31;  Rept.  Secy,  of  St.,  July  6,  1812, 
Am.  St.  Pap.  Foreign  Relations,  III.  583-585. 

'Channing,  Jeffersonian  System,  pp.  184-194. 

See  generally  on  War  of  1812,  A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall, 
Vol.  IV. 

I'T.  Roosevelt,  Naval  War  of  1812,   p.  42;  H.  Adams,  Hist,  of  U.  S., 
III.,  202. 

"John  Lowell,  Review  of  Treatise  on  Expatriation,  by  a  "Massachusetts 
Lawyer." 

15 


control  of  the  oceans  whenever  Great  Britain  cared  to  assert 
it,  and  the  right  to  destroy  American  commerce  without 
recompense.  This  infringed  upon  the  sovereign  right  of  the 
United  States,  and  if  allowed  to  go  unchallenged,  not  only 
would  injure  their  dignity,  but  actually  endanger  their  very 
existence.  While  the  United  States  had  ample  cause  for  war 
against  France,  that  nation  did  not  resort  to  impressment,  and 
Great  Britain's  activities  by  reason  of  her  control  of  the  sea, 
made  a  more  direct  and  harassing  contact,  and  aroused  this 
country,  then  under  a  Republican  administration,  to  self-pro- 
tective action. 

Henry  Clay,  the  great  champion  of  Americanism  stirred  the 
patriotism  of ^  this  country  as  it  had  not  been  stirred  since  the 
Revolution.  In  the  United  States  Senate  on  February'  22, 
1810,  he  argued: 

"Have  we  not  been  for  years  contending  against  the 
tyranny  'of  the  ocean'  .  .  .  We  have  .  .  .  tried  peace- 
ful resistance  .  .  .  When  this  is  abandoned  without  effect, 
I  am  for  resistance  by  the  sword.  "^ 

Two  years  later  while  speaker  of  the  House  of  Represen- 
tatives he  said: 

"The  real  cause  of  British  aggression  was  not  to  dis- 
tress an  enemy,  but  to  destroy  a  rival.  "* 

The  United  States  thus  aroused  to  action  in  the  defense  of 
their  rights,  dignity  and  existence,  declared  war  on  Great 
Britain  on  June  18,  1812. 

In  the  first  instance  referred  to,  the  United  States  mani- 
fested their  determination  to  pursue  as  their  policy  with  refer- 
ence to  foreign  nations  the  principle  of  absolute  non-intervention 
in  European  affairs,  and  of  complete  freedom  from  entangling 
alliances,  while  in  the  second,  was  made  clear  their  refusal  to 
allow  without  challenge  any  nation  directly  or  indirectly  to 
attack  the  sovereignty  or  dignity  of  the  United  States. ^ 

^Annals,  nth  Cong,  jrd  Session,  pp.  579-582. 

^Annals,  I2th  Cong.  ist.  Session,  p.  601. 

^See  also  the  controversy  of  1789-1790  relative  to  Nootka  Sound;  J. 
Marshall,  George  Washington,  pp.  284-285;  J.  S.  Bassett,  The  Federalist 
System,  pp.  59-60;  Manning,  Nootka  Sound  Controversy,  in  American  His- 
torical Association  Report,  1904,  pp.  279-478;  Ford's  Writings  of  Jefferson, 
v.,  199-203,  238;    C.  R.  Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  88-92,  100. 


16 


CHAPTER  III— OUR  FOREIGN  POLICY  PRIOR  TO  1823 


The  complementary  policy  of  preventing  non-American  inter- 
vention in  American  political  affairs,  was  hinted  at  by  Wash- 
ington, and  actually  applied  by  President  Madison  in  the  matter  of 
West  Florida. 


The  events  in  the  early  history  of  the  United  States  show 
an  appreciation  of,  and  an  earnest  effort  upon  the  part  of  those 
entrusted  with  government  to  follow  the  principles  of  foreign 
policy  just  considered  as  well  as  a  ready  and  active  response 
upon  the  part  of  the  nation. 

Washington's  convictions  have  already  been  referred  to. 
These  were  emphasized  by  him  in  his  "Farewell  Address"  in 
which  he  gave  his  parting  injunction  to  the  country  in  the 
following  words: 

"The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  foreign 
nations,  is,  in  extending  our  commercial  relations,  to  have 
with  them  as  little  political  connection  as  possible  .  .  . 
"Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us 
have  none,  or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be 
engaged  in  frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are 
essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore, 
it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves,  by  arti- 
ficialties,  in  the  ordinary  vissicitudes  of  her  politics,  or 
the  ordinary  combinations  and  collisions  of  her  friendships 
or  enmities. 

"Our  detached  and  distant  situation  invites  and 
enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course.  If  we  remain  one 
people  under  an  efficient  government,  the  period  is  not  far 
off  when  we  may  defy  material  injury  from  external 
annoyance . . . 

"Why  forego  the  advantages  of  so  peculiar  a  situa- 
tion? Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground? 
Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part 
of  Europe,  entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils 
of  European  ambition,  interest,  humour,  or  caprice? 

"  'Tis  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent 
alliances  with  any  portion  of  the  foreign  world,  so  far,  I 
mean,  as  we  are  now  at  liberty  to  do  it.  .  .  ."i 

According  to  a  British  writer  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
Washington,  in  this  message,  bequeathed  to  his  country,  "a 
policy  which  above  all  things  may  be  called  American.  "^    This 

iPord's  Writings  of  Washington,  XIII,  311-318. 
J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  oj  the  Presidents,  I.,  222,  223. 
^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  10. 

17 


policy,  unheard  of  before  in  international  affairs,  placed  the 
country  outside  the  toils  of  European  greed,  ambition  and 
treachery.  From  this  policy  the  Monroe  Doctrine  naturally 
developed.  1 

Washington's  successors  also  followed  these  principles  and 
manifested  their  belief  in  them  by  many  statements  and  actions. 
•  John  Adams  in  1782,  said, 

"It  is  obvious  that  aU  the  powers  of  Europe  will 
be  continually  with  us,  to  work  us  into  their  real  or  imagi- 
nary balances  of  power  .  .  .  But  I  think  it  ought  to  be  our 
rule  not  to  meddle  .  .  ,"* 

Adams  also  said  that, 

"America  has  been  long  enough  involved  in  the  wars 
of  Europe.  She  has  been  a  football  between  contending 
nations  from  the  beginning,  and  it  is  easy  to  foresee, 
that  France  and  England  both  will  endeavor  to  involve 
us  in  their  future  wars.  It  is  our  interest  and  duty  to 
avoid  them  as  much  as  possible,  and  to  be  completely 
independent,  and  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  either  of 
them,  but  in  commerce."* 

In  the  Nootka  Sound  Controversy,  in  1790,  Adams  de- 
clared in  favor  of  refusing  Great  Britain  permission  to  send 
troops  through  the  United  States  to  attack  the  Spanish  colony 
of  Louisiana.* 

Long  afterward  on  September  30,  1805,  in  a  letter  to  Dr. 
Rush,  John  Adams  referred  to  his  foreign  policy  when  President, 
in  these  words: 

"The  principle  of  foreign  affairs,  which  .  .  .  has 
been  the  invariable  guide  of  my  conduct  in  all  situations 
.  .  .  was,  that  we  should  make  no  treaties  of  alliance  with 
any  foreign  power;  .  .  .  that  we  should  separate  ourselves, 
as  far  as  possible  and  as  long  as  possible,  from  all  European 
politics  and  wars  .  .  .  "^ 

Jefferson,  referring  to  the  same  policy,  said : 

"I  had  ever  dreamed  it  fundamental  to  the  United 
States  never  to  take  an  active  part  in  the  quarrels  of 
Europe  .  .  .  "s 

This  policy  of  abstention  from  European  politics  was  early 
recognized  by  others  as  being  the  logical  policy  of  the  United 

iH.  C.  Lodge,  Washington,  II.,  141,  143:   Olney  to  Bayard,  July  20, 
1895,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  jj, — S4th  Cong,  ist  sess.,  p.  4. 
2J.  Adams,  Diary,  Nov.  18,  1782. 
»J.  Adams,  Works,  VIII,  9,  497,  599. 
*C.  R.  Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  82-92,  100. 
'John  Adams,  Works,  I,  200. 
^Letter  to  Monroe  of  June  11,  1823:   Jefferson's  Works,  VII.,  287. 

18 


States.  Thomas  Pownall,  appointed  Governor  of  Massa- 
chusetts Bay  Colony  in  1757,  later  Governor  of  New  Jersey,  and 
Governor  of  South  Carolina,  after  his  return  to  England  wrote 
of  the  United  States  in  1781,  as  follows:  ^ 

"As  nature  separated  her  from  Europe,  and  hath 
established  her  alone  on  a  great  continent,  far  removed 
from  the  old  world  and  all  its  embroiled  interests,  it  is 
contrary  to  the  nature  of  her  existence,  and  consequently 
to  her  interest,  that  she  should  have  any  connections  of 
Politics  with  Europe  other  than  merely  commerical  .  .  .  "^ 

The  second  phase  of  this  foreign  policy,  that  of  refusing  to 
allow  European  nations  to  meddle  with  American  affairs, 
which  was  definitely  proclaimed  by  Monroe  in  1823,  manifested 
itself  very  early  in  Washington's  administration.  If  the  policy 
was  not  definitely  announced  at  that  time,  at  least  the  germ 
from  which  the  final  announcement  developed  was  present. ^ 
On  June  21,  1792,  while  the  United  States  was  having  diffi- 
culty with  the  Indians,  who  were  countenanced  and  aided, 
indirectly  if  not  directly,  by  Spain  and  Great  Britain.^  Wash- 
ington wrote  Govemeur  Morris,  who  was  then  on  an  unofificial 
mission  to  England,  as  follows: 

"One  thing,  however,  I  must  not  pass  over  in  silence, 
lest  you  should  infer  from  it,  that  Mr.  D.  had  authority 
for  reporting,  that  the  United  States  had  asked  the  media- 
tion of  Great  Britain  to  bring  about  a  peace  between  them 
and  the  Indians.  You  may  be  fully  assured,  Sir,  that 
such  mediation  never  was  asked,  that  the  asking  of  it 
never  was  in  contemplation,  and  I  think  I  might  go  further 
and  say,  that  it  not  only  never  will  be  asked,  but  would  be 
rejected  if  offered.  The  United  States  will  never  have  an 
occasion,  I  hope,  to  ask  for  the  interposition  of  that  power, 
or  any  other  to  establish  peace  within  their  own  territory."^ 

This  phase  of  the  foreign  policy  was  more  clearly  defined, 
and  more  forcibly  put  forward  during  Madison's  administration. 
Late  in  1810  Spanish  subjects  seized  Baton  Rouge  and  declared 
it  independent.  The  United  States,  against  the  protest  of 
Great  Britain,  occupied  West  Florida,  pending  the  settle- 
ment of  the  question  of  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  which  had 
been  closed  by  the  Spaniards.  Madison  was  informed  and 
believed  that  Spain  was  about  to  sell  West  Florida.     In  a 

^T.  Pownall,  A  Memoiial  to  the  Sovereigns  oj  Europe  on  the  State  of 
Affairs  between  the  Old  and  the  New  World. 

''W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  3,  11. 
See  also  on  Nootka  Sound  Controversy  as  bearing  on  this  point,  C.  R. 
Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  88-92,  100. 

3H.  C.  Lodge,  Washington,  II.,  86,  87,  90. 

*J.  Sparks,  Writings  of  George  Washington,  X.,  239. 

W.  C.  Ford,  Writings  of  George  Washington,  XII.,  132-133. 

19 


message  to  Congress  on  January  3,  1811,  he  set  forth  most 
clearly  this  second  principle,  in  the  following  words: 

"Taking  into  view  the  tenor  of  these  several  communi- 
cations, the  posture  of  things  with  which  they  are  con- 
nected, the  intimate  relations  of  the  country  adjoining 
the  United  States  eastward  of  the  Perdido  River  to  their 
security  and  tranquillity,  and  the  peculiar  interest  they 
have  in  its  destiny,  I  recommend  to  the  consideration  of 
Congress  the  seasonableness  of  a  declaration  that  the 
United  States  could  not  see  without  serious  inquietude, 
any  part  of  a  neighboring  territory  in  which  they  have  in 
different  respects,  so  deep  and  so  just  a  concern  pass  from 
the  hands  of  Spain  into  those  of  any  other  power.  "^ 

Acting  upon  this  recommendation  Congress  passed  the  fol- 
lowing resolution: 

"Taking  into  view  the  peculiar  situation  of  Spain,  and 
of  her  American  provinces,  and  considering  the  influence 
which  the  destiny  of  the  territory  adjoining  the  southern 
border  of  the  United  States  may  have  upon  their  security, 
tranquillity  and  commerce,  therefore 

"Resolved  by  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives 
of  the  United  States  in  Congress  assembled, 

"That  the  United  States,  under  the  peculiar  circum- 
stances of  the  existing  crisis,  cannot,  without  serious 
inquietude,  see  any  part  of  the  said  territory  pass  into  the 
hands  of  any  foreign  power ;  and  that  a  due  regard  to  their 
own  safety  compels  them  to  provide,  under  certain  con- 
tingencies, for  the  temporary  occupation  of  the  said  terri- 
tory. "^ 

It  is  clear,  therefore,  that  as  early  as  1792  in  Washington's 
administration,  one  of  these  two  principles  of  foreign  policy, 
based  solely  upon  the  right  of  national  self-preservation,  had 
become  crystallized  into  a  definite  system,  and  the  other  at 
least  suggested. 3  By  1811  both  principles  had  become  fixed 
and  might  be  put  into  these  words : 

A — No  American  intereference  in  European  affairs;  or 

"America,  hands  off  Europe." 
B — No  European  interference  in  American  affairs,  or 
"Europe,  hands  off  America." 
These  two  principles  in  no  way  conflict  with  any  line  of 
action  the  United  States  might  take  with  reference  to  con- 
solidating its  own  territory,  or  with  reference  to  extending  its 

ij.  D.  Richardson's  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  I.,  488. 
2C/.  5.  Stat,  at  Large,  III.,  471:  Am.  St.  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  III.,  571. 
'T.  B.  Edington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  92. 

H.  C.  Lodge,  Washington,  II.,  141,  143,  213-215. 

W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  10. 

20 


boundaries,  by  purchase,  cession,  annexation  or  othenvise. 
There  is  nothing  contained  in  the  two  principles  cited  which 
would  prevent  the  United  States  from  annexing  Texas  or 
Hawaii  upon  the  request  of  their  respective  peoples,  or  from 
acquiring  by  purchase  Florida,  Louisiana,  Alaska,  the  Virgin 
Islands,  and  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  or  from  securing  by  ces- 
sion CaHfomia,  Porto  Rico,  and  the  Philippines.  As  Wash- 
ington said  in  1783,  "The  .  .  .  true  interest  of  this  country  must 
be  measured  by  a  continental  scale,  "i  Washington's  efforts 
as  President  and  those  of  his  immediate  successors  were  directed 
toward  extending  the  country's  boundaries  west  and  south  to 
the  natural  boundaries  of  the  seas. 

The  question  of  our  territorial  expansion,  as  will  be  shown 
later,  is  not  involved  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  must  be  re- 
garded and  treated  as  a  matter  entirely  distinct  and  in  no  way 
conflicting  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

'Washington  to  Lafayette,  April  7,  1783 — Sparks,  Writings  oj  Wash- 
ington, VIII.,  412;  Bancroft,  History  of  the  U.  S.,  VI.,  83. 


21 


CHAPTER  rV— THE  HOLY  ALLIANCE  AND  ITS  MENACE  TO  THE 
UNITED  STATES  THROUGH  THE  SPANISH-AMERICAN  COLO- 
NIES AND  THE  OREGON  CONTROVERSY  WITH  RUSSLA 


The  menace  to  popular  government  from  the  Holy  Alliance 
and  Russia's  claim  to  Oregon  presented  a  situation  in  182J  which 
called  for  a  definite  application  of  this  second  principle. 


Such  was  the  status  of  the  foreign  poHcy  of  the  United 
States  when  two  grave  dangers  confronted  it  in  1823,  arising  out 
of  matters  concerning  foreign  affairs,  firstly  with  the  Quadru- 
ple or  Holy  Alliance  and  secondly  with  Russia. 

When  Napoleon  invaded  Spain  in  1808  and  forced  her 
King,  Charles  IV,  as  well  as  Prince  Ferdinand  forever  to  re- 
nounce the  Spanish  Crown,  and  bestowed  it  upon  his  own 
brother,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  he  unknowingly  aroused  the 
dormant  spirit  of  Spanish  nationalism,  which  manifested  itself 
in  open  rebellion.  1  Provisional  juntas  in  opposition  to  the  new 
king  were  established  in  the  various  provinces  of  Spain.  There- 
upon the  Spanish  colonies  on  the  American  continents  which 
for  many  years  had  been  chafing  under  the  Spanish  connec- 
tion, particularly  by  reason  of  Spain's  oppressive  measures 
against  the  native  Indians, 2  and  her  commercial,  political  and 
economic  regulations  which  hindered  the  development  of  those 
colonies, 3  began  to  set  up  provincial  governments,  entirely  inde- 
dendent  of  either  government  then  attempting  to  fimction  in 
Spain.  All  the  Spanish  colonies  of  South  America,  with  the 
exception  of  lower  Peru,  declared  their  independence  about  the 
same  time.  Under  San  Martin  in  Argentine,  O'Higgins, 
Rosas,  and  the  Carrera  Brothers  in  Chili,  Bolivar  and  Marino 
in  Venezuela,  the  revolutions  were  carried  on  with  varying 
success,  until  after  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand  VII  to  the 
Spanish  throne,  it  became  apparent  that  Spain  could  not  re- 
cover her  former  colonies.* 

Henry  Clay,  the  great  American  champion  of  the  South 
American  republics,  worked  incessantly  for  their  recognition 
by  the  United  States.  He  saw  as  clearly,  if  not  more  clearly 
than  did  anybody  else,  the  great  effect  which  such  a  recognition 
would  have  in  securing  for  all  time  the  political  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  United  States.  He  believed  and  stated  as  early 
as  1818  that  there  was  no  other  question  of  our  foreign  policy 
in  which  we  had  so  much  at  stake  in  the  matter  of  our  politics, 

ij.  H.  Latane,  The  United  States  and  Latin  America,  p.  27. 
^Ibid,  pp.  5,  6. 

*Ibid,  pp.  5-7;  Hall's  Journal  on  Chili,  Peru  and  Mexico.  (1824 — 
Edinburgh)  I.,  249,  296. 

*J.  H.  Latan6,  The  United  States  and  Latin  America,  pp.  25-48. 

23 


commerce  and  navigation,  and  that  South  America  once  inde- 
pendent would  be  guided  by  an  American  pohcy.i  Spurred 
on  apparently  by  the  untiring  efforts  of  Clay,^  President  Mon- 
roe, on  March  8,  1822,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress,  expressed 
the  opinion  that  the  time  had  arrived  for  such  recognition  and 
asked  for  an  appropriation  sufficient  to  effectuate  it.  An 
appropriation  of  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  ($100,000)  was 
accordingly  made. 

Such  were  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the 
South  American  as  well  as  the  Central  American  nations,  when 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  began  to  cast  its  shadow  across  the 
Atlantic.  This  Alliance,  popularly  called  the  Holy  Alliance 
developed  from  the  Napoleonic  Wars. 

After  Napoleon  was  finally  driven  from  Europe,  the 
European  powers  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in  1814,  acting 
under  such  high-sounding  phrases  as  "Reconstruction  of  Social 
Order,"  and  "Regulation  of  the  Political  System  of  Europe," 
parceled  out  to  the  various  conquering  nations  what  had  been 
taken  from  vanquished  France. ^  The  dread  of  another  return 
by  that  master  soldier,  who  to  the  Allies  symbolized  the  French 
Revolution,  the  Convention,  and  hence  opposition  to  "Legiti- 
macy," coupled  with  the  fear  of  a  growing  demand  by  people 
everywhere*  for  participation  in  their  government,  particularly 
felt  in  France,^  in  England, «,  in  Germany,'  and  in  Italy,* 
induced  Great  Britain,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria  to  organize 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  w^hich  was  probably  the  most  powerful 
and  efficient  international  combination  ever  created  for  the 
purpose  of  controlling  the  destinies  of  the  world,  and  for  main- 
taining as  the  sole  basis  of  lawful  government  the  principle  of 
"Legitimacy,"  or  the  divine  right  of  kings  to  rule,  and  to  hold 
all  the  territory  ruled  over  by  them  in  fee  simple. »  Upon  this 
principle  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  was  based,  in  entire  disregard 
of  the  world-wide  agitation  for  representative  government, 
characterized  by  Mettemich  in  his  "Confession  of  Faith,"  as 
"Presumption. "10 

This    political    system    generally    known    as    the    "Holy 

^Benton's  Abridgement,  VI.,  139,  142. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine. 

^Memoirs  oj  Prince  Mettemich,  II.,  553-586. 

*Ibid,  III.,  193,  194. 

Hbid,  III.,  460,  468. 

^Ihid,  III.,  460,  468. 

'Bancroft,  History  of  the  U.  S.,YI.,  54,  55,  472,  474. 

^Memoirs  of  Prince  Mettemich,  II.,  386. 

^"The  First  principle  to  be  followed  by  the  monarchs  .  .  .  should  be 
that  of  maintaining  the  stability  of  political  institutions  against  the 
disorganized  excitement  which  has  taken  possession  of  men's  minds." 
Ibid,  II.,  473. 

^mid,  III.,  458,  459,  465,  472. 

24 


Alliance,"  originated  in  the  Treaty  of  Chaumont,  March  1, 
1814,1  and  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  of  March  25,  1815.= 

On  September  26,  1815,  at  Paris,  Francis  of  Austria,  Fred- 
erick William  of  Prussia,  and  Alexander  I.,  of  Russia,  executed 
the  documents,  creating  the  so-called  Holy  Alliance. ^  On 
October  6,  1815,  the  Prince  Regent  of  Great  Britain,  by  letter, 
while  stating  that  the  "forms  of  the  British  Constitution" 
precluded  "acceding  formally"  to  the  treaty,  expressed  his 
"entire  concurrence  in  its  principles."^  The  treaty  was 
"acceded"  to  by  France  on  November  11,  1815,  the  action 
however  being  apparently  disregarded. 

The  subscribers  solemnly  declared  "their  fixed  resolution" 
to  "take  for  their  sole  guide  [in  their  political  relations]  the 
precepts  of  justice.  Christian  charity  and  peace."  They  agreed 
"on  all  occasions  and  in  all  places,  [to]  lend  each  other  aid  and 
assistance."  They  further  agreed  that  "the  sole  principle 
.  .  .  shall  be  that  of  doing  each  other  reciprocal  service  .  .  . 
for  [they]  look  upon  themselves  as  merely  delegated  by  Provi- 
dence to  govern  .  .  .  branches  of  the  one  family.  "^ 

On  November  20,  1815,  a  treaty  which  included  the  real 
co-ordinating  force  of  the  Alliance,  was  signed  by  Great 
Britain,  Prussia,  Russia  and  Austria. «  This  treaty,  embodying 
the  so-called  Holy  AlHance  created  the  Quadruple  Alliance.  By 
the  terms  of  this  treaty  the  four  powers  agreed  to  combined 
action  in  the  restoration  of  France,  and  in  the  general  con- 
duct of  European  affairs.  In  1818  France  was  taken  into 
the  combination.  This  treaty  among  other  things,  provided 
for  conferences  of  the  signatory  powers  at  fixed  periods,  which 
in  effect  placed  the  real  governing  power  of  Europe  in  the  five 
sovereigns. 

The  first  of  these  conferences  was  held  at  Aix-la-Chappelle 
in  October  1818,  and  a  declaration  relative  thereto  was  made 
by  the  Powers  on  November  15,  1818,  which  stated  in  part 
that: 

"This  union  .  .  .  does  not  tend  .  .  .  to  any  change  in 
the  relations  sanctioned  by  existing  treaties  ...  it  has  no 
other  object  than  the  maintenance  of  peace,  and  the  guar- 
anty of  those  transactions  on  which  the  peace  was  foimded 
and  consolidated  .  .  .  Faithful  to  these  principles  [the  right 
of  nations]  the  Sovereigns  will  maintain  them  equally  in 
.  .  .  meetings;  whether  they  be  for  the  purpose  of  dis- 
cussing in  common  their  own  interests  or  whether  they 

^British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  I.,  121,  129. 
Ubid,  II.,  443. 

^British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  III.,  211-212. 
'Ibid,  III.,  213. 

^British  and  Foreign  St.  Papers,  III.,  211-212. 
^British^nd  Foreign  St.  Papers,  III.,  273-280. 

25 


shall  relate  to  questions  in  which  other  governments  shall 
formally  claim  that  interference  .  .  .  "^ 

It  had  been  generally  tinderstood  that  Spain's  colonies  in 
Spanish-America  were  to  be  at  least  one  topic  of  discussion  at 
this  conference."  But  for  some  reason  they  were  not  formally 
taken  up  at  that  time. 

The  revolutions  in  Naples,  in  Portugal  and  in  Spain  in 
1820  resulted  in  another  conference  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
at  Troppau  in  November  of  that  year,  after  which  conference 
a  circular  relative  to  its  results  was  drafted  by  the  "Allied 
Courts"  on  December  8,  1820.  This  circular  among  other 
things  declared  that: 

"The. events  which  took  place  March  8,  in  Spain, 
[decree  of  amnesty  for  political  prisoners]  July  2  at  Naples 
[ratification  of  a  constitutional  government]  and  the 
Portuguese  castrophy  [convocation  of  Cortes  by  Lisbon 
and  Oporto  juntas  to  revise  the  constitution]  have  neces- 
sarily given  rise  to  a  deep  feeling  of  uneasiness  and  chagrin 
.  .  .  but  at  the  same  time  has  made  them  [the  Allied 
Monarchs]  recognize  the  need  of  reuniting  and  deliberating 
in  common  upon  the  methods  of  preventing  all  the  evils 
which  menace  the  foundations  of  Europe. 

"It  was  natural  that  these  sentiments  should  make 
an  especially  keen  impression  upon  the  powers  that  had 
recently  put  down  revolution  and  that  had  seen  it  again 
raise  its  head.  It  was  not  less  natural  that  these  powers, 
to  combat  it  for  the  third  time,  should  have  recourse 
to  the  same  methods  of  which  they  had  made  use  with 
such  success  in  that  memorable  struggle  which  delivered 
Europe  from  a  yoke  it  had  borne  for  twenty  years. 

"Everything  gave  ground  for  hoping  that  this  alliance 
.  ,  .  would  also  be  in  a  position  to  put  a  check  on  a  force 
not  less  tyrannical  and  less  detestable,  that  of  revolt  and 
of  crime.  .  .  . 

"The  powers  have  exercised  an  incontestable  right  in 
commonly  concerting  measures  of  safety  against  the 
States  in  which  an  overturn  of  the  government  effected  by 
revolt  can  only  be  considered  as  a  dangerous  example, 
which  must  have  for  a  result  an  attitude  hostile  against 
all  constitutions  and  legitimate  governments.  The  exer- 
cise of  this  right  of  necessity  became  still  more  urgent  when 
those  in  that  situation  sought  to  communicate  to  neigh- 
boring states  the  evil  in  which  they  themselves  were  plunged 
and  to  propagate  revolt  and  confusion  among  them.  .  .  . 


iParl.  Pap.  1819,  XVIII,  351. 

"^"Letters  and  Dispatches  of  Castlereagh,"  XII,  66,   A.  G.  Stapleton 
'Pol.  Life  of  George  Canning,"  II.,  10. 

26 


"We  are  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  proceeding 
against  the  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  in  accordance 
with  the  principles  declared  above.  .  .  . 

"The  allied  monarchs  being  i-esolved  not  to  recognize 
a  government  produced  by  open  revolt.  .  .  "^ 

Though  a  representative  of  Great  Britain  attended  this 
Troppau  conference,  he  took  no  active  part  therein,  and  on 
January  21,  1819  Great  Britain,  in  a  communication  to  its 
ministers  abroad,  expressed  its  dissent  from  the  principles  set 
forth  in  such  circular,  and  declined  to  become  a  party  thereto, 
maintaining  the  Alliance,  however,  as  to  all  other  subjects." 

The  Troppau  Conference  was  adjourned  to  Laibach  to 
confer  with  the  King  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  and  at  its  conclusion 
another  declaration  was  made  on  May  12,  1821,  in  which  it  was 
stated  that  the  Alliance  was 

"solely  intended  to  combat  and  to  repress  rebellion,"  and 

that 

"The  allied  troops  .  .  .  [had]  been  stationed  at  suitable 
places  [in  Italy]  with  the  sole  view  to  protecting  the  free 
exercise  of  legitimate  authority.  .  .  . 

"In  the  future  as  in  the  past,  they  [the  AlHed 
Monarchs]  will  always  have  the  purpose  of  preserving  the 
independence  and  the  rights  of  each  state,  as  they  are 
recognized  and  defined  by  existing  treaties.  The  result 
.  .  .  will  still  be  .  .  .  the  consolidation  of  an  order  of  things 
which  will  assure  to  the  nations  their  repose  and  their 
prosperity. 

"Penetrated  by  these  sentiments,  the  allied  Sovereigns 
.  .  .  announce  to  the  world  the  principles  which  have  guided 
them.  They  are  determined  never  to  recede  from  them, 
and  all  .  .  .  will  see  and  .  .  .  find  in  this  union  an  assured 
guaranty  against  the  attempts  of  disturbers."' 

At  the  last  conference  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  held  at 
Verona  in  November  and  December,  1822,  King  Ferdinand  VII 
of  Spain  requested  the  aid  of  the  Alliance  in  dealing  with 
Spain's  American  colonies.  Spain's  situation  and  her  rela- 
tion to  her  American  colonies  were  there  discussed.  A  plan 
was  made  for  a  conference  in  1823  to  which  the  United  States 
was  to  be  invited.  On  December  14,  1822,  after  the  Verona 
conference,  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia  issued  a  circular  rela- 
tive thereto,  in  which  appeared  the  following  sentiment: 

^British  and   Foreign   St.   Pap.,    VIII.,     1149-1151,     (Translation); 
Memoirs  of  Prince  Metternich,  III.,  444-447. 
^British  and  Foreign  St.  Pap.,  VIII,  1160. 
'British  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  VIIL,  1201. 

27 


U' 


'The  Monarchs  [are]  determined  on  replusing  the 
principle  of  revolt  in  whatever  place  or  under  whatever 
form  it  might  show  itself.  .  .  .  "i 

It  is  a  generally  accepted  fact,  though  never  officially 
acknowledged,  that  at  this  Verona  conference  a  secret  treaty 
was  executed  by  Austria,  France,  Prussia  and  Russia,  which, 
whether  true  or  untrue,  indicates  the  real  motives  and  inten- 
tions of  the  Alliance.  The  first  article  of  this  alleged  secret 
treaty  was  as  follows: 

"Article  1.  The  high  contracting  parties  being 
convinced  that  the  system  of  representative  government  is 
equally  incompatible  with  the  monarchial  principles  as  the 
maxim  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  people  with  the  divine 
right,  engage  mutually,  and  in  the  most  solemn  manner, 
to  use  all  their  efforts  to  put  an  end  to  the  system  of  repre- 
sentative governments,  in  whatever  country  it  may  exist 
in  Europe,  and  to  prevent  its  being  introduced  in  those 
countries  where  it  is  not  yet  known.  "^ 

On  November  22,  1822,  Great  Britain  following  a  long- 
established  policy  in  dealing  with  a  possible  French  and  Spanish 
accord,  declared  its  refusal  to  participate  in  the  French  invasion 
of  Spain^  which  the  Quadruple  Alliance  authorized.  In 
this  Great  Britain  was  undoubtedly  also  influenced  by  Russia's 
growing  intimacy  with  Spain  and  France  as  well  as  by  Russia's 
growing  rivalry  in  maritime  and  colonial  interests.^ 

In  apparent  pursuance  of  the  plan  for  a  conference  on 
Spain's  colonies,  and  proving  that  such  intervention  was  in- 
tended, Spain's  Minister  of  State  wrote  the  Alliance  some 
twenty-four  days  after  Monroe's  message  to  Congress  of 
December  2,  1823,  in  part  as  foUows: 

"The  King  .  .  .  has  seriously  turned  His  thoughts  to 
the  fate  of  His  American  dominions  .  .  .  Accordingly  the 
King  has  resolved  upon  inviting  the  Cabinets  of  His 
dear  and  intimate  Allies  to  establish  a  Conference  at 
Paris,  to  the  end  that  their  Plenipotentiaries  .  .  .  may  aid 
Spain  in  adjusting  the  affairs  of  the  revolted  Countries  of 
America.  .  .  .  His  Majesty,  confiding  in  the  sentiments  of 
His  Allies  hopes  that  they  will  assist  Him  in  accomplishing 
the  worthy  object  of  upholding  the  principles  of  order 

^Br.  and  For.  St.  Papers,  X.,  921-925;  Memoirs  of  Prince  Metternich, 
'    III.,  655-662. 

2Niles  Register,  Aug.  2,  1823,  XXIV,  347;  Eliot,  Am.  Diplomatic 
Code,  II.,  179. 

3  Br.  and  For.  St.  Papers,  X  4,  5,  11,  17. 

*C.K.  Webster,  Some  Aspects  of  Castlereagh's  Foreign  Policy,  Trans- 
actions of  Royal  Hist.  Soc,  jd  Series,  vol.  VI. 

28 


and  legitimacy  the  subversion  of  which,  once  commenced 
in  America,  would  presently  communicate  to  Europe.  .  .  "i 

Invitations  to  attend  such  a  conference  to  be  held  at  Paris 
had  been  sent  to  Austria,  France  and  Russia,  a  copy  being 
handed  to  the  British  Ambassador  to  Spain. ^  Monroe's 
message  reached  Europe,  however,  before  Canning  made  any 
announcement  of  Great  Britain's  position  as  to  such  a  con- 
ference. 

Such  were  the  principles  and  aims  of  the  Quadruple 
Alliance.  Mettemich,  Prime  Minister  of  Austria,  whose 
genius  was  the  guiding  spirit  of  Europe  at  this  time,  believed 
that  Europe's  only  salvation  lay  in  the  maintenance  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  "Legitimacy,"  the  divine  right  of  kings  to  rule  their 
people,  and  the  corresponding  "divine  duty"  of  the  people  to 
submit.  In  Europe  the  French  Revolution,  brought  about  or 
hastened  by  the  American  Revolution,  had  set  up  the  Con- 
vention, the  representative  of  the  people.  Mettemich,  there- 
fore, advocated  the  prohibition  of  such  popular  forms  of  govern- 
ment, and,  as  a  preventive  therefor,  urged  the  suppression  of 
rebellions  everywhere.  Mettemich  was  ably  supported  in 
his  plans  by  Castlereagh  the  British  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs.^ 

In  its  determination  to  destroy  popiilar  government  the 
Alliance  exerted  its  tremendous  power  successfully  in  crushing 
revolutions  in  Piedmont  and  in  Naples  in  1821,  and  in  Spain 
in  1823.*  But  for  the  objection  of  Great  Britain,  a  similar 
revolution  in  Portugal,  which  had  broken  out  in  August  1820 
wotdd  also  have  been  crushed. 

As  indicating  what  the  position  of  the  Alliance  would  be 
if  Spain  under  a  "Legitimate"  government,  should  attempt  to 
regain  her  colonies,  Mettemich 's  letter  of  March  20,  1823,  to 
Esterhazy,  relative  to  Great  Britain's  suggestion  of  prevent- 
ing the  war  between  France  and  Spain  which  France's  invasion 
of  Spain  would  undoubtedly  bring  about,  is  most  enlightening. 
Mettemich  said, 

"The  idea  of  neutrality  in  this  struggle  is  incompatible 
with  our  political  system.  The  Emperor  [of  Austria]  could 
not  declare  himself  neutral  if  a  principle  were  in  question 
on  which  the  existence  of  his  Empire  .  .  .  depended,   a 

i5r.  and  For.  St.  Papers,  XI.,  55-57. 
A.  G.  Stapleton,  Political  Lije  of  George  Canning,  II.,  34. 

"Stapleton's  Pol.  Life  of  George  Canning,  II.,  33,  42. 

^C.  K.  Webster,  Some  Aspects  of  Castlereagh' s  Foreign  Policy — 
Transactions  of  Royal  Hist.  Soc.  jd  series,  Vol.  VI. 

"Br.  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  VIII.,  1149,  1151,  1201.     Br.  and  For.  St.  Pap. 
X.,  921-925.     See  generally.  Memoirs  of  Prince  Mettemich,"  III.,  385-651. 
A.  G.  Stapleton,  Pol.  Life  of  Geo.  Canning,  I.,  133. 

29 


principle  which  we  have  never  ceased  to  regard   as  the 
fundamental  basis  of  the  Alliance.  "^ 

It  was  generally  believed  that  the  next  movement  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance,  as  indicated  by  the  Conference  of  Verona, 
would  be  a  concerted  action  to  suppress  the  revolutions  in  the 
various  Spanish  colonies  in  America.  Ultimately,  it  was  feared, 
definite  action  would  be  taken  against  the  United  States, " 

This,  then,  was  the  situation  with  reference  to  Spanish 
America  which  confronted  the  United  States  in  1823,  during 
Monroe's  administration. 

The  second  danger  which  confronted  the  United  States 
at  this  time  lay  in  Russia's  attitude  toward  Oregon,  which 
involved  the  title  to  a  vast  stretch  of  territory. 

The  Russian-American  Company,  organized  in  Russia, 
was  granted  a  charter  by  the  Czar  in  1799  which  carried  with 
it  jurisdiction  over  the  North  Pacific  Coast  of  North  America 
to  the  55th  parallel  of  north  latitude  and  also  the  right  to 
found  posts  even  farther  south  in  territory  not  then  occupied 
by  other  nations.'  In  1792,  Captain  Gray,  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  had  discovered  the  Colimibia  River,  and  in 
1806  the  Lewis  and  Clark  expedition,  inaugurated  by  President 
Jefferson,  explored  the  Columbia,  and  found  no  Russians,  or 
other  civilized  peoples  in  that  locality.  It  was  not  until  about 
1813  that  Russians  began  to  establish  posts  farther  south  than 
the  55th  parallel.  By  right  of  discovery  and  exploration,  there- 
fore, the  United  States  acquired  title  to  the  territory,  then 
known  as  Oregon, 

Great  Britain  and  Spain  also  asserted  claims  to  this  same 
territory.  But  after  the  war  of  1812  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  entered  into  an  agreement  providing  for  a  tem- 
porary joint  occupation  of  the  disputed  territory.  Spain  by 
the  treaty  of  1819,  in  ceding  Florida  to  the  United  States,  also 
ceded  all  her  rights  in  the  Oregon  territory,  north  of  the  42nd 
parallel  of  latitude,  leaving  the  three  remaining  claimants  all 
asserting  title  to  the  Pacific  Coast  north  of  California,  which 
included  the  Coltmibia  River  and  the  access  it  gave  to  the 
great  territory  it  drained. 

On  September  7,  1821,  Alexander  I.  of  Russia,  issued  the 
following  ukase: 

"The  pursuits  of  commerce,  whaling,  and  fishering, 
and  of  all  other  industry,  in  all  islands,  ports,  and  gulfs, 
including  the  whole  of  the  northwest  coast  of  America, 
beginning  from  Behring's  Straits,  to  the  51  of  northern 
latitude  .  .  .  ,  is  exclusively  granted  to  Russian  subjects. 

^Memoirs  of  Prince  Metternich,  IV.,  37. 
^A.  G.  Stapleton,  Pol.  Life  of  George  Canning,  II.,  20,  21. 
»J.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I.,  890. 

30 


It  is  therefore  prohibited  to  all  foreign  vessels,  not  only 
to  land  on  the  coasts  and  islands  belonging  to  Russia,  as 
stated  above,  but  also  to  approach  them  within  less  than 
a  hundred  Italian  miles.  The  transgressor's  vessel  is 
subject  to  confiscation,  along  with  the  whole  cargo. "^ 

In  this  ukase  Russia  not  only  extended  her  territorial 
claim  four  degrees  farther  south  than  she  had  previously  claimed, 
and  beyond  the  54°  40  'parallel  claimed  by  the  United  States 
as  its  proper  boundary,  but  also  asserted  an  exclusive  right  to 
the  North  Pacific  Ocean  and  to  the  Behring  Sea,  which  claims 
were  not  finally  settled  until  1824. 2 

This  naturally  brought  about  more  or  less  strained  rela- 
tions between  Russia  and  the  United  States,  which  were 
aggravated  by  reason  of  an  announcement  made  on  October 
16,  1823,  to  John  Quincy  Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  by  Baron 
Von  Tuyll,  Russia's  Minister  to  the  United  States,  which  inter- 
jected the  Holy  Alliance  and  Spanish  America  into  the  con- 
troversy: This  announcement  related  to  the  question  of 
Russia's  recognition  of  the  Spanish-American  nations,  and 
was  to  the  effect  that, 

"Faithful  to  the  political  principles  which  she  [Russia] 
observed  in  concert  with  her  Allies,  she  could  in  no  wise 
receive  any  agent  ...  of  the  de  facto  governments  which 
owe  their  existence  to  the  events  of  which  the  New  World 
has  for  some  years  been  the  theatre. "^ 

When  directly  pressed  by  Adams  as  to  what  was  meant 
by  the  phrase,  "political  principles,"  Von  Tuyll  stated  that, 

"He  understood  them  as  having  reference  to  the  right 
of  supremacy  of  Spain  over  her  colonies."^ 

This,  in  effect,  was  a  declaration  that  Russia,  already  at  issue 
with  the  United  States  upon  the  Oregon  boundary,  had  definitely 
alligned  herself  with  the  other  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
against  the  Spanish-American  nations,  whose  independence 
had  already  been  recognized  by  the  United  States.  Russia  had 
so  little  regard  for  this  country  and  its  power  as  openly  to  criti- 
cise its  republican  form  of  government,  and  the  events 
which  made  it  possible  and  which  brought  it  about,  because 
the  criticism  which  was  made  of  the  Spanish-American  nations 
applied  equally  to  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Adams  referring  to  a  discussion  on  July  17,  1823,  with 
Von  Tuyll  upon  the  Oregon  matter,  said, 

M.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I.,  891. 
^J.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I.,  891. 
3J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  180-182. 
^J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  182. 

31 


"I  told  him  specially  that  we  should  contest  the 
right  of  Russia  to  any '  territorial  establishment  on  this 
continent,  and  that  we  should  assume  distinctly  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  American  continents  are  no  longer  sub- 
jects for  any  new  European  colonial  establishments. "^ 

On  July  22,  1823,  Adams  sent  a  dispatch  to  Middleton, 
our  Minister  to  Russia,  in  which  he  emphasized  this  same 
principle  in  the  following  words: 

"There  can  perhaps  be  no  better  time  for  saying 
frankly  and  explicitly,  to  the  Russian  Government,  that 
the  future  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  interest  of  Russia 
herself,  cannot  be  promoted  by  Russian  settlements  upon 
any  part  of  the  American  Continent.  With  the  excep- 
tion of  the  British  establishments  north  of  the  United 
States,  the  remainder  of  both  the  American  continents 
must  henceforth  be  left  to  the  management  of  American 
hands.  "2 

ij.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  163. 
2J.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I.,  462,  463. 
J.  B.  Moore,  Int.  Arbitrations,  I.,  760. 


32 


CHAPTER  v.— GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  HER  DESIRE  FOR  A  JOINT 
DECLARATION  WITH  THE  UNITED  STATES 


Great  Britain's  ministry,  while  sympathizing  with  the  anti- 
republican  principles  of  the  Holy  Alliance  nevertheless  feared 
French  political  ascendency  in  Europe  and  commerical  ascendency 
in  the  Spanish- American  Colonies,  and  sought  a  joint  declara- 
tion with  the  United  States  opposing  intervention  by  France  and 
the  Holy  Alliance  in  the  a  fairs  of  the  rebellious  Spanish- Ameri- 
can Colonies. 


While  the  question  of  recognition  of  the  South  American 
republics  was  being  strenuously  advocated  by  Henry  Clay, 
President  Monroe,  on  May  13,  1818,  suggested  to  John  Quincy 
Adams  that  Great  Britain  be  sounded  upon  the  proposition  of 
such  recognition,!  and  in  1819  such  a  step  was  taken,  the  dip- 
lomatic suggestion  then  being  made  that  Great  Britain  recog- 
nize Buenos  Ayres,  and  do  so  simultaneously  with  the  United 
States. 

During  the  month  of  July,  1818,  Castlereagh,  then  the 
British  Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  infonned 
Richard  Rush,  our  Minister  at  London,  that  Great  Britain  and 
the  other  members  of  the  Alliance  had  been  requested  by  Spain 
to  mediate  between  Spain  and  her  rebellious  American  colonies. 
To  this  Mr.  Rush  replied  that  the  United  States  would  not  in- 
tervene to  establish  any  peace  unless  the  basis  thereof  was  to 
be  the  independence  of  those  colonies. ^ 

George  Canning  succeeded  Castlereagh,  as  Foreign  Sec- 
retary, upon  the  death  of  the  latter,  in  1822.  At  that  time,  the 
British  Ministry  was  "legitimist"  in  its  sympathies,  and  at 
one  time,  constituted  "the  center  of  the  opposition  to  revolu- 
tionary tendencies  in  Europe. "^ 

George  Canning  was  also  an  advocate  of  "legitimacy"-' 
which  inclined  him  to  the  side  of  the  Holy  AUiance,  and  to 
the  side  of  Spain  in  her  efforts  to  regain  her  American  colonics. 
But  British  trade  with  these  same  colonies  had  developed 
greatly  from  the  time  of  their  breaking  away  from  Spain.  With 
the  possible  exception  of  the  slave  trade  monopoly,  granted 
to  England  in  1713,  and  a  few  other  concessions,'^  Spain's 
general  policy  of  colonial  administration  had  been  to  confine 

ij.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV.,  91-92. 

*Von  Hoist's,  Constitutional  Hist,  oj  U.  S.,  I.,  419. 

R.  Rush,  Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London,  pp.  330, 

33 1' 

*F.  L.  Paxson,  Independence  of  So.  Am.  Reps.  2nd  ed.,  p.  251. 

*R.  Rush,  The  Court  at  London,  1819-1825,  pp.  467,  468; 
A.  G.  Stapleton,  George   Canning  and  His  Times,  380;  J.  S.  Ewart, 
Canning  Policy  in  Kingdom  Papers,  XVI.,  173. 

^J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  Am.,  pp.  12,  13. 

33 


that  commerce  to  Spain  and  to  Spanish  ships.'  So  burdensome 
were  these  restrictions  to  the  colonists  that  a  great  smuggHng 
trade  in  and  out  of  the  colonies  had  sprung  up.^  Because  of 
these  restrictions,  and  in  an  effort  to  open  up  this  colonial 
trade  to  the  British,  there  had  been  considerable  agitation  in 
England,  as  early  as  1779,  to  bring  about  revolutions  in  these 
colonies,  and  to  separate  them  from  Spain. »  The  revolt,  when 
it  came  "opened  the  door  to  British  trade  at  a  time  when 
Napoleon  was  doing  his  best  to  close  all  other  doors  to  it."* 

If  then,  Spain  were  to  regain  her  colonies,  her  adminis- 
tration of  them,  as  evidenced  by  her  past,  would  greatly  cur- 
tail British  trade.  Again,  if,  by  reason  of  France's  invasion 
of  Spain  (which  was  almost  equivalent  to  a  declaration  of  war 
against  Great  Britain), ^  and  of  her  contemplated  assistance  of 
Spain  in  the  latter's  effort  to  regain  her  colonies,  France  were  to 
secure  a  portion  of  these  colonies  as  compensation,  and  she 
apparently  desired  to  do  so,^  the  British  merchants  believed 
that  Great  Britain  stood  very  little  chance  of  holding  that 
trade. 

The  British  "newly  won  commercial  supremacy  must  be 
maintained  and  developed.  Thus  far  public  opinion  was 
supreme."'  Canning  was,  therefore,  subjected  to  a  tre- 
mendous pressure  by  the  British  merchant  class*  to  prevent 
France  from  so  intervening.  In  fact,  as  early  as  1798,  it  had 
been  determined  that  in  the  event  of  the  colonies  passing 
into  the  control  of  France,  Great  Britain  would  bring  about 
their  complete  independence. »  As  between  the  principles  of 
"legitimacy"  and  the  interests  of  trade,  Canning  determined  to 

'J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S,  and  Latin  Am,  pp.  6,  12:  Hall's  Journal,  I., 
pp.  249,  296. 

^Hall's  Journal,  I.,  253,  254. 

^J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  Am.,  pp.  14,  15. 

A.  Mahan,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  National  Rev.  (1903),  XL.,  8  1. 

Letters  and  Despatches  of  Castlereagh,  VII.,  266. 

*E.  M.  Lloyd,  Canning  and  Span.  Am.,  Trans,  of  Royal  Hist.  Soc. 
(N.S.),  XVIII,  82: 

F.  L.  Paxson,  Independence  of  So.  Am.  Reps.,  2d  ed.,  pp.  251-252. 

^Annual  Register  (London),  1823,  p.  25. 

^E.  Everett,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  4;  A.  G.  Stapleton,  Pol.  Life  of 
Canning,  II,  32-33. 

'W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  12,  13. 

«Ibid,  24. 

^"But,  if  as  appears  probably,  the  army  destined  against  Portu- 
gal, and  which  will  march  through  Spain,  or  any  other  means  which  may 
be  employed  by  France,  shall  overthrow  the  Spanish  Government,  and 
thereby  place  the  resources  of  Spain  and  of  her  colonies  at  the  disposal  of 
France,  England  will  immediately  commence  the  execution  of  a  plan  long 
since  digested  and  prepared  for  the  complete  independence  of  South 
America."     Life  and  Correspondence  of  R.  King,  II.,  650). 

"...  and  I  should  have  no  difficulty  in  deciding  that  we  ought  to 
prevent,  by  every  means  in  our  power,  perhaps  Spain  from  sending  a 
single  Spanish  regiment  to  South  America,  after  the  supposed  termination  of 
the  war  in  Spain,  but  certainly  France  from  affording  to  Spain  any  aid  or 
assistance  for  that  purpose."  (Memo  of  Canning  1823 — Life  of  Lord  Liver- 
pool, III,  231:     Official  correspondence  of  Canning,  I,  85.) 

34 


pursue  the  latter.  ^     His  policy  therein  "was  essentially  British" 
in  its  character  and  purpose.  ^ 

Canning  accordingly  directed  his  efforts  toward  prevent- 
ing the  intervention  of  France,  first  by  ^attempting  to  secure 
a  joint  declaration  by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain, 
opposing  such  intervention,  which  proved  unsuccessful,  and 
later  by  endeavoring  to  secure  a  disclaimer  of  such  intention 
from  France,  which  endeavor  was  successful.  The  effort  to 
secure  this  "joint  declaration,"  constituted  one  of  the  several 
circimistances  leading  up  to  A'lonroe's  message  of  December  2, 
1823. 

On  August  16,  1823,  Canning  verbally  discussed  with  Mr. 
Rush  the  question  of  a  joint  declaration  by  their  governments, 
which  would  have  the  desired  effect  of  forestalling  an}^  inter- 
vention by  France  in  Spanish-American  affairs.  To  these 
overtures  Mr.  Rush  replied  that  he  would  take  the  matter  up 
with  the  United  States  Government  countering  however, 
by  asking  Canning's  position  upon  the  question  of  recognition, 
to  which  Canning  answered  that  no  steps  toward  that  end  had 
been  taken. ^ 

On  August  20,  1823,  Canning  wrote  to  Rush  definitely 
suggesting  such  a  joint  declaration  upon  the  part  of  the  two 
governments,  stating  among  other  things, 

"1.     We   [Great   Britain]    conceive  the    recovery    of    the 
Colonies  by  Spain  to  be  hopeless. 

2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of  them  as 

Independent  States,  to  be  one  of  time  and  circimi- 
stances. 

3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means  dispposed  to  throw  any 

impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between 
them  and  the  mother  country  by  amicable  negotia- 
tions. 

4.  We  aim  not  at  the  possession  of  an}^  portion  of  them 

ourselves. 

5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred  to  any 

other  power  with  indifference."^ 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  substance  of  this  note,  according 
to  a  later  statement  of  Canning  himself,  had  been  previously 
communicated  in  another  note  to  France,  and  thereafter  to 

ip.  L.  Paxson,  Indep.  of  So.  Am.  Rep.,  2  ed.,  pp.  251-252. 
T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  7. 

Rush  to  Adams,  Dec.  27,  1823.  Rush  Corresp.,  etc.,  Mass.  Hist. 
Soc,  2d.  Series,  XV.,  434-436. 

"T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  13. 

*R.  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  pp.  361-366. 

Rush  Correspondence  etc.,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2nd.  Series,  XV.,  412-415. 

R.  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  pp.  376-378. 

R.  Rush  Correspondence  ttc,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  2nd  Scries,  XV.,  415, 


416. 


35 


Austria,  Russia,  Prussia,  Portugal  and  the  Netherlands, - 
Canning  desiring  to  prevent,  such  intervention  and  taking  every 
step  which  he  thought  might  accomplish  that  purpose.  This 
note  to  Rush,  therefore,  did  not,  as  some  people  believe,  con- 
stitute an  exclusive  invitation  to  the  United  States.^ 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  in  the  second  clause  quoted.  Canning 
totally  ignored  the  fact  that  the  United  States  had  already 
recognized  the  South  American  republics,  and  also,  that  in  the 
fifth  clause  he  apparently  intended  to  have  the  United  States 
commit  themselves  for  all  time  to  a  non-intervention  and  non- 
annexation  policy  for  South  America  and  Central  America. 

On  August  23,  1823,  Canning  again  wrote  Mr.  Rush,  and 
to  the  effect  that  the  Holy  Alliance  was  soon  to  take  up  for 
discussion  the  question  of  Spain  and  her  colonies,  and  he  urged 
the  making  of  a  joint  declaration. ^  To  this  Mr.  Rush  suggested 
immediate  recognition  by  Great  Britain,  apparently  being 
ready,  upon  that  basis,  to  assiime  responsibility  for  a  joint 
declaration.* 

On  August  31,  1823,  Canning  wrote  Mr.  Rush  to  the 
effect  that  Great  Britain  was  not  prepared  to  accord  such  an 
immediate  recognition. »  On  September  18,  and  again  on  Sep- 
tember 26,  1823,  Canning  conferred  with  Rush.  On  the  latter 
date  he  asked  if  Rush  would  not  assent  to  a  joint  declaration 
on  Great  Britain's  promise  of  future  recognition,  which  pro- 
posal Rush  immediately  and  unequivocally  rejected.' 

The  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to  recognize  the  independence 
of  the  Spanish  colonies  at  that  time  created  an  impassse  be- 
tween Rush  and  Canning.  After  September  26,  1823,  though 
he  saw  Rush  on  October  8  and  9,  1823,  Canning  scarcely  referred 
to  Spanish- America  at  all,  and  did  not  again  allude  to  the 
matter  of  a  joint  declaration.  So  striking  was  this  abrupt  and 
sudden  cooling  that  Rush  considered  the  entire  discussion  ended, 
notifying  our  State  Department  to  that  effect.  He  suspected 
however,  that  some  fresh  understanding  between  Great  Britain 
and  France  might  explain  it.'  As  to  this  matter,  Stapleton, 
Canning's  biographer,  stated  that, 

"Mr.  Canning  thought  that,  next  to  the  acquirement  of 

a  coadjutor  so  powerful  as  the  United  States,  the  best  thing 

would  be  to  acquaint  the  French  Government,  by  a  direct 

communication,  that  it  could  not  prosecute  its  designs 

iJ5r.  and  For.  St.  Pap.,  XL,  61,  62. 

'^World  Peace  Foundation,  A  League  of  Nations,  June  1918,  p.  285. 

^Rush  Correspondence  etc.,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  2nd  Series,  XV.,  416, 
417:  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  382. 

*Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  pp.  382-384. 

^Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  pp.  384-388:  Rush  corresp.  etc., 
Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  2nd  Series,  XV.,  418,  419. 

'Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  etc.,  384-406,  Rush  corresp.  etc.,  Mass. 
Hist.  Soc.  2nd  Series,,  XV.,  422,  424. 

Ubid,  XV.,  424-428,  431-433. 

36 


in  Spanish  America,  except  at  the  expense  of  a  war  with 
this  cotintry."i 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  the  conference  of  September  26, 
Canning,  according  to  his  own  statement,  sought  an  "explana- 
tion" with  France.  He  conferred  with  Prince  dePoHgnac,  the 
French  Ambassador  at  London,  on  October  9,  1823,  and  se- 
cured from  him  a  statement  to  the  eflEect  that  France  beHeved 
it  hopeless  to  reduce  Spanish-America  to  its  former  state,  and 
that  France  disclaimed  any  intention  or  desire  to  appropriate 
any  part  of  the  Spanish  possessions  in  America,  or  to  obtain 
any  exclusive  advantages  therein. ^  This  was  not  communi- 
cated to  Rush,  however,  until  late  in  November  and  conse- 
quently did  not  in  any  way  affect  Monroe's  message. « 

According  to  Rush,  "The  apprehension  of  Britain  [seemed] 
to  be  fully  allayed,  at  least  for  the  present  ...  on  the  score  of 
French  aggrandisement  in  Spanish  America.  "<  Canning  hav- 
ing accomplished  his  purpose  by  this  "Explanation"  of  France, 
without  definitely  aligning  herself  against  the  Holy  Alliance, 
and  desiring  not  to  oflfend  the  Holy  Alliance,  was  apparently 
no  longer  interested  in  a  joint  declaration. *  This  adequately 
explains  Canning's  "cooling"  process. 

^\.  G.  Stapleton,  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  II,  26. 

*A.  G.  Stapleton,  Pol.  Lije  of  George  Canning,  II.,  26-30:  Br.  and  For. 
St.  Pap.,  XL,  49-53:  Rush  corres.  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2d  Series,  XV.,  430- 
436. 

*Rush,  The  Court  at  London,  etc.,  pp.  409-415:  W.  F.  Reddaway, 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  54. 

^Rush  corres.  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  2d  Series,  XV.,  430-433. 

*"Our  intercourse  in  August,  not  having  led  to  any  practical  results 
nor  become  matter  of  discussion  between  our  respective  governments  wU 
be  considered  as  having  passed  between  two  individuals  relying  upon  each 
other's  honour  and  discretion."  (Canning  to  Rush,  Dec,  13,  1823,  Rush 
Corres.  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2d.  series,  XV,.  433,  434.) 

"All  serious  danger  to  Spanish  America  being  now  at  an  end,  I 
do  not  at  present  see  what  there  is  to  prevent  a  return  to  that  effective 
amity  between  Great  Britain  and  that  alliance  [Holy  Alliance]  which  has 
heretofore  existed.  Events  the  most  recent  and  authoritative  justify  us  in 
saying,  that  no  attempt  upon  the  liberties  of  Europe,  will  essentially 
throw  Britain  off  from  the  connection,  or  impair  her  co-equal  allegiance  to 
the  Monarchial  principle."  (Rush  to  Adams,  Dec.  27, 1823.  RushCorresp. 
in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2d  Series,  XV.,  434,  436.) 


37 

4262^0 


CHAPTER  VI— ITS  REFUSAL 


The  United  States  Refused  to  Enter  into  Any  Such  Joint 
Declaration  with  Great  Britain. 


The  situations  considered  in  the  last  three  chapters  had 
been  slowly  but  gradually  developing,  both  before  and  during  the 
Presidency  of  James  Monroe.  At  the  same  time  an  intense 
spirit  of  nationalism,  guided  and  nourished  by  Henr}^  Clay  and 
to  a  great  extent  by  Chief  Justice  John  Marshall,  was  also 
developing  in  the  United  States. ^  Prior  to  and  even  during 
the  War  of  1812  a  considerable  part  of  the  population,  par- 
ticularly in  New  England,  was  opposed  to  any  interference 
with  Great  Britain's  conduct  of  the  war  against  France.  = 
They  were  willing  to  suffer  quietly  and  submissively  all  the 
injuries  inflicted  upon  the  United  States  by  Great  Britain, ' 
and  even  considered  seriously  the  dissolution  of  the  Union. ■• 
Open  rebellion  was  imminent.^  "Since  the  adoption  of  the  Con- 
stitution, nearly  all  Americans  except  the  younger  generation, 
had  become  re-Europeanized  in  thought  and  feeling. "«  Of 
that  younger  generation  it  was  Henry  Clay,  from  Kentucky, 
the  great  exponent  of  Americanism,  who  stirred  the  country 
to  action  in  1812. 

The  War  of  1812,  however,  "achieved  an  inestimable  good — 
it  de-Europeanized  America.  It  put  an  end  to  our  thinking 
and  feeling  in  European  terms  and  emotions.  It  developed  the 
spirit  of  the  new  America — ^now  for  the  first  time  emanci- 
pated from  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  sovereignty  of  the 
Old  World."' 

Monroe  had  been  Minister  to  France  under  Washington's 
administration  in  1794,*  during  the  period  when  Washington,  in 
his  attempt  to  safeguard  the  country,  was  deliberately  apply- 
ing the  principle  of  his  purely  American  foreigii  policy  of 
keeping  out  of  all  wars  between  the  European  nations.  Mon- 
roe was  undoubtedly  familiar  with  this  principle  before  he  went 

lA.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  1-58:  Scott  v.  Peters,  5 
Cranch  (U.  S.  Rept.),  p.  135. 

-Morris,  Diary  and  Letters  oj  Gouverneur  Motris,  II.,  548:  A.  J.  Bever- 
idge, Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  5. 

^John  Lowell,  Peace  with  Dishonor — War  without  Hope  (by  a  "Yankee 
Farmer"),  pp.  39,  40. 

<H.  Adams,  History  of  U.  S.,  V.  36. 

^A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  1-58. 

^A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  4. 

''A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Matslmll,  IV.,  56. 

*D.  C.  Oilman,  James  Monroe,  p.  40. 

39 


to  France/  and  while  in  France,  was  forceftdly  reminded  of  it 
by  Randolph,  then  Secretary  of  State. ^ 

He  and  Livingston  were  sent  to  France  by  President 
Jefferson  in  1802,  as  special  envoys  to  negotiate  the  purchase 
of  Louisiana,*  in  which  transaction  the  interests  of  Spain,  of 
France  and  of  England,  as  well  as  those*of  the  United  States 
were  involved.  In  these  negotiations  he  and  Livingston  were 
eminently  successful.  In  1803,  he  was  special  envoy  to  Eng- 
land for  the  purpose  of  asserting  our  national  claims  relative 
to  impressment,  blockade,  and  search,*  and  again  went  to 
England,  with  Pinkney  in  1806  and  1807.  In  1804  he  was  in 
Spain  as  special  envoy  to  secure  the  cession  of  Florida,  an 
effort  which  proved  tmsuccessful.* 

President  Madison  named  Monroe  as  his  Secretary  of 
State  in  1811.  He  therefore  held  that  great  ofhce  at  the  time 
when  England's  persistent  violation  of  our  rights  as  a  neutral, 
her  insistence  on  her  right  of  impressment,  and  her  determined 
hostility  to  the  United  States  brought  on  the  War  of  1812.' 
He  was  a  party  to  the  regeneration  of  that  great  spirit  of  nation- 
alism which  animated  that  period,  and  undoubtedly  he  was 
familiar  with  Madison's  message  of  January  3,  1811,  and  the 
action  of  Congress  thereon,  making  clear  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  as  to  Spain's  transfer  of  Florida  to  any  other 
foreign  power. 

Monroe  was  also  familiar  with  the  warnings  of  Washington, 
of  Adams,  of  Jefferson  and  of  Madison  as  to  the  absolute 
necessity  of  the  United  States  abstaining  from  participation  in 
European  politics.  This  thoroughly  American  foreign  policy, 
actually  applied  during  Washington's  administration,  was 
essentially  the  policy  which  guided  all  administrations  from 
that  of  Washington  down  to  the  time  of  Monroe's  presidency. 
If  not  a  tradition,  this  policy  had  very  nearly  approached  it 
at  the  time  when  Monroe  was  confronted  with  the  two  situations 
already  referred  to,  the  one  involving  the  Holy  Alliance,  its 
direct  threat  to  the  Spanish-American  nations,  and  its  indirect 
threat  to  the  United  States;  the  other  involving  Russia  and 
the  Oregon  boundary. 

Monroe's  Secretary  of  State  was  John  Quincy  Adams, 
probably  the  most  distinguished  American  in  active  public 
life  at  that  time.  He  had,  as  a  boy,  accompanied  his  father 
when  the  latter  went  to  France  as  envoy.  When  fourteen, 
he  had  gone  to  St.  Petersburg  as  private  secretary  to  Francis 
Dana.''    Later  he  acted  successively  as  Minister  to  Holland, 

^D.  C.  Gilman,  James  Monroe,  pp.  41,  48. 

""Ibid,  pp.  57,  58. 

Uhid,  pp.  79-95. 

*Ibid,  pp.  96,  97,  105. 

Uhid,  pp.  98,  99. 

^Ibid,  107-127:  A.  J.  Beveridge,  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  6-58. 

'J-  T.  Morse,  Jr.,  John  Quincy  Adams,  p.  13. 

40 


to  Portugal,  to  Prussia,  to  Russia  and  to  England.'  He  par- 
ticipated actively  in  the  diplomatic  matters  resulting  from 
both  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1 8 1 2;.  He  was  undoubtedly 
the  best  equipped  man  in  the  country  to  handle  the  problems 
then  confronting  the  State  Department. ^ 

Monroe  and  Adams  were,  therefore,  well  versed  in  European 
affairs,  European  designs,  and  European  methods  of  political 
thought. 

During  most  of  Monroe's  Presidency,  Richard  Rush  was 
the  American  Minister  in  London.  His  official  dealings  with  the 
British  government  were  with  Castlereagh,  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
and  on  his  death  with  George  Canning. 

The  situation  presented  to  Monroe  in  1823  resembled  in 
many  ways  the  situation  which  confronted  Washington  in 
1793  at  the  time  of  the  French-English  War.  On  both  occasions 
the  United  States  was  in  grave  danger,  which  consisted  to  a  great 
degree  in  the  difficulties  of  European  nations  and  the  probability 
of  involving  the  United  States  in  these  difficulties.  A  mistake 
might  mean  the  total  destruction  of  the  nation.  In  1793  the 
danger  lay  in  the  United  States  taking  positive  action  in  Euro- 
pean affairs.  The  only  solution  of  the  problem  was  carefully 
to  avoid  becoming  involved,  and  then,  it  was  a  question  of 
volition  upon  the  part  of  the  United  States.  At  that  :time, 
the  Neutrality  Proclamation,  an  exercise  of  volition  and  dis- 
cretion, saved  the  country.  In  1823  one  aspect  of  the  prob- 
lem was  to  avoid  becoming  involved  in  the  designs  of  France 
of  Spain,  of  Great  Britain,  and  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  The 
threatened  danger,  at  this  time,  however,  lay  in  Europe's 
taking  positive  action  in  American  affairs.  While  in  1823  any 
action  to  be  taken  by  the  United  States  might  be  regarded  as 
volimtary,  yet,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  if  Etu"ope  actively  interv^ened 
in  the  Americas,  the  United  States  without  any  exercise  of  voli- 
tion would  necessarily  be  obliged  to  fight  for  its  own  protection. 

The  settlement  of  the  crisis  of  1793  pointed  the  way  to 
safety'  and  the  same  principle  of  self -protection,  which  dictated 
Washington's  Neutrality  Proclamation,  and  his  statement 
as  to  British  intervention  in  American  affairs,  dictated  the 
program.  In  1793  self-protection  required  the  United  States  to 
keep  out  of  European  affairs.  In  1823  on  the  other  hand,  it 
demanded  that  Europe  keep  out  of  American  affairs.  The 
latter  was  the  complement  of  the  former  and  would  undoubtedly 
have  been  the  definite  policy  of  this  country  even  if  Monroe's 
message  had  never  been  written.^ 

On  November  7,  1823,  President  Monroe's  cabinet  began 
discussing  the  proposition  of  such  a  joint  declaration  upon  the 

»J.  T.  Morse,  p.  John  Quincy  Adams,  pp.  19,  23,  24,  70,  75,  76. 
JRept.  of  Sec'y  Fish  to  Pres.  Grant,  July  14,  1870,  Senate  Ex.  Doc, 
112-  41st.  cong.,  2d.  session  1,  3. 

'J.  B.  Moore,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  p.  198. 
^Ibid,  pp.  258,  259. 

41 


part  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  Monroe^  and 
Calhoun  favored  it.  Jefferson^,  in  spite  of  his  life-long  prejudice 
against  Great  Britain  favored  it,  because  he  believed  it  to  be  a 
good  diplomatic  manoeuvre  under  the  existing  circumstances^. 
Madison  also  approved  it.*  Secretary  of  State  Adams,  how- 
ever, stoutly  opposed  such  a  step  and  urged  a  separate  and 
distinct  American  declaration.  He  was  the  only  one  of  the 
Cabinet  who  saw  and  pointed  out  the  significant  part  of  Can- 
ning's suggestion,  stating  that, 

"The  object  of  Canning  appears  to  have  been  to  obtain 
some  public  pledge  from  the  Government  of  the  United 
States,  ostensibly  against  the  forcible  interference  of  the 
Holy  Alliance  between  Spain  and  South  America;  but 
really  or  especially  against  the  acquisition  to  the  United 
States  themselves  of  any  part  of  the  Spanish-American 
possessions,  ...  by  joining  with  her,  therefore,  we  give 
her  a  substantial  and  perhaps  inconvenient  pledge  against 
ourselves."^ 


Adams  also  pointed  out  the  striking  and  sinister  incon- 
sistency between  Great  Britain's  anxious  request  for  a  joint 
protest  against  intervention  by  other  European  Powers,   in 

i"My  own  impression  is  that  we  ought  to  meet  the  proposal  of  the 
British  Gov't.,  to  make  it  known,  that  we  would  view  an  interference 
on  the  part  of  the  European  powers,  and  especially  an  attack  on  the 
Colonies,  by  them,  as  an  attack  on  ourselves,  presuming  that,  if  they  suc- 
ceeded with  them,  they  would  extend  it  to  us.  I  am  sensible  however,  of 
the  extent  &  difficulty  of  the  question,  &  shall  be  happy  to  have  yours  & 
Mr.  Madison's  opinions  on  it."  (Monroe's  letter  of  Oct.  17,  1823  to 
Jefferson,  Hamilton's  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  VI.,  323-325.  Moore, 
Dig.  of  Int.  Law,yi.,  393. 

2"The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have  sent  me,  is  the  most 
momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my  contemplation  since  that  of 
Independence.  That  made  us  a  nation,  this  sets  our  compass  and  points 
the  course  which  we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us. 
And  never  could  we  embark  on  it  under  circum.stances  more  auspicious. 
Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  our- 
selves in  the  broUs  of  Europe.  Our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  inter- 
meddle with  cis-Atlantic  affairs.  .  .  . 

"But  the  war  in  which  the  present  proposition  might  engage  us, 
should  that  be  its  consequence,  is  nor  her  [Great  Britain]  war,  but  ours. 
Its  object  is  to  introduce  and  establish  the  American  system,  of  keeping  out 
of  our  land  all  foreign  powers,  of  never  permitting  those  of  Europe  to  inter- 
meddle with  the  affairs  of  our  nations.  It  is  to  maintain  our  own  prin- 
ciple, not  to  depart  from  it.  And  if,  to  facilitate  this,  we  can  effect  a  di- 
vision in  the  body  of  the  European  powers,  and  draw  over  to  our  side  its 
most  powerful  member,  surely  we  should  do  it  ...  "  (Jefferson's  reply 
to  above,  Oct.  24,  1823,  Ford's  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.,  277,  278- 
315:   Wharton,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I.,  268-270. 

^A.  J.  Beveridge  Life  of  John  Marshall,  IV.,  8,  and  notes. 
^Madison  went  further  than  Jefferson  and  recommended  that  the 
declaration  disapprove  of  the  invasion  of  Spain  and  of  any  interference 
with  Greece.     (Hamilton's,    Writings   of   James  Madison,  IX.,    161,  162: 
Madison's  Works,  III.,  339:  Wharton,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law.,  I.,  270-271. 
6J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  177,  178. 

42 


Spanish-America,  and  her  stubborn  refusal  to  recognize  the 
independence  of  the  Spanish-American  rcpubhcs.  He  argued 
that,  "The  United  States,  liaving  acknowledged  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Trans-Atlantic  territories,  had  a  right  to 
object  to  the  interference  of  foreign  powers  in  the  affairs  of  these 
teiTitories,"  and  that,  "The  South  Americans  as  independent 
nations  .  .  ,  themselves,  and  no  other  nation,  had  the  right  to 
dispose  of  their  condition.  "^ 

Adams,  remindful  of  the  traditional  American  foreign 
policy,  urged  a  declaration  by  the  United  States  only,  which 
would  contain,  "an  earnest  remonstrance  against  the  inter- 
ference of  the  European  powers  by  force  with  South  America : 
to  make  an  American  cause  and  adhere  inflexibly  to  that."^ 
He  contended  that  the  Russian  communications  should  be  made 
use  of  as  an  opportunity,  and  as  a  basis  for  such  a  declaration, ^ 
which  declaration,  while  answering  Von  Tuyll  and  Russia, 
would  also,  and  at  the  same  time,  answer  Canning,  Great 
Britain  and  the  Holy  Alliance.  His  argiiments  to  the  Cabinet 
carried  the  day. 

It  appears  that  the  phraseology  of  Monroe's  message,  par- 
ticularly the  two  sections  generally  accepted  as  including  the 
gist  of  the  message,  was  to  some  degree  at  least  the  work  of 
Adams.  Pltmier,  a  New  Hampshire  Congressman  during 
that  period,  stated  that  the  part  of  the  message  dealing  with 
foreign  affairs,  bore  "the  direct  impress  of  Mr.  Adams'  genius. "< 

W.  F.  Reddaway,  the  British  writer  upon  the  Doctrine, 
states  that  "The  occasion  and  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  .  .  .  point  to  the  authorship  of  Adams. "^  Elihu 
Root  says  that  Adams  "played  a  major  part  in  forming  the 
policy. "6  Many  other  writers,^  including  [Worthington  Ford 
attribute  to  Adams  the  formulation  of  the  ideas  set  forth  in  the 
Doctrine. « 

Jefferson,  as  is  seen  by  his  letter  of  October  24,  1823, 
to  Monroe,  also  had  much  to  do  with  the  actual  message.  He 
was  the  first  to  set  forth  in  so  many  words  the  broad  principle 
that  Europe  should  be  kept  out  of  Ainerican  affairs.  He  therein 
stated  that 

"Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be  never  to 

entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe.     Oui"  second, 

ij.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI,  186. 

''W.  C.  Ford,  Genesis  oj  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2ua 
Series,  XV,  392. 

3J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  178,  179. 

^Pennsylvania  Mag.  of  Hist,  and  Biog.,  VI.,  No.  3,  p.  358. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  SO. 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  114. 

^A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  64:  H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Wash- 
ington, II.,  145:  W.  Ford  Genesis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
2  Series,  XV. 

•For  criticism  of  such  position  see  James  Schouler,  Authorship  of  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  in  Annual  Report  Am.  Hist.  Assoc.  1905,  I.,  126. 

43 


never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic 

affairs."! 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  might  well  be  said  that  neither 
Adams,  nor  Monroe  was  the  "author,  "^  and  that  the  phrase 
"Monroe  Doctrine,"  has  merely  "become  a  convenient  title  by 
which  is  denoted  a  principle  that  doubtless  would  have  been 
wrought  out  if  the  message  of  1823  had  never  been  written — 
the  principle  of  the  limitation  of  Eiiropean  power  and  influence 
in  the  Western  Hemisphere."* 

Whatever  may  be  the  merits  of  this  discussion  as  to  the 
formulation  of  the  ideas  or  principles,  it  remains  true  that  it 
was  the  declaration  of  these  principles  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  that  gave  them  international  standing.  <  The 
responsibility  for  this  enunciation  lay  with  President  Monroe. 
His,  therefore,  must  be  the  credit  for  its,  "courageous  pro- 
nouncement before  Congress  and  all  Europe,  upon  his  own 
solemn  responsibility  as  Chief  Magistrate.  "^ 

iPord's  Writings  of  Jefferson,  X.,  277,  278. 

"T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  92,  93, 

'J.  B.  Moore,  Principles  of  Am.  Diplomacy,  pp.  258,  259:  W.  F. 
Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  p.  329. 

^Rush  to  Adams,  Dec.  27,  1823, — Rush  Corres.  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc. 
2nd  Series,  XV.,  434,  436. 

^James  Schouler,  Auth.  of  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  127. 


44 


CHAPTER  VIL— THE  MESSAGE  TO  CONGRESS 

The  United  States,  through  President  Monroe,  proclaimed 
to  the  world  the  determination  to  prevent  any  European  nation  from 
future  colonization  in,  or  extension  of  its  political  system  to  the 
Western  Hemisphere. 

After  considerable  discussion  by  the  Cabinet,  President 
Monroe's  message  was  finally  drafted  and  submitted  to  Con- 
gress on  December  2,  1823.  The  portions  of  the  message  which 
bear  upon  the  principles  involved,  and  which  have  caused 
those  principles  to  be  known  as  "The  Monroe  Doctrine,"  are 
the  following : 

"...  The  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  assert- 
ing as  a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American  continents, 
by  the  free  and  independent  condition  which  they  have 
assumed  and  maintain,  are  henceforth  not  to  be  con- 
sidered subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European 
Powers.  .  . 

".  .  .  In  the  wars  of  the  European  powers  in  matters 
relating  to  themselves  we  have  never  taken  any  part,  nor 
does  it  comport  with  out  policy  so  to  do.  .  .  With  the 
movements  in  this  hemisphere  w^e  are,  of  necessity,  more 
immediately  connected  .  .  .  We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor, 
and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United 
States  and  those  powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  con- 
sider any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependen- 
cies of  any  European  power  we  have  not  interfered  and 
shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  Governments  who 
have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained,  it,  and 
whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration  and 
on  just  principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any 
interposition  for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them  or  con- 
trolling in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  Euro- 
pean power,  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of 
an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States.  .  .  . 
"...  Our  policy  in  regard  to  Europe,  which  was 
adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars  which  have  so  long 
agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  nevertheless  remain 
the  same,  which  is,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  con- 
cerns of  any  of  its  powers ;  .  .  . 

".  ...  It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  powers  should 
extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either  con- 
tinent without  endangering  our  peace  and  happiness;  .  .  . 
It  is  equally  impossible,  therefore,  that  we  should  behold 
such  interposition,  in  any  form,  with  indifference  .  .  .  "i 

'J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  II.,  2089: 
Am.  St.  Pap.  For.  Pel.,  V.,  246,  250, 

45 


An  analysis  of  these  portions  of  the  message  produces  the 
following  brief  propositions  as  the  essence  of  the  doctrine: 

1.  The  policy  of  the  United  States  with  reference  to 

Europe  is  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal  concerns 
of  any  of  its  powers,  and  not  to  take  part  in  any  of 
their  wars  which  concern  such  powers  only. 

2.  In  both  continents  of  the  Western  Hemisphere,  the 

United  States  have  an  immediate  interest.  Neither 
continent  can  be  considered  as  open  to  future  coloni- 
zation by  any  European  power. 

3.  No  European  power  may  extend  its  political  system 

beyond  its  present  limits  in  either  continent. 

4.  Any  attempt  of  any  European  power  or  combination 

of  such  powers  so  to  extend  its  or  their  political  sys- 
tem, and  particularly  any  interposition  of  any  such 
power  or  powers  which  would  in  any  way  control  the 
political  destinies  of  the  Spanish-American  nations 
will  be  considered  as  so  dangerous  to  the  peace,  safety 
and  happiness  of  the  United  States  that  they  wovUd 
not  behold  the  samQ  with  indifference,  but  would 
consider  it  as  a  manifestation    of    an    unfriendly 
disposition  and  act  accordingly. 
These  propositions  are  essentially  the  same  in  principle  as 
the  foreign  policy  thought  out  by  Washingtoni  and  applied  by 
him  in  1792^  during  his  first  administration,  in  his  refusal  to 
allow  Great  Britain  to  intervene  between  the  United  States 
and  the  Indians,  and  in  his  Proclamation  of  Neutrality  in  1793.^ 
This   traditional  American  foreign   policy,    and   its   two 
complementary    principles    of   no    intervention    in    European 
affairs  and  of  no  toleration  of  any  intervention  by  any  non- 
American  nation  in  the  affairs  of  the  American  nations,  both 
based  upon  that  natural  right  of  the  nation  to  protect  itself, 
are  clearly  summed  up,  and  openly  and  deliberately  announced 
to  the  world  in  this  message  of  President  Monroe. 

At  the  time  when  this  message  was  published  little  if 
anything  was  thought  politically  of  Asia,  Africa,  or  Australia, 
and  the  United  States  was  not  then  menaced  from  any  of  those 
quarters.  While  the  message  refers  to  European  powers,  the 
principles  laid  down  apply  in  essence  to  all  non-American  na- 
tions, and  to  Japan  as  well  as  to  France. 

It  is  to  be  noted  also  that  these  complementary  principles 
involved  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  do  not  comprise  all  the 
foreign  policies  of  the  United  States.  On  the  contrary,  the 
Doctrine  is  strictly  limited  and  is  confined  to  the  subjects  which 
it  purports  to  cover.* 

iQlney  to  Bayard,  July  20,  1895 — Senate  Ex.  Doc,  31-3 4th  Cong.  ist. 
Sess.,  p.  4. 

^H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II.,  145. 

Ubid,  II.,  144,  145,  185. 

*E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  117. 

46 


-*■». 


CHAPTER  VIII— THE  DOCTRINE  TESTED 


The  Monroe  Doctrine,  has  been  tested  at  various  times  by 
France,  Spain,  Germany,  Great  Britian  and  Japan,  but  the 
United  States  has  resolutely  maintained  this  policy  to  the  present 
time. 


A— FRANCE 
(a)  As  TO  Cuba. 


When  President  Monroe's  message  was  published  in  Europe, 
Chateaubriand,  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  stated 
that  the  principles  therein  enunciated, 

"Ought  to  be  resisted  by  the  Powers  possessing  either 

territorial,  or  commercial,  interest  in  that  Hemisphere,  "i 

This  undoubtedly  reflected  the  attitude  of  official  France, 
for  that  country,  despoiled  of  the  Napoleonic  conquests  by  the 
Treaty  of  Vienna,  desired  colonies  and  looked  with  eager  eyes 
at  South  and  at  Central  America,  as  well  as  at  Cuba,  and  the  other 
islands  of  the  West  Indies.  Hence  she  bitterly  resented  the 
recognition  of  the  South  American  nations  by  the  United  States. 

Prior  to  1825  Great  Britain  had  made  one  or  more  unsuc- 
cessful efforts~tb  buy  Cuba  from  Spain. ^  Apparently  she  con- 
templated seizing  it  in  1823. »  In  1825  Great  Britain  feared 
that  Cuba  might  be  acquired  by  the  United  States,  and  Canning 
was  bitterly  opposed  to  any  such  measure.^ 

The  menace  of  France  to  Great  Britain  from  the  western 
hemisphere  was  more  or  less  taken  care  of  by  Canning  in  1823, 
so  that  he  had  no  fear  in  suggesting  that  Great  Britain  would 
rather  see  France  secure  Cuba  than  the  United  States.^ 

Subsequently,  in  1825,  France,  then  the  second  largest 
naval  power  in  the  world,  sent  a  fleet  to  Cuba.  At  that 
time  the  rumor  was  widespread  that  Spain  intended  to  transfer 
the  island  to  France.  Henry  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State, 
realizing  the  threatened  infringement  of  the  doctrine,  and  under 
the  direction   of   President   John   Quincy   Adams,    promptly 

^Quoted  by  A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctiine,  p.  84. 

2 "From  various  sources  intimations  have  been  received  here  that  the 
British  Government  have  it  in  contemplation  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
island  [Cuba]  .  .  .  they  have  been  for  more  than  two  years  in  secret 
negotiation  with  Spain  for  the  cession  of  the  island,"  Adams  to  Forsyth, 
Dec.  17,  1822,  MS.  Inst.  U.  S.  Ministers,  IX.,  158:  See  generally  Niles' 
Register,  Nov.  8,  1817,  and  The  Cession  of  the  Floridas  to  the  United  States 
of  America,  and  the  Necessity  of  Acquiring  the  Island  of  Cuba  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, (London,  1819.). 

^Corresp.  of  Canning,  I.,  116,  117  (note). 

^Wellington's  Despatches,  I.,  511,  545. 

*DeVillele,  Memoirs,  V.,  160. 

47 


applied  the  principles  underlying  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and 
notified  France  that  the  United  States  could  not  under  any 
circtunstances  whatever^  permit  any  power  other  than  Spain 
to  possess  Cuba,  or  Porto  Rico.  This  has  been  frequently 
stated  to  be  the  first  occasion  when  the  principle  was  actually 
applied  to  the  prohibition  of  the  transfer  of  American  colonies 
by  one  European  power  to  another.  However,  such  a  trans- 
fer clearly  would  have  been  contrary  to  the  intent  of  the  Doc- 
trine, and  a  violation  of  its  fimdamental  principles.  If 
France  at  that  contemplated  the  annexation  of  Cuba,  she  did 
not  press  the  matter  any  further. 

(b)  As  TO  Mexico 

In  1821  Mexico  became  independent  and  thereafter  set  up 
a  republican  form  of  government.  During  a  revolution  in  1851 
President  Comoniort  was  driven  from  the  capital.  Ztdoaga 
was  made  President  by  the  rebels  and  his  government,  estab- 
lished at  Mexico  City,  was  recognized  as  the  de  facto  govern- 
ment of  Mexico  by  the  United  States  and  by  other  powers. 
Meanwhile  Juarez,  Chief  Justice  of  the  Supreme  Court,  pur- 
porting to  act  under  the  Mexican  constitution,  organized 
a  rival  government  at  Vera  Cruz.  Zuloaga  later  substituted 
Miramon  for  himself  as  President.  Miramon  published  a 
decree  in  October  1859,  providing  for  the  issue  of  $15,000,000 
of  Mexican  bonds,  expecting  to  raise  by  such  issue  the  simi  of 
$750,000.  Jecker,  the  Swiss  promoter  or  underwriter  of  the 
issue  failed,  and  the  bonds  got  into  the  hands  of  his  creditors. 
France  in  1861  made  a  claim  against  Mexico  for  several  millions 
of  dollars,  including  torts  against  French  subjects  in  Mexico  and 
defaults  on  this  Miramon  bond  issue, ^  the  then  government  of 
Mexico  having  denied  the  validity  of  such  issue.* 

On  October  31,  1861,  while  the  United  States  was  engaged 
by  the  Civil  War,  France,  Great  Britain  and  Spain,  all  alleging 
claims  of  similar  nature  against  Mexico,*  agreed  to  act  jointly 
against  her,^  declaring  their  intention,  however,  not  to  inter- 
fere with  Mexico's  right  to  determine  its  own  form  of  Govern- 
ment.«    Their  combined  forces  seized  Vera  Cruz  in  December 

Mw.  State  Pap.  For.  Rel.,  V.,  855. 

^Wharton's  Digest  of  Int.  Law.,  I.,  312,  Sect.  58:  J.  B.  Moore,  Dig. 
o/7w/.  Low,  VI.,  483,  484. 

^Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  LIL,  294. 

*Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  LIL:  House  Ex.  Doc.  loo-j^th,  Cong.,  2  Sess.; 
J.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  483,  484. 

^Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  LIL,  398. 

*"The  high  contracting  parties  bind  themselves  not  to  seek  for 
themselves  .  .  .  any  acquisition  of  territory  .  .  .  and  not  to  exercise  in 
the  subsequent  affairs  of  Mexico  any  influence  of  a  character  to  impair  the 
right  of  the  Mexcian  nation  to  choose  and  freely  to  constitute  the  form  of 
its  own  government."  Br.  &■  For.  St.  Pap.,  LIL,  398:  J.  H.  Latan6,  The 
U.  S.  &■  Latin  America,  pp.  203, 204:  House  Ex.  Doc,  loo-j^th  Cong.,  2  Sess 
185,  187:  P.  F.  Martin,  Maximilian  in  Mexico,  App.  I.,  436-438. 

48 


of  that  year.  Great  Britain  and  Spain  soon  settled  their 
disputes  with  Mexico  and  withdrew  from  the  enterprise; 
on  the  other  hand,  the  French  remained  and  seized  Mexico 
City  in  1863.  \ 

Thereafter  France,  by  the  aid  of  her  forces,  placed  and  sup- 
ported Maximilian,  an  Austrian  Prince,  upon  the  Mexican 
throne,  with  the  title  of  "Emperor  of  Mexico. "^  Maximilian's 
Government  was  recognized  by  most  of  the  European  Govern- 
ments, but  not  by  the  United  States. 

WiUiam  F.  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  replying  to  a  sug- 
gestion that  the  United  States  join  with  the  Allies  in  such  inter- 
ventipn,  stated  that, 

"The  United  States,  so  far  as  it  is  practicable,  prefer 
to  adhere  to  a  traditional  policy  recommended  to  them 
by  the  Father  of  their  country  and  confirmed  by  a  happy 
experience,  which  forbids  them  from  making  alliances  with 
foreign  nations:  Second,  Mexico  being  a  neighbor  of  the 
United  States  on  this  continent,  and  possessing  a  system 
of  government  similar  to  our  own  in  many  of  its  important 
features,  the  United  States  .  .  .  cherish  ...  a  lively  in- 
terest in  its  security,  prosperity  and  welfare.  "^ 

By  reason  of  the  relations  of  the  North  and  the  South, 
Mr.  Seward  at  that  time,  could  take  no  risk  of  involving  the 
United  States  in  war  with  any  other  country,  and  insistence 
upon  the  "Monroe  Doctrine"  in  so  many  words  would  prob- 
ably have  meant  the  recognition  of  the  Confederate  States  by 
some  such  nation  or  nations  and  consequently  war.» 

Although  the  words  "Monroe  Doctrine"  were  not  used, 
Seward  asserted  in  as  diplomatic  a  way  as  possible  under  the 
circumstances  those  principles  of  the  traditional  American  for- 
eign policy  which  were  the  basis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.'' 
When,  however,  after  the  battles  of  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg, 
the  Civil  War  began  to  turn  in  favor  of  the  Union,  Seward 
changed  his  method  of  meeting  the  situation  and  spoke  more 
boldly.  "> 

On  September  26,  1863,  Secretary  Seward  declared: 

"Their  [United  States]  own   safety  and  the  cheerful 

destiny  to  which  they  aspire  are  intimately  dependent  on 

the  continuance  of  free  republican  institutions  throughout 

Wharton,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  I,  299-338:  J.  H.  Latene,  The  U.  S.  & 
Lat.  Am.,  pp.  193-237. 

^House  Ex.  Doc.  100-37  Cong.  2  sess.,  pp.  187-190:  Br.  &  For.  St. 
Pap.,  LII,  394r-397. 

*A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  148,  149:  J.  H.  Latane,  The 
U.  S.  &■  Latin  American  pp.  217,  218:  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  ii-jSth,  Cong.,  i  Sess. 
p.  471. 

*J   B.  Moore,  Prin.  of  Am.  Diplom.,  p.  260. 

*J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  p.  226. 

49 


America  ...  In  no  case  are  we  likely  to  neglect  such  pro- 
vision for  our  own  safety  as  every  sovereign  state  must 
always  be  prepared  to  fall  back  upon."i 

On  April  4,  1864,  the  House  of  Representatives  declared 
that, 

"The  Congress  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  declare  that 
it  does  not  accord  with  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
to  acknowledge  any  monarchial  Government  erected  on 
the  ruins  of  any  republican  Government  in  America  under 
the  auspices  of  any  European  Power. "« 

In  1865  about  100,000  Union  troops,  released  from  war 
service  were  sent  to  the  Texas  border,  under  General  Sheridan, 
and  on  November  6,  1865,  Mr.  Seward,  through  John  Bigelow, 
our  Minister  at  Paris,  notified  France  that 

"The  presence  and  operations  of  a  French  army  in 
Mexico  and  its  maintenance  of  an  authority  there,  resting 
upon  force  and  not  the  free  will  of  the  people  of  Mexico, 
is  a  cause  of  serious  concern  to  the  United  States."  .  .  .' 

On  February  12,  1866,  with  the  Civil  War  well  out  of  the 
way,  Seward  demanded  that  France  state  definitely  when  she 
intended  to  withdraw  her  forces  from  Mexico,^  and  on  April 
6,  1866,  Napoleon  III.,  confronted  with  the  insistence  of  the 
United  States  upon  this  principle  of  the  doctrine,  issued  the 
necessary  orders  for  such  withdrawal.^  Maximilian's  Empire 
collapsed  in  1867  and  the  republic  was  restored. 

B.     SPAIN 

As  has  been  stated,  Spain  acted  for  a  time  with  France 
and  England  in  the  matter  of  intervention  in  Mexico  in  1861. 
One  reason  for  her  withdrawal  from  that  expedition  was  a 
desire  to  concentrate  her  efforts  in  an  attempt  to  reconquer 
Santo  Domingo.  In  pursuance  of  this  design  Spain  sent  troops 
to  Santo  Domingo  in  1861,  whereupon  the  Dominicans  appealed 
to  the  United  States. 

Mr.  Seward  then  notified  Spain  that  the  United  States, 
"Would  be  obliged  to  regard  them  [the  proceedings] 

as  manifesting  an  unfriendly  spirit  towards  the  United 

States.  "6 

diplomatic  Corresp.  (1863),  II.,  709. 

2J.  B.  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  496. 

»Ms.  Instr.  France,  XVII.,  46. 

*House  Ex.  Doc,  pj — jgth,  Cong,  i  sess. 

^Ibid,  42. 

«Seward  to  Tassara,  Apr.  2,  1861,  MS.  Notes  to  Span.  Leg.,  VII.,  200: 
Moore  Dig.  oj  Int.  Law,  VI.   515. 

Seward  to  Schurtz,  Apr.  2,  1861,  MS.  Inst.  Spain,  XV.,  263:  Moore, 
Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  515. 

50 


Spain,  however,  in  spite  of  this  protest,  annexed  Santo 
Domingo,  the  United  States  at  the  time  being  too  much  con- 
cerned with  the  Civil  War  to  carry  her  protest  to  actual  hos- 
tilities. In  view  of  Seward's  attitude  toward  the  occupation 
of  Santo  Domingo,  however,  there  can  be  no  serious  doubt 
but  that  the  United  States  when  free  of  her  domestic  difficulties, 
would  have  insisted  upon  the  applicability  of  the  Doctrine,  and 
would  have  made  the  same  demand  upon  Spain  to  evacuate 
Santo  Domingo  that  she  made  upon  France  with  reference  to 
Mexico. 

However,  before  that  time  arrived,  Spain,  finding  the 
task  too  great,  relieved  the  United  States  of  that  necessity 
by  withdrawing  from  the  island,  definitely  abandoning  the 
project  on  April  30,  1865.  ^ 

C.     GERMANY 

Shortly  after  the  settlement  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary 
question  between  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain,  which  will  be 
referred  to  hereafter,  Germany  and  Great  Britain  in  1902,  made 
demands  upon  Venezuela  arising  out  of  alleged  mistreatment  of 
their  subjects.  Other  claims  of  Germany  were  based  on  con- 
tracts between  German  subjects  and  the  government  of  Ven- 
ezuela.^  Both  European  Powers  agreed  to,  and  effected,  a 
reprisal  program,  which  included  a  blockade  of  Venezuelan  ports, 
and  the  seizing  of  Venezuelan  warships,^  in  which  procedure 
they  were  joined  by  Italy.  Germany  apparently  was  deter- 
mined to  make  a  test  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  at  the  exact  time 
when  the  United  States  was  negotiating  a  treaty  with  Colombia 
for  the  lease  of  a  canal  route  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. •» 

The  American  minister  to  Venezuela,  acting  under  in- 
structions of  the  State  Department,  persuaded  Venezuela  to 
agree  to  recognize  the  principle  of  the  claims  and  to  arbitrate 
the  amounts  of  them.^  Great  Britain  and  Italy  also  agreed 
to  this  proposition,  but  Germany  declined,^  and  it  was  only 
by  reason  of  the  direct  pressure  exerted  upon  Germany  by 
President  Roosevelt  that  Germany  finally  consented  to  arbi- 
trate. Mr.  Roosevelt  informed  the  German  ambassador  at 
Washington  that  unless  Germany  agreed  to  arbirtrate.  Admiral 
Dewey  and  the  American  fleet,  then  manoeuvering  around  the 
West  Indies,  would  be  ordered  to  Venezuelan  waters  in  ten 
days.  A  week  later  when  the  German  ambassador  declared 
that  no  word  upon  the  matter  had  been  received  from  his 

'Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  517,  518.- 

Mw.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.  (1901),  p.  193:  Am.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.  (1903), 
pp.  427-429. 

*Am.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.  (1903)  419-454:  Moore,  Dig.  oj Int.  Law,  VII., 
140. 

^T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  268,  269. 

*Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  590. 

«J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  p.  252. 

61 


government,  Roosevelt  stated  that  Admiral  Dewey's  orders 
would  be  issued  one  day  earlier,  and  gave  Germany  forty- 
eight  hours  to  agree  to  arbitrate  her  claims.  Within  thirty- 
six  hours  Germany  consented  to  do  so.^ 

At  the  outset,  Secretary  of  State,  Hay,  had  notified  Ger- 
many that  President  Roosevelt  had  stated  in  his  message  to 
Congress  of  December  3,  1901. 

"We  do  not  ask  under  this  doctrine  [Monroe]  for  any 
exclusive  commercial  dealings  with  any  other  American 
State.  We  do  not  guarantee  any  state  against  pim- 
ishment  if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punish- 
ment does  not  take  the  form  of  the  requisition  of  territory 
by  any  non- American  power."'' 

When,  however,  Germany,  with  the  justice  of  her  claim, 
conceded,  refused  to  arbitrate  the  amount,  it  began  to  look 
as  if  Germany  had  some  ulterior  motive  in  such  refusal.  Par- 
ticularly significant  was  this  refusal  in  view  of  Germany's  desire 
for  colonies. 

Germany  came  into  the  field  for  colonies  about  1890,  after 
all  available  spots  for  colonization  had  been  occupied  by  other 
nations.  Her  demand  for  colonies,  therefore,  meant  their 
seizure  from  other  powers.  In  this  respect  South  America  offered 
an  attractive  field,  particularly  in  view  of  the  number  of  German 
emigrants  located  there. ' 

When,  therefore,  Germany  refused  arbitration,  President 
Roosevelt,  without  discussing  in  words  the  traditional  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States,  and  without  referring  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  name,  all  of  which  was  weU  known  to  Germany,  at 
once  brought  into  action  the  one  force  which  has  always  stood 
behind  that  policy,  viz.,  the  American  fleet,  and  indicated  to 
the  world  in  a  most  positive  way  that  the  United  States  in- 
tended to  fight  if  necessary  in  support  of  that  policy.  The 
intimation  itself,  however,  was  sufficient. 

D.  JAPAN 
In  1912  Japan  was  generally  supposed  to  be  engaged  in  an 
attempt  to  secure  control  of  land  in  Magdalena  Bay  on  the 
Pacific  Coast  of  Mexico.  It  was  reported  that  the  purchase 
had  been,  or  was  to  be  negotiated  in  the  name  of  a  Japanese 
company.*  Such  an  indirect  method  of  securing  a  foothold  in 
the  Western  hemisphere  would  be  most  ingenious,  for  while 
nominally  title  to  such  territory  might  be  in  the  subjects  of 
Japan,  yet  in  time  of  the  Empire's  need  the  holdings  of  such 

»W.  R.  Thayer,  Lije  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,  II.,  286-288. 
*J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  President  s,  pp.  6662- 
6663:  J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  pp.  252-255. 
»A.  B   Hart,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  269-278. 
*  Congressional  Record,  62nd  Congress,  2nd  Sess.,  XLVIII.,  5661-5663. 

52 


subjects,  to  all  intents  and  purposes  would  be  the  holdings  of 

Japan. 

The  situation  appeared  to  be  so  threatening  that  Senator 

Lodge  introduced  into  the  United  Stated  Senate  a  resolution 

which  was  adopted  in  the  following  form: 

"Resolved,  that  when  any  harbor  or  other  place  in  the 
American  continents  is  so  situated  that  the  occupation 
thereof  for  naval  or  military  purposes  might  threaten  the 
communications  or  the  safety  of  the  United  States,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  could  not  see  without 
grave  concern  the  possession  of  such  harbor,  or  other 
place  by  any  corporation  or  association  which  has  such 
a  relation  to  another  Government,  not  American,  as  to 
give  that  Government  practical  power  or  control  for 
military  or  naval  purposes.  "^ 

Close  analysis  of  this  resolution  shows  the  application  of 
the  same  principle  of  our  foreign  policy  as  that  upon  which 
was  based  Monroe's  message  of  December  2,  1823.  Resting 
upon  the  same  right  of  national  self-preservation,  and  denying 
any  foreign  nation  the  right  to  interfere  in  purely  American 
concerns,  the  Lodge  resolution  follows  closely  and  logically 
the  traditional  American  foreign  policy.  Lest,  however, 
there  be  any  doubt  in  the  minds  of  any  foreign  statesmen, 
as  to  the  exact  extent  to  which  such  principle  was  applicable, 
this  resolution  proclaims  definitely  that  the  United  States 
understands  that  the  policy  applies  to  all  non-American  Powers, 
Asiatic  as  well  as  European,  and  to  all  attempts,  direct  or 
indirect,  to  secure  any  foothold  upon  the  two  American  con- 
tinents. 

E.— GREAT  BRITAIN 

At  the  time  that  the  Holy  or  Quadruple  AUiance  was 
threatening  to  intervene  in  the  affairs  of  the  Spanish-American 
colonies,  Great  Britain  was  interested  in  preventing  France 
from  extending  her  power  to  Spanish-America.  As  has  been 
stated.  Great  Britain  had  secured  great  commercial  advan- 
tages in  the  South  American  countries  by  reason  of  Spain's 
difficulties.  Her  desire  for  a  joint  declaration  with  the  United 
States  was  to  prevent  such  an  intervention. 

Canning's  suggestion  was  apparently  designed  to  make  it 
impossible  for  the  United  States  to  seciu-e  any  territory  in 
Spanish-America,  and  he  was  greatly  disappointed  when  the 
United  States,  refusing  such  a  joint  declaration,  enunciated 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  doctrine,  was  aimed  not  only 
at  the  intervention  threatened,  but  was  also  directed  against 
any  new  colonization  or  extension  of  the  political  system  of 
any  Eiiropean  power  to  the  American  Continents.     This  struck 

^Cong.  Rec.  62nd  Cong.,  2nd  Sess.,  XLVIII,  9923. 

53 


at  Great  Britain  more  than  at  any  other  nation  by  reason  of  her 
holdings  on  these  continents  which  she  could  not  thereafter 
extend  save  at  the  risk  of  war  with  the'tJmted  States. 

Great  Britain's  earlier  activities  with  reference  to  Cuba 
have  already  been  referred  to,  as  have  also  Great  Britain's 
activities  in  Mexico  in  1861  and  in  Venezuela  in  1902. 

(a)  As  TO  Cuba. 

In  1840  considerable  agitation  was  caused  by  the  report 
that  Great  Britain  was  about  to  annex  or  seize  Cuba.  On 
July  15,  1840,  Secretary  of  State  Forsyth  wrote  our  Minister 
to  Spain  that, 

"the  United  States  will  prevent  it  [transfer  of  title 

or  possession  to  Cuba  from  Spain  to  Great  Britain]  .  .  . 

at   all  hazards  .  .  .  and  ...  in   case  of  any  attempt  .  .  . 

to  wrest  from  her  this  portion  of  her  territory,  she  may 

securely  depend  upon  the  military  and  naval  resources  of 

the  United  States  to  aid  her  in  preserving  or  recovering 

it."i 

In  1843  when  British  interference  in  Cuba  was  again  feared, 
Daniel  Webster,  then  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  oiu-  Consul  at 
Havana  with  reference  to  the  same  subject  that, 

"...  the    United    States    never    would    permit    the 

occupation  of  that  Island  by  British  .  .  .  ".^ 

He  also  renewed  the  "guaranty"  of  assistance  to  Spain  to 
prevent  Cuba's  being  wrested  from  her.  No  definite  action, 
other  than  as  stated  in  the  way  of  interfering  with  Cuba  was 
taken  at  this  time  by  Great  Britain. 

From  1849  to  1851  preparations  were  on  foot  for  the  in- 
vasion of  Cuba  from  over  seas,  bv  armed  bodies  imder  the  Cuban 
patriot,  Lopez.  At  least  three  of  these  expeditions  reached 
Cuba.'  In  1851  British  and  French  representatives  at  Wash- 
ington notified  our  government  that  orders  had  been  issued 
to  their  fleets,  then  in  Cuban  waters,  to  repel  all  attempts  at 
invasion  of  Cuba.  To  this  the  United  States  replied  that 
such  steps  could 

"not  but  be  regarded  .  .  .  with  grave  disapproval,  as  in- 
volving on  the  part  of  European  sovereigns  combined 
action  of  protectorship  over  American  waters."* 

Thereafter,  on  April  23,  1852,  Great  Britain  and  France 
suggested  that  an  abnegatory  declaration  as  to  Cuba  be  exe- 

'Forsyth  to  Vail,  July  15,  1840,  MS.  Instr.  Spain,  XIV.,  Ill:  House 
Ex.  Doc.  I2i-j2nd,  Cong,  i  Sess. 

''Webster  to  Campbell,  House  Ex.  Doc,  I2i—j2nd,  Cong.,  i  Sess. 

3J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  Am.,  pp.  92-96. 

^Curtis,  Life  oj  Webster,  II.,  551. 

54 


cuted  by  them  and  by  the  United  States,  i  This  proposition, 
however,  was  definitely  rejected  by  the  United  States  and  the 
affair  ended. 

(b)  As  TO  Yucatan 

In  1848  there  was  an  Indian  outbreak  in  Yucatan  and  the 
authorities  of  that  country,  apparently  unable  to  cope  with  the 
outbreak,  offered  to  transfer  to  the  United  States  "the  dominion 
and  sovereignty' '  of  that  country.  Similar  offers  were  also  made 
to  Great  Britain  and  Spain. 

President  Polk  in  a  special  message  to  Congress  on  April 
29,  1848,  while  disclaiming  any  desire  for  the  annexation  of 
Yucatan,  referred  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  stated  that, 
"according  to  our  established  policy,  we  could  not  con- 
sent to  a  transfer  of  this  'dominion  and  sovereignty' 
to  either  Spain,  Great  Britain,  or  any  other  European 
power.  "2 

The  trouble  between  the  Indians  and  the  Whites  later 
blew  over  and  no  further  action  was  taken  by  Yucatan,  and 
there  is  no  evidence  that  Great  Britain  ever  pursued  this 
offer  of  Yucatan. 3 

This  subject  is  treated  here,  not  because  it  amounted  to 
any  test  of  the  Doctrine  initiated  by  Great  Britain,  for  it 
was  not.  It  is  so  treated,  merely  because  Yucatan  offered  to 
transfer  sovereign  rights  in  American  territory  to  Spain  and 
Great  Britain,  and  Great  Britain  was  the  more  able  and  likely 
to  accept  that  offer. 

(c)  As  TO  Belize,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  the  Bay  Islands, 

AND  TiGRE  Island. 

The  strip  of  territory  bordering  the  Caribbean  Sea,  just 
south  of  Yucatan  and  known  as  British  Honduras,  or  Belize,  has 
been,  and  may  yet  be  a  cause  of  much  concern  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  The  territory  was  formerly 
a  part  of  the  Spanish  province  of  Yucatan.  A  group  of  British 
adventurers,  engaged  in  the  business  of  cutting  and  exporting 
logwood,  settled  in  this  territory  about  1682.^  They  were 
limited  to  certain  territory  by  a  concession  from  Spain.  The 
settlers,  however,  constantly  overstepped  these  limits  and 
frequent  trouble  between  the  British  and  Spanish  resulted. 

In  1763  these  nations  sought  to  remedy  the  trouble  by  a 
treaty  whereby  Great  Britain  acknowledged  Spain's  sovereignty 
over  BeHze,   and  agreed  to  demolish  all    fortifications  con- 


^Sen.  Ex.  Doc,  13-32nd,  Cong.,  2d  sess. 

"5.  Ex.  Docs.  40,  45,  49,30th,  Cong,  i,  sess;   Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law, 
VI.,  423,  424. 

'See  generally  Br.  df  For.  St.  Pap.,  LI.,  1184,  at  seq. 
^A.  R.  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  p.  26. 

55 


structed  therein  by  the  British  settlers.*  The  settlers,  how- 
ever, still  persisted  in  extending  the  sphere  of  their  operations, 
and,  upon  war  with  England  breaking  out  in  1779,  the  Spanish 
destroyed  the  settlement.  ==  Great  Britain  thereupon  protested, 
but  took  no  other  action  against  Spain.  In  1783  the  British 
again  entered  Belize  and  engaged  in  their  log  wood  activities, 
and  again  trouble  began. » 

On  September  3,  1783,  a  new  treaty  was  negotiated  between 
Great  Britain  and  Spain  whereby  Great  Britain  again  recognized 
specifically  the  "rights  of  sovereignty  of  the  King  of  Spain" 
over  the  district  in  question.*  Friction  arose,  or  rather  contin- 
ued, even  after  this  treaty.^ 

Another  treaty  was  therefore  executed  in  1786,  which  con- 
firmed the  prior  treaties,  and  by  the  terms  of  which  Spain  allowed 
the  British  to  extend  their  woodcutting,  the  "lands  in  question, 
however,  being  indisputably  acknowledged  to  belong  of  right  to 
the  King  of  Spain. "«  i  Great  Britain  also  agreed  to  evacuate 
"the  country  of  the  Mosquitoes  as  well  as  the  continent  in  general 
and  the  islands  adjacent."     Trouble  and  warfare  still  persisted. 

A  new  treaty  was  negotiated  in  1814^  which  among  other 
things  provided  for  the  ratification  and  confirmation  of  the 
status  provided  for  in  the  treaty  of  1786,  which  as  has 
been  said,  expressly  recognized  the  sovereignty  of  Spain  over 
Belize. 

In  1825  Great  Britain  suggested  that  the  provisions  of  this 
1786  treaty  be  incorporated  in  a  proposed  treaty  between  Great 
Britain  and  New  Granada.*  In  1831  she  did  likewise  with 
reference  to  a  proposed  treaty  with  the  Republic  of  Central 
America.  9  In  1826  she  actually  incorporated  these  provisions 
in  her  treaty  with  Mexico.  *" 

It  is  clear  therefore  that  up  to  1831  Great  Britain  had  never 
acquired,  or,  in  fact,  asserted  any  title  to  this  territory. 

The  Bay  Islands,  a  group  of  small  islands  off  the  coast  of 
Belize  provided  with  good  harbors,  were  also  Spanish  territory, 
and  no  rights  whatever  under  any  of  the  treaties  mentioned 
were  ever  accorded  British  subjects  in  these  islands.  On  the 
contrary,  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of  1786  whereby  Great  Britain 

'L.  Hertslet,  Collection  oj  Treaties  Between  Great  Britain  and  Other 
Powers,  II.,  233-235. 

^A.  R.  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  pp.  41,  42. 

'L.  Hertslet,  Collection  of  Treaties,  II,  237:  A.  R.  Gibbs,  British 
Honduras,  44,  45. 

^L.  Hertslet,  Collection  of  Treaties,  II.,  235-241. 

*A.  R.  Gibbs,  British  Honduras,  49-57. 

«L.  Hertslet,  Collection  of  Treaties,  II.,  245,  255:  A.  R.  Gibbs,  Br. 
Honduras,  pp.  46,  47:  Correspondence  Relating  to  Interoceanic  Canal  etc. 
(1885),  pp.  171,  172. 

^J.  B.  Henderson,  Jr.,  American  Diplomatic  Questions,  pp.  105,  106. 
L.  Hertslet,  Collection  of  Treaties,  II.,  269-273. 

*T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  64. 

^Ibid,  p.  64. 
^"Ibid,  p.  64. 

56 


agreed  to  abandon  the  continent  and  adjacent  islands,  include<l 
within  their  scope  the  abandonment  of  the  Bay  Islands. ' 

Such  was  the  international  status  of  Belize  and  the  Bav 
Islands  until  1822  when  the  Central  American  nations  including 
Honduras  established  their  independence.  Belize  and  the  Bay 
Islands  then  naturally  came  under  the  jurisdiction  of  Honduras. 
The  title  and  the  possession  of  Honduras  to  both  remained 
unquestioned  and  undisputed  until  1835,  when  the  British 
settlers  in  Belize  undertook  to  organize  a  local  government  which 
they  styled  "British  Honduras,"  and  in  1840  proclaimed  that 
"the  law  of  England  is  and  shall  be  the  law  of  this  settlement  or 
colony  of  British  Honduras. "" 

British  Honduras  thereupon  laid  claim  to  the  strip  of  coast, 
known  as  the  Mosquito  Coast,  the  eastern  frontier  of  Honduras 
and  Nicaragua,  as  far  south  as  the  San  Juan  River,  which 
efifectually  dominated  the  eastern  entrance  of  any  interoceanic 
canal  such  as  was  then  contemplated,  through  Nicaragua.  The 
British  claim  to  the  Mosquito  Coast  rested  upon  the  absurd 
theory  that  the  tribe  of  Mosquito  Indians  who  occupied  it  had 
sovereign  rights  over  it,  and  had  requested  its  establishment 
into  a  British  Protectorate. 

But  in  the  Treaty  of  1786  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain, 
the  former  recognized  the  sovereignty  of  the  latter  over  the 
entire  Mosquito  Coast,  which  was  an  effectual  denial  of  any 
sovereignty  residing  in  the  Mosquito  Indians.  In  1841  Great 
Britain  announced  this  protectorate,  and  in  1848  in  open 
defiance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  drove  all  the  Nicaraguans 
from  the  town  of  San  Juan  del  Norte,  at  the  Mouth  of  the  San 
Juan  River,  occupied  it,  and  called  it  GreytowTi.'  The  United 
States,  however,  never  recognized  any  such  sovereignty  in  the 
Mosquito  Indians,*  and  protested  against  the  establishment  of 
any  such  alleged  protectorate. 

On_October  16,  1849  British  forces  seized  Tigre  Island  off 
the  west  coast  of  Honduras^  which  would  control  the  western 
entrance  of  any  interoceanic  canal  through  Nicaragua. 

Great  Britain,  therefore,  in  1849  occupied  Belize,  the 
Mosquito  Coast,  and  Tigre  Island  without  title  to  any  of  them. 
There  can  be  no  question  but  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
violated  by  her  then  asserted  possession  of  all  these  places. 
If  the  United  States  had  considered  the  situation  sufficiently 
menacing  and  had  been  ready  to  apply  the  Doctrine  and  the 
force  necessary  to  maintain  it,  there  was  no  valid  reason  why 


45. 


1  Hertslet  Coll.  of  Treaties,  II.,  237:  A.  R.  Gibbs,  Br.  Honduras,  pp.  44, 


^A.  R.  Gibbs,  Br.  Honduras,  p.  92. 

'J   B.  Henderson,  Jr.,  Am.  Diplo.  Questions,  pp.  106,  107. 

^Marcy  to  IngersoU,  June  9,  1843,  MS.  Instr.  Great  Britain,  XVI.,  210: 
Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  150,  151:  Marcy  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  6,  1855, 
H.  Ex.  Doc.  1-34  Cong.— I  sess.,  69,  71:  Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  164: 
J.  H.  Latan^,  The  If.  S.  and  Latin  Am.,  p.  158. 

^J.  B.  Henderson,  Jr.,  Atn.  Diplo.  Questions,  p.  109. 

57 


this  country  should  not  have  done  so.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
Mr.  Clayton,  then  Secretary  of  State,  began  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  to  secure  a  settlement  of  the  difficulties 
arising  form  Great  Britain's  activities  in  Central  America. 
These  negotiations  were  apparently  entirely  outside  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  At  least  both  Clayton  and  Bulwer,  the  British 
diplomat,  both  so  stated.  ^ 

By  the  terms  of  this  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  the   United 
States  and  Great  Britain  agreed  not  to 

"occupy  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume  or  exercise 

any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  the  Mosquito 

Coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America. "^ 


Almost  immediately  after  the,  execution  of  this  treaty, 
Great  Britain  asserted  that  Belize  was  not  a  part  of  "Central 
America"  as  that  phrase  was  used  in  the  treaty, *_^that  such 
phrase  applied  only  to  the  five  republics  formerly  grouped  in 
the  "Republic  of  Central  America,"^  and  hence  that  Belize  did 
not  come  within  the  treaty  requirement  that  Great  Britain 
abandon  such  territory  as  she  held  in  "Central  America." 
Clayton  for  some  reason  agreed  to  this  proposition, ^  and  was 
most  bitterly  criticized  therefor  in  Congress. «  It  is  to  be  noted 
that  although  Behze  was  thereby  excluded  from  "Central 
America,"  Honduras  of  which  it  had  been  and  was  a  part,  was 
included  in  "Central  America"  so  defined. 

In  1852  with  this  proposition  apparently  established.  Great 
Britain,  violating  the  treaty,  seized  the  Bay  Islands,  contending 
that  they  were  dependencies  of  Belize  and  on  July  17,  1852, 
established  them  into  the  British  "Colony  of  the  Bay  Islands." 
The  United  States  protested  against  this  seizure,  contending 
that  it  was  a  violation  of  the  Cla3^on-Bulwer  Treaty.'' 

"It  seems  to  be  a  just  conclusion  that  when  in  1852 
the  Bay  Islands  were  erected  into  a  British  'colony'  this 
was  a  flagrant  infraction  of  the  treaty;  that  as  regards 


iBulwer  letter  of  June  29,  1850,  Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  136, 
137:  Clarendon  to  Bulwer,  Julv  4,  1850,  House  Ex.  Doc.  1-34  Cong,  i  sess., 
p.  119. 

^Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  Art.  I.  Moore's  Dig.  Int  Law,  III.,  130. 

^Bulwer  letter,  June  29,  1850:  Moore's  Dig.  hit.  Law,  III.,  136,  137: 
Wharton,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  II.,  190. 

^Guatemala  Salvador,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica  and  Honduras, — Clay- 
ton Speech  in  Senate,  March  9,  1853, — Cong.  Globe,  jsd.  Cong.  2d.  sess.,  p. 
248. 

D.  G.  Munroe,  The  Five  Republics  of  Central  America. 

^Clayton  to  Bulwer,  July  4,  1850,  House  Ex.  Doc.  1-34,  Cong.  1  sess., 
119:   Moore's  Dig.  of  1 1.  Law,  137. 

^Cong.  Globe,  32,  Cong.  2d.  sess.,  App.  260-261. 

''Correspo.  Relating  to  Interoceanic  Canal,  etc.,  1885,  245:  S.  Douglass' 
speech,  Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.  2  Sess.,  App.  260-261. 

68 


Belize,  the  American  arguments  were  decidedly   stronger 
and  more  correct  historically."' 

As  a  result  of  Great  Britain's  attitude  trouble  increased 
and  the  situation  became  very  threatening. «  The  matter, 
however,  was  adjusted  by  a  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  Republic  of  Honduras,  signed  on  November  28,  1859,  pro- 
viding for  the  recognition  of  the  sovereignty  of  Honduras  over 
the  Bay  Islands,  and  that  part  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  within 
the  frontier  of  that  republic,^  and  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua, 
signed  on  January  28,  1860,  recognizing  the  lattcr's  sovereignty 
over  that  portion  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  "within  the  frontier 
of  that  republic."*  Though  England  in  1880  was  reported  to 
be  then  attempting  to  secure  a  cession  of  the  Bay  Islands  from 
Honduras  nothing  ever  developed  from  it.^ 

In  1888,  and  again  in  1894  the  United  States  protested 
against  British  interference  in  Mosquito  Coast  affairs, «  in  the 
latter  year  sending  marines  to  Bluefields  ostensibly  to  protect 
American  interests.  Great  Britain  having  landed  troops  prior 
thereto.^  On  both  occasions  Great  Britain  alleged  that  her 
interference  was  to  secure  to  the  Mosquito  Indians  rights  under 
the  British  treaty  with  Honduras  of  1860.  On  November  20, 
1894,  the  Mosquito  Indians  by  a  treaty  surrendered  to  Nicaragua 
all  their  rights  under  the  1860  British  treaty  and  this  was  ratified 
by  Nicaragua  on  February  27,  1895.  This  new  treaty  removed 
any  cause  for  further  interference  by  Great  Britain  on  that 
basis.* 

This  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  executed  in  1850  has  been 
charged  up  many  times  as  a  diplomatic  defeat  for  this  country. 
This  charge  has  been  based  in  part  upon  the  fact  that  Great 
Britain,  while  apparently  making  great  concessions,  had  nothing 
which  she  could  concede,  and  that  having  no  right  in  Central 
America,  no  such  treaty  shoiild  have  been  made  with  her. 
This  charge  has  also  been  based  on  the  fact  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  w^as  not  asserted  against  Great  Britain  as  it  might 
well  have  been. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  had  this  effect,  that  whereas 
Great  Britain  had  no  legal  rights  in  Central  America,  yet,  by 

'Cambridge  Edition  (1910)  of  the  Encylopedia  Britannica,  vol.  VI., 
495. 

"Buchanan's  Message,   Dec.  3,    1860,   Messages  and  Papers  of  the 

^Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  XLIX.,  13:  Moore's  Int.  Arbitrations,  11.,  2106. 

*Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  L.,  96-105:  Moore's  Int.  Arbitrations,  II.,  2106. 

^Evarts  to  Logan,  Mar.  4,  1880— M5.  Instr.  Cent.  Am.  XVIII.,  73: 
Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  432. 

^Bayard  to  Phelps,  Nov.  23,  1888,  House  Ex.  Doc,  50  Cong.  2d  sess., 
vol.  1,  Pt.  I.,  759-768. 

'Gresham  to  Bavard,  Apr.  30,  1894,  Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III., 
245. 

"  ^Am.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.  (1894),  Appendix  I.,  234-363:    Moore's  Dig. 
of  Int.  Law,  III.,  250-252. 

59 


becoming  a  party  to  such  treaty,  she  estabHshed  a  basis  for  her 
contention  that  she  was  to  be  considered  in  all  future  matters 
relative  to  an  interoceanic  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama. 
The  importance  of  that  fact  will  be  discussed  hereafter. 

(d)  As  TO  THE  Panama  Canal 

The  affairs  of  Belize,  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the  Mosquito 
Coast  are  most  intimately  connected  with  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  to  the  Panama  Canal,  and  the 
importance  of  these  places  in  the  political  relations  between  the 
two  coimtries  has  been  tremendously  increased  by  the  construc- 
tion and  operation  of  that  interoceanic  canal. 

"Its  relation  to  our  power  and  prosperity  as  a  nation, 

to  our  means  of  defense,  our  unity,  peace,  and  safety,  are 

matters  of  paramount  concern  to  the  people  of  the  United 

States."! 

The  control  of  the  approaches  to  both  sides  of  the  canal  are 
as  important  as  the  control  of  the  canal  itself,  or  to  put  it  in 
other  words,  the  nation  that  controls  the  islands  or  coasts  by 
which  vessels  intending  to  use  the  canal  must  pass,  effectually 
dominates  that  canal.  In  times  of  peace,  that  control  furnishes 
coaling  or  oil  stations,  and  reshipment  points,  which  relate  to 
commercial  competition  only,  but  in  times  of  war,  that  control 
vitally  affects  the  very  existence  of  any  nation  depending  upon 
that  canal  for  the  protection  of  its  shores  or  of  its  communica- 
tions. It  is  apparent  that  the  nations  controlling  such  strategic 
islands  or  coasts,  are  in  possession  of  interior  points,  that  is  points 
upon  the  line  of  communications  necessarily  passing  through 
the  canal.  They  can  base  their  war  fleets,  battleships,  swift 
cruisers,  destroyers,  submarines,  and  aircraft  upon  such  places, 
and  can  greatly  curtail  or  even  prevent  merchantmen  and  war- 
ships from  passing  such  points  and  from  entering  into  the  canal, 
by  the  simple  process  of  harassing  raids  conducted  from  such 
points.  ^2 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  is  a  semi-circle  of  islands  in  the 
Caribbean,  which  control  the  approach  to  the  canal  from  the 
East.  Jamaica  which  has  been  in  British  control  since  1655,  is  the 
innermost  of  those  islands,  and  hence  the  most  valuable  strate- 
gically, in  that  it  controls  all  routes  from  the  East,  the  other 
islands  merely  controlling  certain  alternative  passages . '  Various 
other  islands  control  the  passage  into  the  Caribbean  and  to  the 
Canal  from  the  southeast.  Bermuda  and  the  Bahama  Islands, 
also  British,  control  the  passage  between  them  and  the  North 
American  continent  from  the  North  Atlantic  into  the  Carrib- 

iPres.  Hayes'  Message  Mar.  8,  1880,  Messages  &  Papers  of  the  Pres., 
VII.,  585:  Sen.  Ex.  Doc,  ii2-46th,  Cong.  2  sess. 

^A.  Mahan,  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  on  History,  pp.  29-35:  Naval 
Strategy,  pp.  38,  53,  102,  139,  382. 

»A.  Mahan,  Naval  Strategy,  pp.  140,  194,  310,  316,  351-356. 

60 


bean,  but  are  themselves  subject  to  a  later  control  from  Florida, 
Cuba,  Porto  Rico  and  Jamaica. 

The  strategic  value  of  Belize,  the  Bay  Islands,  and  the 
Mosquito  Coast  is,  therefore,  at  once  apparent.  They,  with 
Jamaica,  would  constitute  an  effectual  eastern  control  of  the 
Canal. 

Tigre  Island  occupies  a  somewhat  similar  position  with  re- 
ference to  the  western  approach  to  the  Canal.  At  the  time  of 
the  seizures  referred  to  the  canal  contemplated  was  one  which 
would  traverse  Nicaraguan  territory  and  these  places  occupied 
a  much  more  important  strategical  position  with  reference  to 
such  a  route,  but  their  lessened  importance  with  reference 
to  the  present  canal  is  only  a  matter  of  degree. 

Undoubtedly  this  was  the  reason  why  Great  Britain,  with 
her  usual  foresight,  seized  these  places.  By  their  possession  she 
not  only  would  exercise  a  military  and  strategic  control  over 
any  canal,  but  also,  if  the  seizures  were  recognized,  would  make 
herself  a  necessary  party  to  all  proceedings  concerning  Central 
America,  and  particularly  concerning  any  interoccanic  canal. 

In  1846  the  United  States  and  Coltmibia  i  (then  New 
Granada)  executed  a  treaty  which  was  ratified  in  June,  1848, 
whereby  Colimibia  guaranteed, 

"the  United  States  that  the  right  of  way  or  transit  across 

the  Isthmus  of  Panam.a  .  .  .  shall  be  open  and  free  to  the 

.  .  .  United  States  .  .  ."i 

Apparently  stirred  by  this  treaty  Great  Britain,  as  has  been 
stated  seized  and  occupied  [Greytown  in  1848^,  and  Tigre  Island 
in  1849'  which  gave  absolute  control  over  the  east  and  west 
approach  to  any  canal  by  way  of  the  San''Juan  River  through 
Nicaragua  and  Costa  Rica,  which  then  was  the  more  preferred 
route  for  an  interoceanic  canal.  These  seizures  and  other 
activities  of  Great  Britain  in  Central  America  led  to  much 
friction  between  this  country  and  Great  Britain  resulting  in  the 
negotiation  and  execution  orthe  Clayton-Bulwer  treat^^ 

On  June  21,  1849  Hise,  our  charge  in  Central  America, 
negotiated  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua  which  would  give  the 
United  States  exclusive  rights  to  construct  a  canal  through  that 
country."  On  September  16,  1849,  Squier,  our  charg^  in  Hon- 
duras, negotiated  a  treaty  with  Honduras  providing  for  the 
cession  of  Tigre  Island  to  the  UnitedStates.' 


^Compilation  oj  Treaties  (1904),  pp.  194-206:    Corresp.  in  Relation  to 
Interoceanic  Canal.,  etc.  (1885),  p.  5:  Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  5-7. 

^H.  Ex.  Doc.  75-3ist.  Cong.,  i  sess.,  92-96. 

'Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  135:  Br.  &f  For.  St.  Pap.,  XL.,  997- 
1002,  1019. 

*Interoceanic  Canal  Corresp.,  pp.  94r-99;  133:  Br.  &f  For.  St.  Pap.,  XL. 
969. 

^Br.  &■  For.  S  .  Pap.  XL.,  997-1002,  1019. 

61 


On  October  16,  1849  Chatfield,  the  British  Minister  to 
Guatemala,  with  an  armed. force  took  possession  of  Tigre  Island 
as  has  been  stated.  The  United  States  protested  and  Great 
Britain  ordered  the  island  restored  to  Honduras. ^  For  some 
reason  these  treaties  were  never  submitted  to  the  Senate  but 
were  merely  used  as  one  basis  for  the  negotiation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  Treaty. 

Clayton  apparently  disregarded  Great  Britain's  absolute 
lack  of  sovereignty  in  Belize,  the  Mosquito  Coast,  the  Bay 
Islands,  and  Tigre  Island  in  arriving  at  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
This  treaty  is  really  the  only  occasion  wherein  the  United  States 
might  be  criticised  for  not  asserting  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  all 
its  force, 2  for  clearly  it  applied  to  Great  Britain's  hold  upon  any 
part  of  Central  America,  which  hold  was  the  only  reason  for  that 
nation  being  a  party  to  stich  a  treaty.*  It  is  to  be  noted,  how- 
ever, that  if  British  Honduras  or  Belize  did  not  come  within 
the  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  as  Great  Britain  con- 
tended,^ and  as  Clayton  later  stated,^  which  fact  alone  might 
be  argued  in  favor  of  Clayton's  manner  of  handling  the  treaty, 
then  Great  Britain's  title  to  Belize  was  not  recognized^  and  the 
\  Monroe  Doctrine  may  still  be  applied. 

As  has  been  stated,  this  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  bitterly 
assailed  in  this  country  as  a  gratuitous  concession  to  Great 
Britain,  and  as  a  surrender  or  sacrifice  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
It  does  not  in  any  way  constitute  such  a  surrender,  for  as  was 
stated  by  Clayton,  and  Clarendon,  it  was  negotiated  without 
reference  to  the  doctrine. ' 

In  the  discretion  of  the  United  States  it  was  not  then  ap- 
plied, the  emergency  apparently  not  being  deemed  sufficiently 
menacing  to  necessitate  a  resort  to  it,*  or  to  the  force  necessary 
to  maintain  it ;    Great  Britain's  title  to  Belize  however,  was  not 

iMoore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  135: 

^Buchanan  to  McClemand,  Apr.  2, 1850.  in  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  Oct.  1899 

*J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  Am.,  p.  157. 

^Bulwer  Letter  of  June  29,  1850,— Mocre's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  136, 
137:  Clarendon  to  Buchanan,  May  2,  1854,  House  Ex.  Doc,  i,  34  Cong., 
I  sess.,  89;  Br.  &  For.  St.  Pap.,  XLVL,  267. 

^Clayton  letter  to  Bulwer,  July  4,  1850,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  i,  34  Cong,  i  sess. 
119. 

Clayton  Speech  in  Senate,  March  9,  1853,  Cong.  Globe,  32nd  Cong. 
2d  Sess.,  pp.  248-251. 

^Interoceanic  Canal  Correspondence,  etc.  (1885)  234:  Wharton's 
Digest  of  Int.  Law,  II.,  190:  Clayton  to  Bulwer,  July  4,  1850,  H.  Ex.  Doc.  i- 
34th.  Cong.  ist.  sess.,  119:  Clayton  Speech  in  Senate,  March  9,  1853— 
Cong.  Globe,  32  Cong.~2d  Sess.,  Appendix  248. 

Buchanan  to  Clarendon,  Julv  22,  1854,  Wharton,  Digest  of  Int.  Law, 
II.,  193. 

''House  Ex.  Doc.  1-34,  Cong.,  ist.  Sess.,  89-119. 

^Buchanan  to  Clarendon,  Jan.  6,  1854,  Wharton  Digest  of  Int.  Law, 
II.,  191,  192. 

62 


recognized/  and  if,  in  the  future,  her  claims  to  BeHze  do  con- 
stitute a  menace  to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States, 
the  doctrine  may  then  be  resorted  to. 

The  terms  of  the  Clayton-Bidwcr  trea^ty,  applied  to  a  canal 
through  the  territory  of  Nicaragua  or  Costa  Rica,  supposedly 
to  be  built  soon  thereafter  by  private  capital,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  both  nations.  It  did  not  contemplate  a  canal  to  be 
built  by  the  United  States,  with  its  o^atl  funds  and  upon  its 
own  territory. 2 

The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  of  1901,  which  superceded  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  mentioned  for  the  first  time  any  canal  to 
be  constructed  "under  the  auspices  of  the  Government  of  the 
United  States."*  It  also  provided  that  "the  said  Government 
shall  have  and  enjoy  all  the  rights  incident  to  such  constniction, 
as  well  as  the  exclusive  rights  of  providing  for  the  regulation  and 
management  of  the  canal."  Even  this  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty 
still  contemplated  the  Nicaraguan  Canal  and  did  not  refer  to 
any  canal  to  be  built  through  United  States  territory. 

The  canal  however,  which  was  actually  built  traversed 
territory  over  which  the  United  States  had  sovereign  rights, 
and  was  built  with  American  money.  In  addition  to  securing 
from  the  Republic  of  Panama  the  cession  of  the  Canal  Zone,* 
the  United  States  acquired  the  rights  of  the  French  Canal  Com- 
pany. Hence,  because  of  the  fact  that  the  canal  was  constructed 
through  American  territory  instead  of  through  foreign  territory, 
neither  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  nor  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty  apply  to  the  present  canal, ^  for  it  is  well  settled  that 
treaties  made  with  reference  to  known  conditions  existing  at  the 
time  of  such  execution  cease  to  be  obligatory  "so  soon  as  the 
conditions  upon  which  they  were  executed,  are  essentially 
altered."* 

I'rhe  Foreign  Relations  Committee  of  the  United  States  Senate  on 
February  11,  1853,  reported  a  resolution  to  the  Senate  to  the  effect  that 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  after  this  Bulwer  reservation  amounted  to  an 
admission  by  both  nations  that  "nothing  contained  in  the  treaty  [Clayton- 
Bulwer]  was  to  be  considered  as  affecting  the  title  or  existing  rights  of 
Great  Britain  to  the  English  settlements  in  Honduras  Bay.  .  .  "  Cong. 
Globe,  32d  Cong.,  2  sess.,  p.  567. 

^Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  Preamble,  Arts.  I,  VIII:  Compilation  of 
Treaties  in  Force,  (1904),  pp.  327,  328:  Correspondence  in  Rel.  to  Interoceantc 
Canal  {1885),  pp.  99-101. 

Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  130: 

J.  H.  Latan6,  The  U.  S.  and  Lattn  Am.,  pp.  144,  145,  165. 

^Compilation  of  Treaties  {1904)  pp.  380-382:  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  85,— 57th 
Cong.  ist.  sess.  7:  Moore,  Digest  of  Int.  Law,  III.,  219-221.:  M.  Poindexter, 
American  Rights  in  Panama,  in  Fotum,  February,  1921. 

^Am.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.  (1904),  p.  543:  Compilation  of  Treaties  (1904), 
pp. 609-616. 

^M.  Poindexter,  Am.  Rights  in  Pa^iama,  in  Forum,  Feb.,  1921,  pp. 
134,  136. 

Hannis  Taylor,  Int.  Pub.  Law,  pp.  148,  400. 

«Hannis  Taylor,  Int.  Pub.  Law,  p.  400:   Oppenheim  Int.  Law,  I.  550. 

63 


Acting  upon  this  principle  Congress  enacted  a  law  in  1912 
which  exempted  American  vessels  from  the  payment  of 
canal  tolls.  This,  however,  was  only  after^  a  long  and  bitter 
debate  in  which  the  British  contention  was  most  vigorously 
put  forward  that  Great  Britain's  rights  under  the  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaty  would  be  infringed  in  that  the  provision  as  to  the 
canal  being  "free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  ...  of  all  nations 
...  on  terms  of  entire  equality,"  prohibited  such  toll  exemption. 

In  1914  President  Wilson  under  a  veiled  implication  as  to 
difficult  international  relations,  requested  Congress  to  repeal 
that  law,  which  Congress  did.^' 

In  1921  Senator  Borah  introduced  a  bill  into  the  Senate  to 
re-establish  that  toll  exemption. 

The  United  States  has  the  right  to  establish  such  rules 
governing  American  ships  with  reference  to  the  use  of  the  Canal 
as  it  deems  proper,  particularly  is  this  true  as  to  coastwise  ships 
which  must  necessarily  be  American.  The  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  apart  from  its  abrogation  in  1901,  had  been  previously 
broken  by  Great  Britain,  by  the  refusal  to  withdraw  from 
Central  America  and  by  her  seiziu-e  of  the  Bay  Islands  and 
therefore  no  longer  bound  the  United  States,  if  they  elected  not 
so  to  be  bound. 2  The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  does  not  apply 
in  that  it  referred  to  conditions  which  did  not  attend  the  con- 
struction of  the  present  Canal.  Even  if  it  did  apply,  the  phrase 
"open  to  the  vessels  ...  of  all  nations  ...  on  terms  of  entire 
equality"  logically  refer  to  nations  other  than  the  United  States. 
That  this  is  so  is  indicated  by  the  position  of  Great  Britain  in 
not  contending  that  United  States  naval  vessels  shoiild  pay  tolls, 
as  they  do  not,  while  those  of  other  nations  do.  It  would  be 
absurd  to  make  such  a  contention  because  it  would  simply  mean 
that  the  United  States  would  pay  tolls  to  itself.  Yet  the  same 
provisions  in  the  treaty  covers  "vessels  of  commerce  and  war." 

This  question  of  tolls  is  but  an  incidental  question,  the 
settlement  of  which  however,  will  have  a  distinct  effect  upon  the 
future  of  this  country,  because  while  it  is  but  an  incident  in  the 
affairs  of  the  canal  it  really  goes  to  the  gist  of  the  question  of 
whether  the  United  States  is  to  be  the  exclusive  sovereign  over 
its  own  territory.  Its  settlement  may  have,  and  undoubtedly 
will  have  a  very  vital  effect  upon  the  future  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

(e)  As  TO  Venezuela. 

Great  Britain  secured  title  to  British  Guiana  from  Holland 
under  the  treaty  of  1814.  The  territory  then  ceded,  however, 
was  merely  described  as,   "the  establishments  of  Demarara, 

^As  to  this  implication  see  The  London  Letters  of  Walter  H.  Page,  in 
World's  Work,  Sept.,  1921. 

^Frelinghuysen  Despatch,  May  8, 1882,  Corresp.  re  Interoceanic  Canal, 
etc.  (1885),  pp.  160,  161. 

64 


Essequibo,  and  Berbice,"  and  thenceforth  the  boundary  of  this 
ceded  territory  was  in  dispute. ^ 

Great  Britain  began  pushing  her  claim  of  jurisdiction  north 
and  west,  and  in  1841  sent  Schomburgk,  an  Engineer  to  Guiana, 
to  erect  boundary  posts. ^  These  were  erected  far  to  the  north 
and  west  of  any  previous  boundary  claims,  but  were  asserted  by 
Great  Britain  to  be  merely  "a  preliminary  measure,"^  and  to 
leave  open  for  discussion  the  determination  of  the  correct 
boundary.  Gradually,  while  Venezuela  was  constantly  pro- 
testing against  the  encroachment,  British  colonists  pushed  still 
further  north  and  west  into  Venezuelan  territory,  and  Great 
Britain  pushed  its  claim  of  title  north  and  west  with  them. 
Venezuela  frequently  appealed  to  Great  Britain  to  arbitrate, 
but  Great  Britain  constantly  refused,  or  offered  to  arbitrate 
only  a  part  of  that  territory  which  Venezuela  claimed  to  be 
improperly  occupied  by  Great  Britain,  and  refused  to  arbitrate 
title  to  any  territory  within  the  Schomburgk  "preliminary" 
line.* 

President  Cleveland,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress  on 
December  17,  1895, ^  which  was  based  to  a  large  extent  on  a 
despatch  which  Richard  Olney,  Secretary  of  State,  had  sent  to 
Great  Britain,  on  July  20,  1895, ^  and  Lord  Salisbury's  reply 
thereto  of  November  26,  1895,  Mnsisted  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine controlled  the  situation  and,  called  for  the  appointment  of 
an  American  Commission  which  was  to  be  sent  to  Venezuela  to 
report  to  the  United  States  upon  the  true  boundar3^  If  Great 
Britain  persisted  in  claiming  beyond  that,  it  would  undoubtedly 
have  meant  war,  for  President  Cleveland  in  that  same  message 
said, 

"When  vSuch  report  is  made  and  accepted,  it  will,  in 
my  opinion,  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  resist  by 
every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  aggression  upon  its 
rights  and  interests,  the  appropriation  by  Great  Britain 
of  any  lands  or  the  exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction  over 
any  territory  which  after  investigation  we  have  determined 
of  right  belongs  to  Venezuela.  In  making  these  recom- 
mendations I  am  fully  alive  to  the  responsibility  incurred, 
and  keenly  realize  all  the  consequences  that  may  follow. 

I  am,  nevertheless,  firm  in  my  conviction  that  while 
it  is  a  grievous  thing  to  contemplate  the  two  great  English- 
speaking  peoples  of  the  world  as  being  otherwise  than 
friendly  competitors  in  the  onward  march  of  civilization, 


ij.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  p.  238. 
^G.  Cleveland,  Presidential  Problems,  pp.  178,  182. 
Ubid,  pp.  178-180. 
'Ibid,  pp.  177-270. 

^Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  ji — 54  Cong.,  ist.  sess.;   Richardson's  Messages  and 
Papers  of  the  Presidents,  IX.,  655. 

^Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  31 — 34  Cong.  ist.  sess.,  p.  4. 
Ubid,  22. 

65 


and  strenuous  and  worthy  rivals  in  all  arts  of  peace, 
there  is  no  calamity  which  a  great  nation  can  invite  which 
equals  that  which  follows  a  supine  submission  to  wrong  and 
injustice,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  national  self-respect 
and  honor,  beneath  which  are  shielded  and  defended  a 
people's  safety  and  greatness." 

Lord  Salisbury  in  his  reply  to  Olney  had  denied  the  ap- 
plicability of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  situation.  For  a  time 
affairs  were  very  threatening.  Great  Britain  however,  capitu- 
lated and  agreed  to  arbitrate  the  matter  with  Venezuela. 
Strangely  enough,  considering  Great  Britain's  prior  refusals  to 
arbitrate,  the  decision  was  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  advantage 
of  Great  Britain. ^ 

Cleveland  and  Olney  have  been  many  times  criticised  for 
their  handling  of  this  situation.  But  their  insistence  upon  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  applicability  was  as  logical,  cogently 
reasoned,  and  as  thoroughly  American  in  its  purpose  and  effect 
as  well  might  be  desired.  The  later  developments  in  the  Carib- 
bean and  in  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  prove  that  both  Cleveland 
and  Olney  had  the  foresight  which  probably  saved  this  country 
much  future  trouble. 

"It  was  a  great  triimiph  of  American  diplomacy. "" 

'G.  Cleveland,  Presidential  Problems,  212-211 . 

^J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  p.  249. 


66 


CHAPTER  IX.— COMMENTS,  CRITICISMS,  AND  FALLACIES 

Many  mistakes  and  misinterpretations  have  arisen  rela- 
tive to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  such  as  the  following: 

A.  That  George  Canning,  the  British  statesman,  was 
the  author  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  that  the  British 
fleet  has  ever  supported  it. 

B.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  changed,  or 
extended  beyond  its  original  scope. 

C.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  guaranty  given  by 
the  United  States  to  Spanish  America. 

D.  That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been  con- 
sistently applied  by  the  United  States. 

E.  That  the  Doctrine  is  a  prohibition  against  the 
acquisition  of  new  territory  by  the  United  States. 

A.  British  Authorship  and  Supfort  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

It  has  been  frequently  said  by  Americans  as  well  as  by 
others  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  suggested  by  George 
Canning  and  that  the  credit  of  originating  it  should  be  his.i  In 
this  respect  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Canning's  biographer 
does  not  go  so  far,  as  he  merely  states  that  Canning's  acts 
"encouraged,  if  it  did  not  originate,"  the  Doctrine. ^  In  addi- 
tion to,  and  in  connection  with  this,  it  is  also  frequently  stated 
that  from  1823  to  date  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  rested  upon, 
and  has  been  supported  by  the  "broad  back  of  the  British 
fleet. "2  A  mere  cursory  study  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  its 
origin,  and  its  history,  utterly  disproves  both  statements,  and 
emphasizes  the  fact  that  in  its  philosophy,  its  origin  and  its 
history,  as  has  been  admitted  by  Reddaway,  the  British  writer, 
it  is  essentially  and  solely  American,^  and  that  far  from  being 
supported,  it  has  never  been  recognized  as  a  controlling  prin- 
ciple by  any  great  power,  but  has  always  been  challenged  and 
opposed  by  all  the  European  powers,  including  Great  Britain. 

The  allegation  of  British  authorship  rests  practically  upon 
the  following  basis: 

(a)  Canning's  inquiry  of  Rush  on  August  16, 1823,  as  to  the 
possibility  of  the  United  States  joining  with  Great  Britain  in  a 

i"The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  now  familiarly  called,  proceeded  from 
Canning.  He  was  its  inventor,  promoter,  and  champion,  at  least  so  far  as 
it  bears  against  European  intervention  in  American  affairs."  W.  G. 
Sumner,  Prophetic  Voices  Concerning  America,  p.  157:  T.  B.  Edgington, 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  51 :  J.  S.  Ewart,  The  Canning  Policy,  in  Kingdom 
Papers,  No.  16,  pp.  171,  173.  Mr.  Ewart  even  says  that  "Canning  per- 
suaded Monroe  to  send  to  Congress  his  message."  (J.  S.  Ewart,  Kingdom 
Papers,  I,  No.  6. 

''A.  G.  Stapleton,  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  II.,  39. 

'Owen  Wister,  A  Square  Deal,  pp.  120,  137. 

*W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  28. 

67 


"joint  declaration"  opposing  intervention  by  France  or  the  Holy 
Alliance  in  Spanish  America. ^ 

(b)  Canning'  letter  of  August  20,  1823,  to  Rush  relative 
to  his  earlier  inquiry,  and  stating  his  five  propositions  under- 
lying Great  Britain's  attitude  toward  the  Spanish  colonies. 2 

(c)  Canning's  speech  of  December  12,  1826,  defending  his 
position  with  reference  to  the  French  invasion  of  Spain,  in 
which  he  said : 

"I  looked  another  way.  I  sought  material  for  com- 
pensation in  another  sphere.  ...  I  called  the  NewWorld 
into  existence,  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  old."^ 

(d)  Canning'  letter  of  December  31,  1823,  to  Sir  William 
a  Court  to  the  effect  that, 

"while  I  was  yet  hesitating  what  shape  to  give  to  the 
declaration  and  protest  which  ultimately  was  conveyed 
in  my  conference  with  P.  de  Polignac;  and  while  I  was 
more  doubtful  as  to  the  effect  of  that  protest  and  declara- 
tion, I  sounded  Mr.  Rush  (the  American  minister  here) 
as  to  his  powers  and  disposition,  to  join  in  any  step  which 
we  might  take  to  prevent  a  hostile  enterprise  on  the  part 
of  the  European  powers  against  Spanish  America.  He 
had  no  powers;  but  he  would  have  taken  upon  himself 
to  join  with  us,  if  we  would  have  begun  by  recognizing  the 
Spanish-American  States.  But  I  have  no  doubt  that  his 
report  to  his  government  of  this  sounding  (which  he 
probably  represented  as  an  overture)  I  had  a  great  share  in 
producing  the  explicit  declarations  of  the  President."* 

But  an  analysis  of  Canning's  acts  and  statements,  in  addi- 
tion to  revealing  the  fact  that  he  totally  ignored  the  recognition 
of  the  South  American  nations  by  the  United  States,  shows  that 
he  desired, 

1.  A  joint  declaration  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
intervention  only. 

2.  A  pledge  from  the  United  States  that  it  wotdd 
not  in  any  way  acquire  any  Spanish-American  territory. ^ 

A  review  of  the  cabinet  discussions  which  took  place  prior 
to  the  publication  of  the  message  conclusively  proves  that  both 
suggestions  were  voted  down,«  and  that  it  was  finally  deter- 
mined to  answer  the  Russian  Minister  Von  Tuyll,  and  to  make 
that  answer  the  vehicle  for  declaring  to  the  world,  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  toward  the  threat  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
against  Spanish  America,  and  toward  Russia's  claim  to  Oregon, 

'R.  Rush,  The  Court  of  London  from  i8ig  to  1825,  pp.  361,  366. 

^Ibid,  376,  378;   Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  2d.  Series,  XV.,  415,  416. 

^Hansard,  Pari.  Debates  new  series,  XVI,  398. 

*A.  G.  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  his  Times,  pp.  394-396. 

6J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  177,  178. 

Hbid,  VI.,  178,  179. 

68 


thereby  rendering  any  special  answer  to  Canning  xmnecessary. 
According  to  Reddaway,  a  British  writer,  "the  cabinet  of 
Monroe  was  full  of  suspicion  of  Great  Britain,  "i  believing, 
"both  that  Great  Britain  might  be  induced  to  return  to  her 
allegiance  [to  the  Holy  Alliance],  and  that  the  object  of  the 
European  league  was  the  overthrow  of  liberty,  first  in  South  and 
then  in  North  America. "^  Canning's  suggestion  was  not 
followed,  therefore,  and  no  claim  of  British  authorship  can 
properly  be  based  upon  that  phase  of  the  transactions. 

Canning,  patriotically  and  rightfully  enough,  believed  that 
"The  interests  of  his  own  native  land,  are  those  to  which  above 
all  others  a  Statesman  should  attend.  "^  Washington  had  the 
same  belief.*  Canning  put  that  belief  into  practice,  and  his 
entire  policy  with  reference  to  the  Spanish-American  colonies 
was  based  upon  it.  As  Rush  said,  Canning's  policy  ' 'was  British 
selfishness  .  .  .  this  was  its  beginning  and  its  end;  this  its  in- 
spiring principle,  and  only  aim.''^  His  policy  was  "essentially 
British.  "6 

Canning  was  interested  only  in  preventing  the  threatened 
intervention  by  France  or  by  the  Holy  Alliance,  in  Spanish- 
America,  and  that  because  of  British  interests.'  France,  by 
reason  of  her  invasion  of  Spain  in  spite  of  British  opposition, 
and  by  reason  of  the  restoration  of  Ferdinand  VU,  a  "legiti- 
mist" to  the  Spanish  throne,  had  gained  a  great  ascendancy  in 
European  political  affairs.  If  France  should  undertake  to 
suppress  the  revolution  in  the  Spanish  colonies  and  should  suc- 
ceed, it  was  probable  that  some  of  them  would  be  expected  by 
her,  and  would  be  ceded  to  her  by  Spain,  as  a  recompense  for 
her  expense  and  effort.  As  has  been  stated,  Great  Britain,  as 
a  result  of  these  revolutions,  had  secured  an  immense  trade  with 
the  Spanish-American  nations,  which  had  been  denied  her  before, 
and  undoubtedly  would  be  denied  her  again  if  Spain  or  France 
should  secure  possession  of  them. 

The  large  and  powerful  merchant  class  of  England  was 
rising  in  protest  against  any  conditions  which  would  curtail 
British  trade,  and  was  insisting  that  such  intervention  by  France 
would  accomplish  that  end,  and  hence  must  be  prevented. 
Great  Britain's  "newly-won  commercial  supremacy  must  be 
maintained  and  developed."*  In  other  words,  British  com- 
merce "was  the  lode  star  of  the  British  statesman.  "^ 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  40. 

^Ibid,  19;  Rush  to  Adams,  Dec.  27,  1823,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc,  2d  Series, 
XV.,  434-436. 

^A.  G.  Stapleton,  Political  Lije  of  George  Canning,  I.,  134. 

*H.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II.,  144. 

^R.  Rush,  The  Court  of  London  from  1819  to  1825,  p.  466. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  1,  3. 

Ubid,  17. 

*W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  12,  13. 

^Ibid,  pp.  21,  23:  Rush  to  Adams,  Dec.  27,  1823,  Mass.  Hist.  Soc, 
2d  Series,  XV.,  434-436;  G.  F.  Tucker,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  8.:  A. 
Mahan,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  in  National  Review  (1903),  XL.,  874. 

69 


Castlereagh  had  been  Mettemich's  "second  self"  so  far  as 
legitimacy  went.^  and  his  successor,  George  Canning,  in  opinion, 
also  was  a  "legitimist"  from  beginning  to  end.^  However 
Canning  decided  that  the  principles  of  "legitimacy"  must,  as 
a  practical  matter,  yield  to  the  interests  of  commerce.  He, 
therefore,  endeavored  by  every  means  possible  to  prevent  inter- 
vention, and  when  he  felt  that  he  could  not  count  on  a  joint 
declaration  with  the  United  States,  he  secured  from  France  a 
declaration  to  the  effect  that  she  woidd  not  intervene.^  Having 
received  such  an  assurance,  on  October  9,  1823*  he  took  no 
further  steps  toward  joint  action  with  the  United  States. 

Canning  was  not  in  accord  with  the  fundamental  basis  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  viz.,  the  protection  of  republican  principles 
in  the  United  States  by  the  protection  of  the  same  principles  in 
South  as  well  as  Central  America.  This  is  clearly  shown  by 
his  letter  to  Sir  William  a  Court,  already  referred  to,  dated 
December  31, 1823,  in  part  as  follows : 

"Monarchy  in  Mexico  and  monarchy  in  Brazil  would 
cure  the  evils  of  universal  democracy  and  prevent  the 
drawing  of  the  line  of  demarcation  which  I  most  dread — 
America  vs.  Europe.  The  United  States  naturally  enough, 
aim  at  this  division  and  cherish  the  democracy  which  leads 
to  it."'> 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  Canning  merely  desired  to  prevent 
intervention.  He  never  anticipated,  and  never  accepted  the 
other  principle  laid  down  in  Monroe's  mesage  to  the  effect  that 
the  American  continents  were  no  longer  subjects  for  future 
colonization.  In  a  letter  to  Bagot,  the  British  Minister  at 
Washington,  dated  January  9,  1824,  Canning  said, 

"It  is  hardly  necessary  for  me  to  add  .  .  .  that  the 

principle  .  .  .  prohibiting  colonization  ...  is  as  new  to  this 

Government  as  that  of  France. "« 

He  wrote  Granville  on  December  17,  1824,  a  year  later, 
that 

"The  fight  has  been  hard,  but  it  is  won.  Spanish 
America  is  free ;  and  if  we  do  not  mismanage  our  matters 
sadly,  she  is  English."^ 

W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  18,  22,  24. 
T.  B.  Edgington,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  49. 

*"I  am  no  more  a  lover  of  revolution  than  Prince  Metternich.  T 
have  certainly  passed  near  thirty  years  in  fighting  for  old  institutions." 
(Stapleton's  George  Canning  and  his  Times,  380) :  W.  F.  Reddaway,  The 
Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  24:  R.  Rush,  The  Court  at  London,  from  1819-1825, 
p.  467. 

'A.  G.  Stapleton,  Political  Life  of  George  Canning,  II.,  26. 

*Ibid,  II.,  26,  32. 

^A.  G.  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  his  Times,  394-396:  Moore's 
Digest  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  410. 

*C.  H.  Sherrill,  Modernizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  85. 

^A.  G.  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  pp.  407-411. 

70 


This  may  have  referred  to  commercial  relations  and  it  may 
also  have  referred  to  something  more  than  mere  commercial 
relations.  ^ 

Canning  asserted  further  that, 

"Great  Britain  could  not  acknowledge  the  right  of 
any  power  to  proclaim  such  a  principle,  much  less  to  bind 
other  countries  to  the  observance  of  it.  If  we  [Great 
Britain]  were  to  be  repelled  from  the  shores  of  America,  it 
would  not  matter  to  us  whether  that  repulsion  were 
effected  by  the  Ukase  of  Russia  excluding  us  from  the  sea, 
or  by  the  new  Doctrine  of  the  President  prohibiting  us 
from  the  land.  But  we  cannot  yield  obedience  to  either."^ 
He  also  contended  that, 

"The  principle  was  one  which  his  Majesty's  Ministers 
were  prepared  to  combat  in  the  most  unequivocal  man- 
ner."* 

This  principle  indeed  was  aimed  at  Great  Britain  as  much, 
as  it  was  aimed  at  any  other  nation.  Considering  Great  Bri- 
tain's apparent  designs  in  the  Northwest,  in  the  West  Indies, 
and  in  Central  as  well  as  South  America,  that  principle,  if 
carried  out  by  the  United  States,  would  work  to  Great  Britain's 
very  great  disadvantage.  In  effect  it  created  a  deadlock  with 
Great  Britain. »  Accordingly  Canning  challenged  this  prin- 
ciple to  the  very  end  and  never  accepted  it,*  which  is  rather 
convincing  evidence  that  he,  at  least,  never  claimed  any  credit 
for  authorship  of  that  principle. 

If  other  proof  were  needed,  however,  it  is  at  hand  in  ample 
quantity.  Canning's  first  reported  conversation  upon  this 
matter  with  Mr.  Rush  was  on  August  16,  1823,  and  his  first 
letter  to  Mr.  Rush  on  August  20,  1823.  It  was  on  the  first  of 
these  occasions  that  Canning  inquired  as  to  the  possibility  of  a 
joint  declaration,  and  on  the  latter  that  he  suggested  his  five 
principles  already  referred  to.  Clearly,  if  there  was  any  British 
authorship  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  must  be  found  in  the 
transactions  covered  by  these  two  occasions.  But  if  the  pri- 
mary principles  enunciated  by  President  Monroe  had  been 
enunciated  prior  to  August,  1823,  Canning  can  not,  of  course, 
be  regarded  as  the  father  of  them. 

The  "Non-colonization"  principle  had  been  set  forth  by 
Adams  in  his  conference  upon  the  Oregon  situation  with  Von 
Tuyll  on  July  17,  1823,^  and  again  in  his  letter  of  instructions  to 
Rush  of  July  22,  1823, «  and  in  a  similar  letter  sent  at  the  same 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  p.  97:  J.  B.  Henderson,  Jr. 
Am.  Diplo.  Questions,  p.  339. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  97. 

>Ibid,  p.  114. 

*W.  F.  Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  p.  349:  R.  Rush,  The 
Court  at  London,  from  181Q-1825,  p.  419. 

*J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  VI.,  163. 

Mw.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.,  V.,  447. 

71 


time  to  Middleton,  our  Minister  to  Russia. i  The  first  of  these 
events  antedated  by  a  month  Canning's  first  talk  with  Mr. 
Rush.  Canning  could  not  possibly  have  been  a  "posthimious" 
father. 

The  other  principle  of  "non-intervention"  by  European 
nations  was  more  or  less  definitely  suggested  by  Washington  in 
1792,  when  he  refused  topermit  any  interposition  or  mediation  by 
Great  Britain  in  the  struggle  then  going  on  between  the  United 
States  and  the  Indians.  It  was  developed  by  the  repeated  de- 
clarations against  Spain's  transfer  of  Cuba  to  any  other  power. 
It  was  most  definitely  proclaimed  in  1811  by  President  Madison^ 
and  approved  by  Congress  with  reference  to  Florida.  Madison's 
message  of  1811  and  Monroe's  of  1823,  were  both  based  upon 
the  same  principle  viz.,  that  the  "United  States  had  the  right 
to  limit  the  action  of  foreign  powers  with  regard  to  territory 
within  the  western  hemisphere  but  beyond  their  own  borders, 
in  order  to  prevent  possible  injury  to  their  interests. "^ 

On  May  13,  1818,  more  than  five  years  before  Canning's 
talk  with  Rush,  Monroe  proposed  at  a  cabinet  meeting  the 
following : 

"Whether  Ministers  of  the  United  States  in  Europe 
shall  be  instructed  that  the  United  States  will  not  join  in 
any  project  of  interposition  between  Spain  and  the  South 
Americans,  which  should  not  be  to  promote  the  complete 
independence  of  those  provinces."* 

With  this  principle  clearly  enunciated  some  twelve  years 
before  Monroe's  message,  and  suggested  by  Monroe  himself  over 
five  years  before  it,  the  claim  of  British  authorship  does  not 
rest  on  very  secure  foundations. 

As  a  matter  of  fact.  Canning  denied  any  connection  with 
the  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  very  carefully 
pointed  out  to  France  the  difference  between  Great  Britain's 
principles  and  those  set  forth  in  Monroe's  message. ^ 

The  most  conclusive  evidence  against  Canning  is  furnished 
by  Canning  himself.  In  a  letter  to  Bagot  dated  January  9, 1824, 
recently  discovered.  Canning  said, 

"The  first  and  most  essential  difference  is  that  .  .  . 
The  United  States  have  actually  acknowledged  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  late  Spanish  Colonies,  while  His  Majesty's 
Government  continues  still  to  withhold  such  recognition.  .  . 
...  If  the  message  ...  is  to  be  considered  as  objecting 
to  an  attempt  to  recover  her  dominions  on  the  part  of  Spain 

^Ibid,  436. 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  9. 

^Ibid,  p.  10. 

*J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  IV.,  91-92. 

*W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  95,  96,  97. 

72 


herself,  there  is  again  as  important  a  difference  between  his 
[Monroe]  view  of  the  subject  and  ours  as  perhaps  it  is 
possible  to  conceive,  "i 

The  policy  of  non-intervention  and  neutrality  established 
by  Washington  at  least  as  early  as  1793  was  novel  to  the  world. 
It  was  the  logical  outcome  of  the  great  struggle  for  liberty.  The 
development  of  that  principle  into  "America, — hands  off 
Europe,"  and  "Europe, — ^hands  off  America"  was  just  as  logical 
and  as  purely  American.  As  Reddaway,  the  British  author, 
puts  it, 

"For  forty  years  the  United  States  had  been  hastening 

toward  the  position  that  they  assumed  in  1823. "2 

_  Far  from  being  suggested  by  British  statesmen,  it  is  a  most 
distinctively  American  creation.  Reddaway  says  that  "the 
negotiations  between  Rush  and  Canning  merely  determined  the 
time  and  manner  of  the  enunciation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  "3 
This  is  the  most  that  can  truthfully  be  said  of  Canning's  con- 
ferences with  Rush. 

The  claim  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  rested  for  its  ^ 
support  upon  the  British  fleet  is  just  as  unsound  as  is  the  claim 
of  British  authorship.  A  review  of  the  events  in  which  the 
doctrine  was  tested  shows  that  at  no  time  was  Great  Britain  or 
the  British  fleet  supporting  the  position  of  the  United  States, 
but  on  the  other  hand  was  either  engaged  in  an  individual  effort 
of  Great  Britain's,  or  was  indifferently  disposed,  while  Great 
Britain  consented  to  the  effort  of  some  other  nation  to  test  the 
doctrine,  e.g.,  Great  Britain's  attempt  on  Cuba  in  1825,  on 
Venezuela  from  1840  to  1895,  her  joint  attempts  with  Spain 
and  France  resulting  in  the  French  invasion  of  Mexico  in  1862, 
and  her  joint  effort  with  Italy  and  Germany  against  Venezuela 
in  1902. 

The  closest  approach  to  any  basis  of  fact  for  such  a  state- 
ment is  furnished  by  the  reported  action  of  the  British  fleet  with 
respect  to  the  German  Fleet  in  Manila  Bay  in  1898,  at  the  time 
when  Admiral  Dewey  was  preparing  for  his  attack  upon  the 
Spanish  forts.  However,  at  that  time  Germany  was  just  eight 
years  advanced  on  her  naval  colonial  expansion  program,  which 
ultimately  brought  on  the  World  War  in  1914.  She  was  then 
fast  becoming  a  great  commercial  and  territorial  rival  of  Great 
Britain.  She  had  already  acquired  coaling  stations  and  other 
possessions  throughout  the  world.  Great  Britain,  therefore, 
feared  Germany  and  any  effort  which  might  have  been  exerted 
by  the  British  Fleet  at  that  time  was  a  measure  of  self-protection 
for  Great  Britain  and  not  of  friendliness  toward  the  United 
States,  or  in  support  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

^Charles  H.  Sherrill,  Modernizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  84,  85. 
''W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  p.  3. 
Ubid,  14. 

73 


The  Monroe  Doctrine,  therefore,  is  a  poHcy  thoroughly 
American  in  its  conception,  development  and  application.  It 
"was  formulated  by  Americans  to  promote  American  interests. "^ 
For  its  efficacy  it  has  rested  solely  upon  the  power  of  the  United 
States  and  must  necessarily  continue  so  to  do. 

B.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Changes,  or  Extensions 
Thereof. 
There  are  some  critics  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  who,  in 
effect,  hold  that  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine  no  longer  exists,* 
that  it  has  been  expanded, ^  enlarged,  warped  or  distorted  so 
that  in  its  present  state  neither  President  Monroe  nor  John 
Quincy  Adams  wotdd  recognize  it  as  their  "literal  teaching."* 
There  is,  of  course,  no  question  but  that  the  particular  circum- 
stances which  obtained  in  1823  have  long  since  ceased  to  exist. 
The  message  of  Monroe,  however,  was  not  intended  to  be 
limited  to  those  particular  circiunstances,  but  was  intended  to 
set  forth  general  principles^  subject  to  future  application  as  cir- 
cimistances  might  require.  Its  terminology,  general  in  char- 
acter, the  antecedent  cabinet  discussions,  the  statements  and 
understanding  of  those  who  had  to  do  with  it,  all  point  to  the 
fact  that  it  was  not  a  mere  statement  of  policy  for  that  period 
only.  Jefferson,  for  instance,  in  his  letter  to  President  Monroe 
of  October  24,  1823,  preceding  the  drafting  of  the  message,  and 
referring  to  the  principles  set  forth  in  the  message,  said 

"This  sets  our  compass  and  points  the  course  which 
we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us. 
.  .  .  Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be  never 
to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second, 
never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic 
affairs. 

"We  will  oppose  with  all  our  means,  the  forcible  inter- 
position of  any  other  power,  as  auxiliary,  stipendiary,  or 
under  any  other  form  or  pretext,  and  more  especially  their 
transfer  to  any  other  power  by  conquest,  cession  or  acqui- 
sition in  any  other  way.''^ 

The  grounds  generally  stated  in  support  of  the  assertion  of 
a  change  in,  or  enlargement  of  the  Doctrine  are  the  following: 

(a)  Henry  Clay's  notification  to  France  of  October  25, 
1825,  that  the  United  States 

^W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  28. 

«J.  B.  Henderson,  Jr.,  Am.  Diplo.  Questions,  pp.  293,  294,  448:  W.  I. 
Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  2,  22,  23,  29,  37,  38:  H.  Bingham,  The 
Monroe  Doctrine,  An  Obsolete  Shibboleth,  Atlantic  Monthly,  June,  1913. 

Lord  Bryce,    The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a  League  of  Nations, — The 
Nation,  Dec.  13,  1917. 

»A.  C.  Coolidge,  The  U.  S.  as  a  World  Power,  p.  101. 

*A.  C.  Coolidge,  The  U.  S.  as  a  World  Power,  p.  107. 

'E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  107. 

«Ford's  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  X.,  277-278. 

74 


"Could  not  consent  to  the  occuption  of  the  islands 
[Cuba  and  Porto  Rico]  by  any  other  European  power  than 
Spain  under  any  circumstances  whatever.  "^ 
This  is  alleged  to  be  the  "first  distinct  officiabstatement  that  it 
is  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the  United  States  and  forbidden 
by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  any  European  colony  in  the  Americas 
to  be  transferred  to  another  European  Power.  "^ 

(b)  President  Polk's  message  of  December  2,  1845,  to 
Congress  in  which  he  said, 

"It  should  be  distinctly  announced  to  the  world  as 
our  settled  policy  that  no  future  European  colony  or  do- 
minion shall  with  our  consent  be  planted  or  established  on 
any  part  of  the  North  American  continent."' 
It  is  contended  that  the  words  "or  dominion"  constitute  an 
extension  of  the  Doctrine  in  that  it  prevents  any  European 
nation  from  securing  territory  by  purchase  or  cession,  in  effect 
prohibiting  any  European  interference  on  the  North  American 
continent.  ■» 

(c)  President  Grant's  special  message  of  May  31,  1870,  in 
which  he  said, 

"I  now  deem  it  proper  to  assert  the  equally  important 

principle  that  hereafter  no  territory  on  this  continent  shall 

be  regarded  as  subject  of  transfer  to  a  European  Power."* 

It  is  alleged    that  this  prohibition  of  Spanish-American  States 

from  transferring  American  territory  to  European  nations  is  an 

enlargement  of  the  Doctrine. 

(d)  President  Cleveland's  special  message  to  Congress  of 
December  17,  1895,  in  which  he  stated  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
"has  its  place  in  the  code  of  international  law."^  It  is  asserted 
that  this  amounts  to  a  claim  of  a  status  which  the  doctrine  has 
never  attained. 

(e)  Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge's  pronouncement  relative 
to  Venezuela  in  1895: 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine  ...  is  merely  the  declaration 
that  no  foreign  power  must  establish  a  new  government, 
acquire  new  territory  by  purchase  or  force  or  by  any 
method  whatever,  or  seek  to  control  existing  Governments 
in  the  Americas."^ 
It  is  asserted  that  this  use  of  the  word  "foreign"  is  an  extension 

Mot.  S  .  Pap.  For.  Rel.,  V.,  855:   Moore's,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI,  Ail. 

^W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  5,  6:  A.  B.  Hart,  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  pp.  90,  91:  J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  pp.  323, 
324. 

'J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  2248- 
2249:  Sen.  Doc.  i-2g  Cong,  i  sess.,  14-15:  Moore's  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI., 
420. 

*W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  9:  H.  Bingham,  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  An  Obsolete  Shibboleth. 

^J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  4015. 

Hbid,  pp.  6088-6090. 

''Cong.  Rec.  54th,  Cong,  ist  Sess.;  413-420. 

75 


\ 


to  all  foreign  powers,  Asiatic  as  well  as  European;    that  the 

words  "by  any  method  whatever"  is  a  distinct  departure  from 

the  message  of  Monroe. 

(f)  The  Senate  Resolution,  offered  by  Senator  Lodge,  in 

1912,  relative  to  Magdalena  Bay. 

"Resolved,  that  whenever  any  harbor  or  other  place 
in  the  American  continents  is  so  situated  that  the  occupa- 
tion thereof  for  naval  or  military  purposes  might  threaten 
the  communications  or  safety  of  the  United  States,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  could  not  see  without 
grave  concern  the  possession  of  such  harbor  or  other  place 
by  any  corporation  or  association  which  has  such  a  relation 
to  another  government,  not  American,  as  to  give  that 
Government  practical  power,  or  control  for  naval  or  military 
purposes,  "i 

It  is  contended  that  this  is  an  enlargement  in  that  it  applies  not 
only  to  Asiatic  powers,  but  also  to  the  acquisition  of  territory 
by  agencies  other  than  national  governments. ^ 

In  spite  of  these  contentions  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been  changed.  As  has  been  stated, 
the  purpose  of  the  message  was  to  declare  a  general  principle 
parallel  with  that  of  Washington's  of  non-intervention  in  Euro- 
pean affairs.  The  underlying  principle  was  to  prevent  any 
foreign  political  influence  of  any  kind  from  getting  such  a  foot- 
hold on  the  American  continents  that  it  might  be  dangerous 
to  the  peace  and  safety  of  the  United  States.  One  reasonable 
way  to  determine  whether  the  doctrine  has  been  changed  in  its 
application  to  any  given  circumstances  is  to  consider  how 
Monroe  and  John  Quincy  Adams  would  have  viewed  those 
same  circumstances.  To  hold  that  President  Monroe  and 
Secretary  Adams  intended  to  exclude  future  colonization  by  a 
non-American  nation  solely  because  it  might  endanger  this 
country,  and  at  the  same  time  to  assert  that  he  did  not  intend 
to  cover  the  purchase  of  territory  by  such  a  nation,  or  by  a 
fictitious  person  created  by  such  a  nation,  is  to  strain  at  the 
gnat  and  to  swallow  the  camel.  In  fact  John  Quincy  Adams, 
referring  to  Polk's  message  already  quoted,  said  that  he 
"approved    entirely. "» 

The  Statement  of  Jefferson  quoted  above  shows  most  clearly 
that  it  was  intended  to  apply  the  principle  to  all  non-American 
interposition  in  American  political  affairs,  direct  or  indirect, 
and  under  any  form  or  pretext  such  interposition  might  take. 

The  doctrine  is  strictly  limited  as  to  its  scope.'*     It  applies 

^Congressional  Rec.  62d.  Cong.,  2  sess.,  Vol.  48,  Pt.  10,  p.  9923.  See 
also  pp.  5661-5663. 

'^W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  10,  11. 

3J.  Q.  Adams,  Memoirs,  XII.,  218. 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  in  Int.  Subjects,  p.  117. 

76 


to  the  occupation  or  use  of  territory  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
to  the  overthrow  or  exclusion  of  an  American  Government,  or 
to  the  danger  of  the  United  States.  Hence,  the  principle  an- 
nounced by  Monroe  as  a  measure  of  self-protection  necessarily 
and  by  fair  implication  included  within  its  general  terms  all 
measures  looking  to  the  prevention  of  all  extension  of  the  poli- 
tical system  of  any  non-American  nation,  and  of  all  acquisition 
or  occupation  of  territory  by  any  such  nation,  if  it  endangered 
the  peace  or  safety  of  the  United  States.  It,  therefore,  included 
those  manifestations  appearing  in  the  later  application  of  the 
doctrine  referred  to  which  are  improperly  called  enlargements 
of  the  doctrine  or  extensions  of  its  meaning. 

C.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  a  Guaranty  of  Protection  to 
Spanish  America. 
It  has  been  urged  frequently  and  particularly  by  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Spanish-American  nations  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine extended  such  a  guaranty  of  protection  to  those  nations, 
that  almost  upon  the  mere  request  of  a  South  American  nation 
the  United  States  ought  to  go  to  war  if  necesary  to  prevent 
any  foreign  nation,  American  as  well  as  European,  from  inter- 
fering in  any  way  with  such  Spanish- American  nations. ^ 

At  the  time  of  the  original  proclamation,  there  was  un- 
doubtedly a  great  element  of  sympathy  for  the  South  American 
nations,  but  it  is  not  that  sympathy  which  was  the  basis  of  the 
doctrine.  It  is  solely  the  safety  of  the  United  States  which 
constituted  such  basis.  The  doctrine  offers,  and  was  intended 
to  offer,  no  such  guaranty.  It  is  an  individual  policy  of  the 
United  States  designed  and  intended  solely  for  its  own  protec- 
tion.    Except  as  stated, 

"It  has  not  otherwise  any  relation  to  the  affairs  of 
either  American  or  European  States.  In  good  conduct  or 
bad,  observance  of  rights  or  violations  of  them,  agreement 
or  controversy,  injury  or  reprisal,  coercion  or  war,  the 
United  States  finds  no  warrant  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for 
interference.  "2 

The  Panama  Congress,  called  in  1826,  undoubtedly  failed 
because  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  of  distinct  opposi- 
tion to  giving  any  such  pledge  to  the  Spanish-American  nations.^ 
Secretary  of  State  Hay  said  with  reference  to  Venezuela, 
and  it  applies  to  all  similar  cases,  that  the  United  States,  while 
it 

"regretted  that  European  Powers  should  use  force  against 
Central  and  South  American  Countries,  could  not  object 
to  their  taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for  injuries  suffered 

^J.  H.  Latane,  The  U.  S.  and  Latin  America,  pp.  326-327. 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  117. 

Mm.  St.  Pap.  For.  Rel.,  V.,  834-905:    Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI., 


416. 


77 


by  their  subjects,  provided  that  no  acquisition  of  territory 
was  contemplated."^ 

President  Roosevelt,  speaking  of  this  matter  in  his  annual 
message  of  December  3,  1901,  said: 

"We  do  not  guarantee  any  state  against  punishment 
if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punishment  does  not 
take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  any  non- 
American  power.  "2 

Secretary  of  State  Olney  in  his  dispatch  of  July  20,  1895, 
to  Bayard,  set  forth  most  clearly  the  negative  phases  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  as  follows : 

"It  does  not  establish  any  general  protectorate  by 
the  United  States  over  other  American  states.  It  does  not 
relieve  any  American  state  from  its  obligations  as  fixed 
by  international  law,  nor  prevent  any  European  Power 
directly  interested  from  enforcing  such  obligation  or  from 
inflicting  merited  punishment  for  the  breach  of  them.  It 
does  not  contemplate  any  interference  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  any  American  State  or  in  the  relations  between 
it  and  other  American  States.  It  does  not  justify  any 
attempt  on  our  part  to  change  the  established  form  of  gov- 
ernment of  any  American  State  or  to  prevent  the  people  of 
such  State  from  altering  that  form  according  to  their  own 
will  and  pleasure.  "^ 

Henry  Clay  in  discussing  this  phase  of  the  question  said, 

"The  declaration  must  be  regarded  as  having  been 
voluntarily  made,  and  not  as  conveying  any  pledge  or 
obligation,  the  performance  of  which  foreign  nations  have 
a  right^to  demand."^ 

D.  The  Inconsistent  Application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
In  connection  with  the  assertion  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  been  changed,  the  charge  is  also  made  that  the  United  States 
has  not  always  applied  or  enforced  the  doctrine,  but  has  on  some 
occasions  ignored  circumstances  of  a  nature  appropriate  forresort 
to  it.  From  this  it  is  argued  that  the  doctrine  cannot  be  a  fixed 
or  permanent  political  policy  of  the  United  States.  The  follow- 
ing examples  are  cited  in  support  of  such  argument. 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Ink  Sub.,  p.  112. 

*J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  6662- 
6663:  Moore,  Dig.  of  Int.  Law,  VI.,  595",  596. 

^Olney  to  Bayard,  July  20,  1895:  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  31,  54th  Cong.  ist. 
sess.  4. 

*Clay  to  Forbes,  U.  S.  Minister  to  Buenos  Ayres,  Jan.  3,  1828,  XII. 
MS.  Inst.  U.S.  Min.  49. 

78 


(a)  Great  Britain  and  the  Falkland  Islands. 

In  1824,  Buenos  Ayres  seized  the  Falkland  Islands,  off 
the  coast  of  Patagonia,  declaring  them  to  be  part  of  that  republic. 
Great  Britain  then  occupied  the  Islands,  declaring  that  they  had 
been  British  possessions  for  some  sixty  years.  In  spite  of  the 
contention  of  Buenos  Ayres  that  Great  Britain's  act  was  a 
violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  recognized 
British  sovereignty  over  the  Islands. 

(b)  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Germany  and  Venezuela  (1902). 
In  July,  1902,  Great  Britain  and  Germany  brought  claims 

against  Venezuela,  and  upon  her  refusing  to  recognize  then,  or 
to  agree  upon  a  common  tribunal  to  pass  on  them,  these  European 
Powers  proclaimed  and  carried  out  a  pacific  blockade  "in  re- 
prisal," seizing  and  sinking  some  Venezuelan  gunboats.  Ven- 
ezuela finally  agreed  to  the  validity  of  the  claims  and  offered 
to  arbitrate  the  amounts.  Great  Britain  and  Italy,  who  had 
joined  in  the  enterprise,  were  satisfied  and  discontinued  the 
reprisal  program,  Germany  refusing  so  to  do.  Until  President 
Roosevelt  brought  pressure  to  bear  against  Germany,  as  here- 
tofore related,  the  United  States  took  no  action  relative  to  the 
situation  so  far  as  the  Allied  Powers  were  concerned. 

As  has  been  stated,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  in  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  and  of  no  other  nation.  It  is,  therefore, 
within  the  discretion  of  the  United  States  to  say  when  any  given 
situation  constitutes  a  menace  to  their  peace  and  safety.  It  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  every  instance  of  pressure  brought 
to  bear  on  a  Spanish-American  nation  by  a  foreign  power  does 
not  constitute  such  a  menace.  Hence  the  United  States  are  not 
required  to  apply  the  doctrine  on  every  occasion,  but  may 
refrain  from  doing  so  if  the  occasion  is  not  considered  a  real 
menace. 

In  the  Falkland  Islands  episode,  the  United  States  recog- 
nized a  title  of  Great  Britain,  acquired  many  years  before.  It 
was,  therefore,  not  a  question  of  a  new  venture  by  Great 
Britain,  and  as  was  said  later  by  Secretary  Bayard, 

"It  is  not  seen  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  .  .  .  has  any 

application  to  the  case.''^ 

With  reference  to  the  Venezuelan  incident  President 
Roosevelt  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  intended 
to  prevent  European  nations  from  collecting  their  just  claims, 
but  applied  only  to  permanent  acquisitions.  Inasmuch  as 
Germany  and  Great  Britain  denied  any  such  intention  and  the 
latter  nation's  actions  supported  that  denial,  there  was  no  need 
of  invoking  the  principle.  However,  when  Germany's  attitude 
later  showed  that  her  intentions  were  in  aU  probability  other 

iBayard  to  Quesada,  March  18,  1886— lf5.  Notes  to  Arg.  Rep.,  VI., 
256. 

79 


than  she  had  stated,  Roosevelt  immediately  brought  pressure  to 
bear  on  Germany  and  that  nation  discontinued  its  objectionable 
activities.  Just  as  the  Doctrine  asserts  no  right  of  the  United 
States  to  control  the  sovereignty  of  other  American  nations,  so 
it  asserts  no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  hold 
the  South  and  Central  American  nations  harmless  against 
foreign  powers,  and  asserts  no  obligation  to  such  foreign  powers 
to  police  any  South  American  or  Central  American  nation. ^ 

E.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Territorial  Expansion 
OF  the  United  States. 

It  is  frequently  stated  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  in 
some  way  been  violated  or  extended  beyond  its  intent  by  the 
expansion  of  the  territorial  limits  of  the  United  States  into  the 
Caribbean  Sea,  into  Central  America  and  into  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  It  is  argued  that  the  possession  of  Porto  Rico,  of  the 
Panama  Canal  Zone,  of  the  Virgin  Islands  and  of  the  Philippines 
controvert  the  Doctrine. ^ 

It  is  argued  that  "the  principles  of  its  [Monroe  Doctrine] 
growth  will  be  found  to  be  only  two  .  .  .  the  integrity  of  national 
territory,  and  .  .  .  the  preservation  of  popular  government;"' 
that  while  the  United  States  has  insisted  many  times  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  prohibited  acquisition  of  American  territory 
by  non-American  nations,  it  has  nevertheless  refused  to  permit 
the  rule  "to  work  both  ways,  and  forbid  the  further  acquisition 
of  American  lands  by  the  United  States. "^  It  is  asserted  that 
this  is  a  one-sided  interpretation  of  this  feature  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,^  which  "enables  us  to  annex  American  lands  at  our 
pleasure, "6  and  which  has  been  "utilized  not  only  to  extend 
the  boundary  of  the  United  States  southward  and  eastward  to 
include  parts  of  Mexico  and  Columbia  and  a  West  India  Island, 
but  to  bring  some  islands  of  the  Pacific  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes  as  well."'  All  this,  it  is  said,  is,  in  effect,  a  violation  of 
territorial  integrity  by  the  United  States. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  no  relation 
whatever  to  any  governmental  action  outside  the  Western 
hemisphere  or  to  territorial  expansion  by  the  United  States. 
The  doctrine  was  intended  solely  as  a  defensive  measure,  and  at 
the  very  time  of  its  promulgation  the  United  States  was  engaged 
in  the  process  of  consolidating  its  continental  boundaries. 
Washington  believed  that  the  true  mission  of  the  United  States 
was  continental  in  its  extent.     He,  therefore,  worked  unceas- 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  119. 

'^W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine;  H.  Bingham,  The  Monroe  Doctrine 
an  Obsolete  Shibboleth. 

'W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  4. 
*IbU,  pp.  12,  13. 
Hbid,  pp.  14,  22. 
Hbid,  p.  40. 
Ubid,  pp.  19,  20. 

80 


ingly  to  secure  the  control  of  the  Mississippi,  the  cession  of  the 

western  posts  by  Great  Britain,  and  generally  to  make  the  United 

States  in  fact  independent. ^ 

John  Quincy  Adams,  some  eight  months  before  the  message 

was  announced,  stated: 

"In  looking  forward  to  the  probable  course  of  events 
for  the  short  period  of  half  a  century,  it  is  scarcely  possible 
to  resist  the  conviction  that  the  annexation  of  Cuba  to  our 
Federal  Republic  will  be  indispensable  to  the  continuance 
and  integrity  of  the  Union  itself.  It  is  obvious,  however, 
that  for  this  event  we  are  not  yet  prepared.  "^ 

Jefferson,  in  his  letter  to.  Monroe  relative  to  the  proposed 
message,  said: 

"I  candidly  confess  that  I  have  ever  looked  on  Cuba 
as  the  most  interesting  addition  which  could  ever  be  made 
to  our  system  of  states."' 

When  Mr.  Monroe  was  sent  to  France  as  envoy  in  1794, 
his  very  specific  instructions  contained  the  following: 

"Among  the  great  events  with  which  the  world  is  now 
teeming,  there  may  be  an  opening  for  France  to  become 
instrumental  in  securing  to  us  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi.  Spain  may,  perhaps,  negotiate  a  peace,  sepa- 
rate from  Great  Britain,  with  France.  If  she  does,  the 
Mississippi  may  be  acquired  through  this  channel,  especi- 
ally if  you  contrive  to  have  our  mediation  in  any  manner 
solicited."* 

Later,  Monroe  was  sent  to  France  by  Jefferson  to  negotiate 
with  Livingston  the  purchase  of  Louisiana,  in  which  transac- 
tion, as  events  have  proved,  he  was  eminently  successful.^ 
In  1804,  as  Envoy  to  Spain,  Monroe  endeavored  to  secure  the 
cession  of  all  Spain's  possessions  cast  of  the  Mississippi,  but 
failed. « 

During  the  administration  of  his  predecessor.  West 
Florida  had  been  occupied  by  the  United  States,  and  in  pur- 
suance of  a  Presidential  message.  Congress  expressed  its  opposi- 
tion to  any  Spanish  transfer  of  that  territory  to  any  other 
nation,^  and  during  Monroe's  first  administration  in  1819,  the 
cession  of  Florida  by  Spain  was  finally  negotiated.* 

iH.  C.  Lodge,  George  Washington,  II.,  133,  162-164,  21.5. 

2J.  Q.  Adams  to  Nelson,  April 28, 182^;  House  Ex,  Doc,  121,  32nd  Cong. 
I  sess.,  6:  Br.  &  For.  S  .  Papers  XLIV.,  138:  Moore,  Digest  of  Int.  Law, 
I.,  583. 

'JefEerson  to  Monroe,  Oct.  24,  1823,  Ford's,  Writings  of  Thomas 
Jefferson,  X.,  277,  278. 

*D.  C.  Oilman,  James  Monroe,  p.  48. 

^Ibid,  pp.  78-95. 

^D.  C.  Oilman,  James  Monroe,  pp.  98-99. 

''American  State  Papers,  For.  Rel.,  III.,  571. 

*D.  C.  Oilman,  James  Monroe,  p.  146. 

81 


President  Polk  in  his  annual  message  of  December  2,  1845, 
with  reference  to  this  point  and  the  bearing  of  the  Monroe 
doctrine  upon  it,  stated  that, 

"...  We  must  ever  maintain  the  principle  that  the 
people  of  this  continent  alone  have  the  right  to  decide  their 
own  destiny.  Should  any  portion  of  them,  constituting  an 
independent  state,  propose  to  unite  themselves  with  our 
Confederacy,  this  will  be  a  question  for  them  and  us  to 
determine  without  any  foreign  interposition.  We  can 
never  consent  that  European  powers  shall  interfere  to 
prevent  such  a  union  because  it  might  disturb  the  'balance 
of  power'  which  they  may  desire  to  maintain  upon  this 
continent.  "1 

In  view  of  the  statements  from  the  persons  who  had  so 
much  to  do  with  the  enunciation  of  the  Doctrine,  it  is  absurd 
to  say  that  the  doctrine  was  bilateral;  that  it  forbade  non- 
American  nations  to  acquire  territory  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
and  at  the  same  time  forbade  the  United  States  from  extending 
their  borders  in  any  way. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  however,  does  not  in  any  way 
justify,  nor  was  it  intended  to  justify,  intervention  in  the  in- 
ternal affairs  of  any  of  the  nations  of  Central  or  of  South 
America.  This  is  made  very  clear  by  the  attitude  of  John 
Quincy  Adams  with  reference  to  the  recognition  of  Brazil  in 
1824.  If  the  doctrine,  with  the  formulation  of  which  Adams 
had  so  much  to  do  in  December  1823,  was  intended  to  provide 
for,  or  to  justify  such  interference,  it  is  certain  that  in  May, 
1824,  that  same  doctrine  wotdd  have  been  made  use  of  to  justify 
a  refusal  to  recognize  the  independence  of  Brazil,  a  monarchy 
amid  republics.  Brazil  through  a  revolution  established  its  inde- 
pendence but  set  up  a  monarchy  rather  than  a  republic.  Con- 
siderable opposition  was  aroused  in  the  United  States  to  the 
recognition  of  that  form  of  government  in  America.  Adams, 
however,  argued  that  such  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
Brazil  was  contrary  to  American  policy, "  and  Brazil  was 
accordingly  recognized  on  May  26,  1824. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  claims  no  right  upon  the  part  of  the 
United  States  in  any  way  to  control  the  sovereign  rights  of  any 
American  nation.  Such  incidents  as  are  offered  in  proof  of  the 
allegation  that  our  government  has  coerced  other  weaker 
American  nations  if  examined  show  clearly  that  any  rights 
asserted  by  the  United  States  against  such  other  nations  were 
those  of  an  equal  and  not  of  a  superior. ^  In  these  assertions  of 
right  which  exist  in  every  sovereign  state,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  in  no  way  concerned. 

^  J.  D.  Richardson  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  2248- 
2249. 

*W.  F.  Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  115-116. 
'E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  116. 

82 


In  instances  such  as  the  Venezuelan  controversy  with  the 
Allied  Powers  in  1902,  the  initial  "intervention"  of  the  United 
States  was  rather  under  the  Hague  Conventipn  right  or  obliga- 
tion of  "rendering  the  offices  of  good  fellowship. "^  The  United 
States  under  this  provision  has  frequently  offered  its  services 
in  the  settlement  of  disputes  between  American  nations. 

As  a  residt  of  this,  and  of  the  misunderstanding  as  to  its 
basis,  it  has  been  asserted  that  the  United  States  has  become  the 
great  American  "schoolmaster"  to  all  the  South  and  Central 
American  nations.  This  feeling  is  rather  prevalent  in  South 
America  where  those  who  feel  that  way,  either  fail  or  refuse  to 
distinguish  between  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  course  of 
action  by  the  United  States  of  which  they  complain.  It  matters 
not  whether  the  cry  of  "Yankee  Imperialism"  by  South  Am- 
ericans, is  or  is  not  justified,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  in  no  way 
involved. 

This  feeling  of  resentment  is,  however,  directed  against  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  being  "patronizing"  or  "menacing."^ 
It  has  undoubtedly  been  fostered  by  the  Canning  myth,^  which 
has  been  carefidly  nourished  in  South  America  to  the  effect 
that  it  was  Canning  who  prevented  Spain  from  subduing  her 
American  colonies,  and  hence  that  it  was  Great  Britain,  and  not 
the  United  States,  that  brought  about  the  independence  of  the 
Spanish-American  nations,  when,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Great 
Britain  did  not  recognize  any  of  these  nations  until  two  years 
after  the  United  States  had  done  so. 

It  is  interesting  to  note  that  while  this  cry  of  "School 
Master"  is  raised,  at  the  same  time  the  cry  is  heard  from  non- 
American  nations  that  aU  the  bandit  chiefs  of  South  and  Central 
America  conduct  their  marauding  expeditions  as  they  will, 
and  when  threatened  with  punishment,  answer  with  the  counter 
threat  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  will  overwhelm  such  threaten- 
ing nation  if  it  does  not  let  the  marauder  conduct  his  business 
without  interference.*  In  one  breath  it  is  said  that  the  United 
States  is  too  much  interested  to  suit  South  America  and  in  the 
next,  that  South  America  is  too  much  interested  in  the  protec- 
tion of  the  United  States.  Both  claims,  however,  have  this 
common  basis,  viz.,  that  those  who  make  them  want  to  see  the 
power  of  the  United  States  to  protect  itself  greatly  diminished. 

President  Roosevelt's  message  of  December  6,  1904,  is 
frequently  quoted  as  a  justification  for  this  South  American 
fear  of  this  country,  but  in  that  message  the  President  merely 
stated  that, 

"Chronic  wrongdoing,  or  an  impotence  which  results 

in  a  general  loosening  of  the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may 

'E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  119. 

"George  H.  Blakeslee,  A  New  Basis  Needed  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
1913,  North  Am.  Rev.,  CXCVIII.,  779-789. 

*C.  H.  Sherrill,  Modernizing  he  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  87. 

*Is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  a  Bar  to  Civilization?  by  "An  American 
Business  Man,"  1903,  North  Am.  Rev.,    CLXXVI.,  525. 

83 


in  America,  as  elsewhere,  ultimately  require  intervention, 
by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
may  force  the  United  States,  however  reluctantly,  in  fla- 
grant cases  of  such  wrongdoing  or  impotence,  to  the  exercise 
of  an  international  police  power.  .-  .  . 

"We  would  interfere  with  them  only  in  the  last  resort, 
and  then  only  if  it  became  evident  that  their  inability  or  un- 
willingness to  do  justice  at  home  and  abroad  had  violated 
the  rights  of  the  United  States  or  had  invited  foreign  ag- 
gression to  the  detriment  of  the  entire  body  of  American 
nations.! 

This  is  thoroughly  sound  in  principle  and  independently  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  stated  in  the  first  chapter,  rests  upon 
the  right  of  self -protection,  and  is,  in  no  sense,  a  threat  to  South 
or  Central  America.  President  Roosevelt  made  this  amply  clear 
in  his  message  of  December  5,  1905,  in  which  he  said, 

"There  are  certain  essential  points  which  must  never 
be  forgotten  as  regards  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  the  first 
place  we  must  as  a  nation  make  it  evident  that  we  do  not 
intend  to  treat  it  in  any  shape  or  way  as  an  excuse  for 
aggrandizement  on  our  part  at  the  expense  of  the  republics 
to  the  South.  We  must  recognize  the  fact  that  in  some 
South  American  countries  there  has  been  much  suspicion 
lest  we  should  interpret  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  in  some 
way  inimical  to  their  interests,  and  we  must  try  to  convince 
all  the  other  nations  of  this  continent  once  and  for  all  that 
no  just  and  orderly  government  has  anything  to  fear  from 
us.  .  .  ."2 

!J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  7051- 
7054. 

^Ibid,  p.  7357. 


84 


CHAPTER  X.— TEE  FUTURE  OF  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

The  future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  effect  must  resolve  it- 
self into  one  of  two  following  policies. 

A.  Its  absolute  abandonment. 

B.  Its  continued  assertion  and  maintenance,  by  the 
United  States  acting  alone. 

The  query  naturally  presents  itself  as  to  what  is  to  be  the 

future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Some  authors  say  that  the 

doctrine  which  was 

"the  sine  qua  non  of  American  public  policy  in  the  nine- 
teenth century,  is  fast  taking  the  aspect,  in  this  twentieth 
century  of  the  bete  noire  or  the  Frankenstein  of  the  Republic 
which  called  it  into  existence,  "i 
According  to  some  writers,  the  future  holds  approximately 

eight  possible  "solutions"   of  the   "problem"   raised  by  the 

"present  status"  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.^ 

These  solutions  may  be  classified  as  follows : 

1 .  Reduction  of  its  interpretation  to  the  literal  phraseology 

of  President  Monroe. 

2.  Its  support  by  a  concert  of  powers. 

3.  Its  support  by  an  "A. B.C."  alliance. 

4.  Its  support  by  the  Pan-American  nations. 

5.  Its  international  recognition. 

6.  Its  submission  to  the  "Supra  National"  jursidiction  of 

(a)  The  Hague  Court  of  Arbitration  or  of  Arbitral 

Justice. 

(b)  The  League  of  Nations. 

7.  Its  absolute  relinquishment. 

8.  Its  continued  assertion  and  maintenance  by  the  United 

States  alone. 
The  first  "solution"  is  based  on  the  assimiption  that  the 
doctrine  has  been  enlarged  and  no  longer  represents  the  principles 
announced  by  President  Monroe.  It  is  suggested  that  its 
interpretation  be  restricted  to  the  prevention,  (a)  of  conquest 
or  colonization  by  European  Powers,  and  (b)  of  restoration  of 
monarchy  in  Central  or  in  South  America.  As  has  been  stated, 
the  doctrine  has  never  been  changed  or  expanded  to  include 
any  principles  other  than  those  contained  in  Monroe's  message. 
Conditions  and  circumstances  may  have  changed,  and  the 
manner  of  applying  the  principles  enunciated  may  have  changed 
with  them,  but  the  fundamental  principle  of  preventing  foreign 
nations  from  influencing  the  future  of  the  various  nations  of  the 
American  continents  to  the  danger  of  the  peace  and  safety  of 
the  United  States  has  ever  been  the  same.  The  very  dangers 
which  the  Holy  Alliance  held  for  the  United  States  still  threaten 

'W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  1. 

2W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  42-124. 

85 


it,  whatever  forms  they  may  asimie.  Colonization  and  Absolut- 
ism assume  very  many  forms.  "Peaceful  penetration"  in  all 
its  subtle  phases  is  more  menacing  than  avowed  colonization  by 
reason  of  its  very  indirectness.  "Claims,  financial  and  other- 
wise, of  European  Powers  against  weaker  nations  of  this  hemi- 
sphere present  a  problem  no  less  pressing  and  no  less  dangerous" 
than  the  problems  of  1823. ^ 

Imperialism,  however  described,  whether  in  the  euphonious 
terminology  of  "Commonwealth"  or  "Empire"  is  just  as  dan- 
gerous to  republicanism  today  as  it  was  in  1823,  when  it  was 
labelled  "Legitimacy,"  and  "Holy  Alliance."  "Eternal  Vigi- 
lance is  the  price  of  Liberty."  The  advocates  of  "compression" 
base  their  argument  upon  false  premises,  and  their  conclusions 
are  necessarily  unsound. 

The  second,  third,  =  and  fourth'  "solutions"  are  predicated 
upon  alliances  with  foreign  nations,  which  alliances,  if  the 
doctrine  is  to  be  permanent,  must  necessarily  be  permanent 
also.  Such  alliances  would  be  absolutely  contrary  to  the  funda- 
mental principle  of  American  foreign  policy  armoiinced  by 
Washington  and  adhered  to  ever  since,  viz.,  that  of  avoiding 
permanent  alliances  with  foreign  nations.  This  has  become  so 
firmly  planted  in  the  national  character  that  even  to  suggest 
abandoning  it  is  almost  equivalent  to  suggesting  national 
suicide.^  The  results  of  the  national  election  of  1920  are^a 
sufficient  indication  of  the  way  in  which  the  country  at  large 
regards  such  alliances  with  foreign  powers,  whether  actual  or 
apparent,  and  whether  temporary  or  permanent. 

The  fifth  "solution"  rests  upon  the  suggestion  that  inas- 
much as  certain  powers  are  supposed  to  threaten  the  United 
States,  a  treaty  should  be  made  with  them,  under  which,  and 
in  consideration  of  the  United  States  giving  ''suitable  quid  pro 
quo — such  as  the  Philippines,  or  tariff  concession,"  such  powers 
would  agree  to  recognize  the  binding  force  of  the  doctrine.  ^ 
Nothing,  however,  would  be  gained  by  such  a  step  because  if  at 
any  time  any  of  such  powers  beHeved  it  to  be  for  its  interest  to 
avoid  the  doctrine,  and  believed  itself  powerful  enough,  no  such 
agreement  would  protect  the  United  States.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  they  were  not  powerfid  enough  to  make  such  an  at- 
tempt, lack  of  power  and  not  the  treaty  would  be  the  deterrent. 
The  United  States  then,  apart  from  the  imdignified  bargaining 
to  maintain  a  self-protective  measure,  has  more  to  gain  by 

^R.  D.  Armstrong,  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Modified  or  Aban- 
doned? 10  Am.  Journal  of  Int.  Law,  p.  77. 

*G.  H.  Blakeslee,  A  New  Basis  Needed  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  1913 
No.  Am.  Rev.,  CXCVIII,  779-789.  Is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  a  Bar  to 

Civilization?  by  "An  American  Business  Man,"  1903  No  Am.  Rev.  CLXXVI. 

'R.  D.  Armstrong,  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Modified  or  Aban- 
doned? 10  ^w.  Journ.  Int.  Law. 

*C  H.  Sherrill,  Modernizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  105,  112,  113, 
121,  133. 

'W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine. 

86 


maintaining  its  traditional  policy  of  no  permanent  alliances, 
and  looking  to  its  own  resources  for  its  preservation. 

The  sixth  "solution"  goes  further  than  the  others,  suggest- 
ing in  euphonious  terms  that  the  "United  States  take  another 
grand  and  noble  stride  along  the  path  of  the  new  internation- 
alism, and  place  its  Pan-American  problem  ...  in  the  hands  of 
the  entire  family  of  nations  represented  by  the  Permanent 
Court  of  Arbitration  at  the  Hague,  "i  or  place  it  in  the  hands 
of  the  League  of  Nations. ^  In  other  words  it  is  suggested 
that  the  United  States  submit  to  the  determination  of  other 
agencies  than  itself  the  absolute  control  of  the  doctrine,  and 
that  the  doctrine  cease  to  be  solely  American  and  that  it  have 
a  world  basis. ^ 

Such  a  step  would  amount  to  an  admission  that  the  self- 
preservation  and  self-protection  of  the  United  States,  so  far  as 
it  rested  upon  the  future  affairs  of  the  American  Continents, 
were  no  longer  to  be  a  matter  solely  for  the  United  States  to 
pass  upon,  and  so  far  it  would  be  a  waiver  of  the  right  of  self 
protection.  The  fundamental  right  to  national  self-preserva- 
tion, recognized  in  toto  as  to  all  other  nations  would  be  denied, 
or  at  least  considerably  restricted  as  to  the  United  States. 

When  the  Hague  Conventions  of  1899  and  1907  were  held, 
and  the  peace  conventions  were  under  discussion,  the  United 
States  specifically  reserved  the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  the 
operation  of  these  conventions.*  The  question  of  submitting 
the  administration  of  the  Monroe  doctrine  to  the  Hague, 
therefore,  has  been  considered  already.  On  both  occasions  it 
was  determineed  that  the  interests  of  the  United  States  pro- 
hibited any  such  submission. 

The  reasons  for  such  refusal  are  even  stronger  to-day  than 
then,  particularly  in  view  of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
toward  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant.  There  was  room  for 
argument  that  the  provision  of  that  Covenant  reserved  to  the 
United  States  the  jurisdiction  over  the  doctrine,  but  the  United 
States  Senate  insisted  upon  a  more  specific  reserv^ation,  and  the 
people  of  the  country,  not  satisfied  with  the  Covenant  even 
with  that  reservation  and  others,  by  ballot  in  the  national 
election  of  1920,  refused  to  become  a  party  to  that  Covenant. 

All  suggestions  of  securing  international  support,  or  inter- 
national recognition  for  the  doctrine  are  beside  the  point. 
Whatever  effect  such  action  might  give  has  already  been 
secured  to  this  country.  When  the  powers  represented  at  the 
second  Hague  Conference  recognized  our  reservation  as  to  the 

^W.  I.  Hull,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  43,  44. 

^World  Peace  Foundation,  A  League  of  Nations,  I.  No.  5,  pp.  253-265. 

^C.  H.  Levermore,  Wot  Id  Court,  Sept.  1917. 

^Roll's,  Peace  Conference  at  The  Hague,  pp.  477,  531;  W.  M.  Malloy, 
Treaties,  Conventions,  etc.  of  the  U.  S.   1776-190Q   II.   2032:   A.  B.  Hart 
ThetMonroe  Doctrine,  pp.  213,  214:    Moore,  Princ.  of  Am.  Diplomacy 
P.L261. 

87 


Monroe  Doctrine,  i  they  in  effect  recognized  our  right  to  make 
such  a  reservation,  and  in  reaHty  to  assert  the  doctrine  against 
the  world.  If  that  Hague  recognition  will  not  control  such  for- 
eign nations,  no  other  written  memorandum  will  have  greater 
weight. 

As  the  doctrine  is  based  upon  the  right  of  self-protection, 
it  cannot  possibly  be  changed  to  a  joint  declaration  with  any 
other  states  American,  European,  or  Asiatic.  Similar  declara- 
tions by  such  powers  might  be  made,  based  upon  a  similar  right 
of  self-protection  inherent  in  such  other  states.  Anything 
other  than  this  would  necessarily  be  an  alliance  and  entirely 
hostile  to  American  traditions. ^ 

Lord  Bryce  argues  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
"was  originally  delivered  as  announcing  a  restriction  or 
limitation  which  America  proposed  to  place  on  her  own 
action.  She  would  not  interfere  in  the  wars  and  alliances 
of  the  Old  World  and  she  expected  that  in  return  the  states 
of  the  Old  World  would  not  interfere  with  the  affairs  of  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  .  .  . 

"Monroe's  policy,  which  was  also  Washington's,  of 
holding  aloof  from  European  complications  was  long  main- 
tained, and  wisely  maintained,  by  America,  but  the  current 
of  events  has  been  too  strong  to  make  it  possible  to  stand 
apart  any  longer.  The  whole  world  has  now  become  one, 
and  must  remain  one  for  the  purposes  of  politics.  No 
great  nation  can  stand  out. 

"Thus  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  old  form  may  seem 
to  have  disappeared;  for  the  counterpart  to  the  exclusion 
of  the  European  Powers  from  interfering  with  the  freedom 
of  American  states  was  the  abstention  of  America  from 
interference  in  European  affairs. "^ 

Lord  Bryce,  in  effect,  contends  that  the  United  States  by 
participating  in  the  World  War  sacrificed  whatever  right  this 
country  may  have  had  to  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He 
argues  speciously  that  we  practically  agreed  not  to  interfere  in 
European  affairs  if  Europe  would  not  interfere  in  American 
affairs,  and  that  inasmuch  as  we  did  intervene  in  European 
affairs  by  participation  in  the  World  War,  the  agreement  was 
terminated. 

The  premises  of  this  argument  are  wholly  unsoimd.  There 
is  nothing  historically  to  justify  the  conclusion  that  President 
Monroe  was|laying  a  restriction  upon  this  country.  All  the 
facts  point  to  the  opposite  conclusion,  that  the  United  States 
asserted  the  principle  as  a  matter  of  self -protection  and  in  spite 

^E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  109. 

*E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  120. 

^The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a  League  of  Nations, — The  Nation,  Dec.  13, 
1917. 

88 


of  the  opposition  of  foreign  nations  thereto.     Lord  Bryce's 
conclusion,  therefore,  is  wholly  unwarranted. 

The[seventh  "solution"  is  more  courageous  than  the  others 
in  that  it  argues  that  the  doctrine  has  been  outgrown,  has  no 
application  whatever  at  the  present  time,  is  not  worth  while, 
"is  an  ignis  fatuus,"^  devotion  to  which  is  "mere  slavery  to 
rhetoric  and  sentiment"-,  and  that  it  should  be  abandoned  as 
an  "obsolete  shibboleth."*  It  is  in  reality  the  only  alternative 
to  the  eighth  "solution,"  that  of  the  United  States  maintaining 
the  doctrine  singly. 

The  problem  of  national  self-protection  has  not  materially 
changed  from  the  time  of  Monroe's  mesage  to  the  present.  To 
abandon  the  doctrine  now  would  be  to  leave  South  and  Central 
America  open  to  the  territorial  ambitions  of  the  European  and 
Asiatic  powers.  The  treaty  of  Versailles,  following  the  World 
War,  made  it  clear^that  the  great  world  powers  are  as  greedy 
for  territory  now  as  they  ever  were.*  "The  spirit  of  colonial 
expansion  still  exists, "^  and  the  abandonment  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  woiild  really  be  an  open  invitation  to  such  Powers  to 
secure,'^  or  to  J  increase  their  foothold  in  the  Americas.  The 
controlof  the^Caribbean  Sea,  and  of  the  Panama  Canal  would 
follow.  %The  very  dangers  which  threatened  in  1823,  and  which 
called  forth  the  enunciation  of  the  Doctrine  would  overwhelm 
the  United  States. « 

The  people  of  this  country, 

"have  yet  in  mind  that  France  seized  upon  the  apparent 
opportunity  of  our  Civil  War  to  set  up  a  monarchy  in 
the  adjoining  state  of  Mexico.  They  realize  that  had 
France  and  Great  Britain  held  important  South  American 
possessions  to  work  from  and  to  benefit,  the  temptation 
to  destroy  the  predominance  of  the  Great  Republic  in  this 
hemisphere  by  furthering  its  dismemberment  might  have 
been  irresistible.  .  .  ."' 

It  has  been  well  said  that, 

"Nothing  but  the  .  .  .  Monroe  Doctrine,  has  .  .  .  pre- 
vented the  acquisition  of  territory  in  South  America  and  in 

iSydney     Brooks,  76  Fortnight  Rev.,  p.,  1021. 

2J.  B.  Henderson,  Jr.,  Am.  Diplo.  Questions,  p.  293. 

'H.  Bingham,  The  Monroe  Doctrine — An  Obsolete  Shibboleth,  Altantic 
Monthly.  June  1913. 

*J.  B.  Angell.  The  Eur opea^t  Concert  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Hamard 
Grad.  Mag.  XIV.  23. 

J.  Bryce,    The  Monroe  Doctrine  and  a  League  of  Nations  in   The 
Nation,  Dec.  13,  1917. 

^R.  D.  Armstrong  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Modified  or  Aban- 
doned? 10.  Am.  Jour.  Int.  Law,  84. 

^Ibid,  77-78. 

^Olney  to  Bayard  July  20,  1895,  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  54th  Cong.,  i  sess.  p.  4. 

89 


the  neighborhood  of  the  Panama  Canal  in  recent  years  by 
certain  nations  of  Eiirope."i 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  "cannot  become  obsolete  while  our 
republic  endures. ""      It  has  become  an  unceasingly  vital  and 
compelling  policy  for  this  country.^ 
The  Monroe  Doctrine, 

"Like  the  independence  of  this  country,  it  is  a  question 
of  fact  and  not  of  law.  The  independence  of  this  country 
is  unquestioned,  because,  having  declared  it,  we  compelled 
the  world  to  recognize  it .  In  the  same  way  we  have  always 
acted  on  the  declaration  of  Mr.  Monroe  as  the  guiding  prin- 
ciple of  our  foreign  policy.  .  .  . 

"We  declare  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  be  a  principle 
which  we  believe  essential  to  the  honor,  the  safety,  the 
interests  of  the  United  States.  We  declare  it  as  a  state- 
ment of  fact,  and  we  must  have  it  recognized,  because  we 
sustain  and  support  it,  and  we  can  no  more  permit  it  to  be 
a  matter  of  discussion  with  other  nations  than  we  can 
afford  to  discuss  withjfthem  our  national  welfare  or  our 
forms  of  government .  It  embodies  for  us  the  same  principle 
as  the  balance  of  power  so  jealously  maintained  by  the 
nations  of  Europe.  They  will  not  allow  that  to  be  dis- 
turbed, and  we  hold  to  our  balance  of  power  with  equal 
tenacity."* 

From  the  time  of  President  Monroe's  announcement  to  the 
present  time,  a  period  of  about  ninety-eight  years,  this  country 
has  been  engaged  in  but  three  foreign  wars,  the  Mexican,  the 
Spanish  and  the  World  War.  During  that  same  period 
Europe  has  beheld  at  least  seventeen  wars,  an  average  of  one 
new  war  for  approximately  every  four  years.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  keeping  European  powers  from  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere has  tended  toward  a  long  continued  peace.  To  abandon 
it  now  wotdd  be  to  welcome  Europe's  almost  chronic  warfare. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  intended  then,  as  a  purely 
defensive  measure,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  securing  the  peace 
and  safety  of  this  coimtry.  It  was  designed  to  prevent  any 
danger  from  non-American  nations  by  reason  of  the  possession 
or  occupation  of  territory  thereafter,  or  the  interference  with 
the  internal  affairs  of  any  American  nation.  It  was  based  upon 
this  country's  right  of  self-preservation.  The  principle  announ- 
ced in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  therefore,  by  fair  implication,  if 

iH.  Holt,  Independent,  LXI,  1119. 
F.  Snow,  Treaties  &  Topics  in  Am.  Diplomacy,  p.  423. 

2Pres.  Cleveland's  Message  of  Dec.  17,  1895,  J.  D.  Richardson, 
Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  pp.  8088-6090. 

*E.  Root,  Addresses  on  Int.  Subjects,  p.  106. 

*H.  C.  Lodge,  Speech  in  Senate,  Dec.  30,  1895,  Cong.  Rec.  54  Cong, 
ist.  Sess.  p.  419-420. 

90 


not  by  words  apply  to  any  occupation'  of  American  territory, 
temporary  or  permanent,  direct  or  indirect,  by  any non- American 
power,  which  the  United  States  beheves  to  endanger  the  peace 
or  safety  of  this  country.  To  permit  the  temporary  occupation 
of  custom  houses,  or  of  ports,  by  non-American  powers,  to  en- 
force payment  of  debts,  or  for  any  other  reason,  as  stated  by 
President  Roosevelt,  is  very  inadvisable,  for  such  temporary 
occupation  might  very  easily  turn  into  a  permanent  occupa- 
tion.! 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  cannot,  then,  be  abandoned,  but 
must  continue  to  hold  its  position  in  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States.  The  avoidance  of  permanent  or  entangling 
alliances  with  foreign  nations  and  the  absolute  prevention  of  any 
direct  or  indirect  interference  upon  the  part  of  non-American 
nations  in  the  political  affairs  of  American  nations  must  still  be 
our  policy.  The  United  States  must  not  only  assert  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  but  also  enforce  it,  eliminating  conditions  which  are 
provocative  of  aggression,  as  well  as  opposing  actual  aggres- 
sion. ^  No  other  policy  has  yet  been  suggested  which  compares 
in  safety  with  that  doctrine  so  ably  worked  out,  and  adopted  by 
the  early  fathers,  whose  wisdom  and  statesmanship,  viewed 
through  the  years,  seem  inspired. 

As  President  Roosevelt  said, 

"Our  people  intend  to  abide  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

and  to  insist  upon  it  as  the  one  sure  means  of  securing  the 

peace  of  the  Western  Hemisphere."' 

It  is  the  one  sure  means  for  the  preservation  of  the  United 
States  and  for  the  preservation  of  liberty  and  republicanism, 
for  as  was  so  eloquently  expressed  by  Washington  in  his  in- 
augural address, 

"...  the  preservation  of  the  sacred  fire  of  liberty  and  the 
destiny  of  the  republican  model  of  government  are  justly 
considered  perhaps  as  deeply,  as  finally,  staked  on  the 
experiment  entrusted  to  the  hands  of  the  American 
people."* 

^Message  of  Feb.  15,  1905.  Confidential  Ex.  V.,  58  Cong.,  3d  Sess.; 
Moore  Dig.  of  Int.  Laiv,  VI,  518-528. 

^R.  D.  Armstrong,  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  Modified  or  Aban- 
doned, p.  97. 

'Roosevelt's  Annual  Message,  Dec.  3,  1901,  J.  D.  Richardson 
Messages  and  Papers  of  the  President,  pp.  6662-6663. 

^Washington's  First  Inaugural.  J.  D.  Richardson,  Messages  and 
Papers  of  the  Presidents,  I.,  p.  53. 


91 


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